

EAPTC 2019, Belgrade, Serbia

## Opening Remarks

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*Check against delivery*

Thank you Mr Chairperson.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by **thanking the Conflux Center for hosting the 2019 EAPTC**, and for inviting the European Union. It is an honour and a privilege for us, and for me, to be here today.

I have **a particular place in my heart for Belgrade**, and for the Balkans, as I spent wonderful summers here some time ago to carry out research. It is a real pleasure to be back.

And what **better reason to be back, then to talk about peacekeeping** at such an important point in time for not only peacekeeping, but for the United Nations and for multilateralism at large.

The **High Representative, Ms Mogherini, at the Hague preparatory meeting for the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial, stressed "that the European Union is and will continue to be the most reliable and the most dedicated partner and supporter of the UN system"**. "In the EU, we believe that **multilateralism is the only way to solve and to address the many and complex problems the world is facing today.**"

**The EU's support to the United Nations, and to multilateralism, is a choice that is made, based on values, but also, based on pragmatism.** In the European Union, there is no doubt that working with, and supporting the United Nations, is the **best way to serve our collective interests of peace, security and global progress.**

**In a complex world like ours, we need to join forces between global and local actors; we need peacekeepers and trainers; we need doctors and engineers as well as diplomats and mediators; we need the military and the civilian side, men and women, to come together. This is the European way to peace and security. It is what we call the 'integrated approach'.**

## **1. EU CSDP missions and operations (and other activities)**

**One of the tools within the EU's integrated approach, is indeed crisis management - Common Security and Defence Policy - CSDP civilian missions and military operations.**

As you all probably know, **crisis management in the EU includes peacekeeping, but also a range of other tasks as set out in the EU Treaty including: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peacemaking or possibly even peace enforcement; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance; and post-conflict stabilisation (etc.).**

Currently, the **EU deploys 16 CSDP missions and operations across three continents** - six military and ten civilian:

**Three executive and three non-executive military operations:**

1. **Three executive military operations** - reporting to the UN Security Council: **Operation Sophia, and Operation Atalanta** - which are both naval operations, one in the Mediterranean and one outside the horn of Africa; **EUFOR Althea i Bosnia-Herzegovina**, which is currently our oldest operation dating back to 2004 when it stood at 7500 troops. Now it fields some 600 troops.
2. **Three non-executive military training operations:** what we call **EUTMs in the Central African Republic, in Mali - Sahel, and in Somalia.**

When it comes to the **ten civilian missions, there is a range of different missions.**

3. One **executive civilian mission in Kosovo** - EULEX
4. One **civilian monitoring mission in Georgia** - EUMMA
5. One **confidence-building measure mission in the Middle East** - EUBAM Rafah
6. **Four capacity-building missions: so called EUCAP's** in Somalia, Mali and Niger, **plus EUPOL COPPS** also in the Middle East
7. **Two advisory missions - EUAM's in Ukraine and in Iraq** - the latter which is our most recently launched one - fully operational in March 2018.

**Since the first mission and operation were launched in 2003, (EU's policing mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), the EU has run 34 operations and missions on three continents. Of these 22 were civilian and 11 were military, and one mixed (Darfur).**

In the **face of increasingly complex challenges** - both within and beyond the European Union, and as part of our **efforts to step up implementation of the EU's Global Strategy**, the **EEAS** has over the course of the last two years, **under the direction of our Member States, been working to strengthen the EU's security and defence**

**structures**, as well as the **EU's civilian and military capacities**.

A central part is **reinforcing partnerships** - partnership with **third countries** in support of CSDP missions and operations and wider partnerships on security and defence issues; and **partnerships with international and regional organizations including the United Nations and the African Union** (etc.).

## **2. EU-UN Partnership**

The **UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management** is one of the **EEAS'** most longstanding and most structured partnerships.

**EU CSDP missions and operations have cooperated closely with UN missions since first deployments in 2003** in the Balkans. **A joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management was issued that same year**, underlining the importance of coordination; **sending a strong signal of complementarity from the very outset of deploying CSDP missions and operations**.

Since then, several joint documents have been issued, **confirming the EU and UN's shared values and commitments**, but also **setting out joint priorities for our cooperation in the field**. **A UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management has been meeting twice a year for over 12 years** now, chaired by the UN USG for peace operations (in increasingly close cooperation with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) and EU DSG for CSDP (and Crisis Response).

However, **most importantly, our cooperation has consistently strengthened in the field**. **All of EU CSDP missions and operations work closely together with the United Nations on the ground** - both the UN Secretariat and UN agencies. And **11 out of the 16 missions and operations, share the same theatre with the United Nations peace operations or special political missions**.

Last year, we **used the opportunity of the 2015-2018 UN-EU priorities on peacekeeping and crisis management coming to an end, to take a step back, and jointly assess our cooperation**. In an **inclusive and widely consultative process**, involving also EU Member States, experts and civil society, we **drew conclusions on what has worked well, and what could work better**, all with a view to defining our next set of joint priorities.

We found that **while some coordination challenges remain**, we agreed that **putting in place light coordination mechanisms help delineate roles and ensure complementarities** - both between ourselves, and vis-a-vis the host state. This in turn **increases the effectiveness and impact** of both of our efforts. However, we agreed that we have to be cautious to think about a model approach. Just because something worked in one place, does not mean it has to work in another. We always have to work within the specific context.

Moreover, we now have an **established practice of cross-fertilisation on assessments and strategic reviews**. Increasingly, **our respective leaders and principals, address each other's constituencies** - USG Lacroix to the PSC in Brussels, and DSG Serrano to the UN Security Council in New York. The **more systematic exchange of information as well as analysis, is increasingly feeding into each others' planning processes and mandate renewals**. The UN-EU Steering Committee that I mentioned earlier has played a key role in this regard.

As a result, we have been able to **bring to the attention of EU Member States key gaps in the field that we have subsequently been able to fill**. Examples include the **deployment of an EU Liaison Planning Cell in support of UNSMIL in Libya**, and the recent **inter-operability pillar adding a policing element to EUTM-RCA in support of MINUSCA**.

Finally, **cooperation on mutual support has also strengthened with more than 15 MoUs and TA between our missions and operations**, whereby for example, **MINUSMA is providing EUTM-Mali and EUCAP-Sahel with transportation** to carry out training in the regions (etc.); and **MINUSCA is providing EUTM-RCA with force protection and emergency services** and the use of UN aircraft and medical support (etc.). We also **share camps in several places**. All on a **reimbursement basis** of course.

### **3. 2019-2021 UN-EU Priorities on Peace Operations and Crisis Management**

**Against this background**, combined with a reflection on the **changing nature of threats and challenges**, as well as **on-going developments within both of our organisations and the global context**, we last year agreed on **UN-EU joint priorities on peace operations and crisis management for the next three years - 2019-2021**.

In addition to reaffirming and to a certain extent **developing our shared political commitments**, we agreed on **eight priority areas**. Three of these priority areas could be considered as **new**.

*[Non-exhaustive list of actions under the priority areas.]*

#### **1. WPS**

- Desk-based mapping of already ongoing cooperation - based on input on the ground, define new strategic areas for reinforced but also new cooperation. In addition, can serve as a tool for outreach and awareness raising
- Hope to this year, launch the Regional Acceleration of Resolution 1325 initiative, which also includes NATO and the African Union, and to some extent the OSCE.
- Also, agreed to mainstream gender and WPS.

## **2. Transitions and stabilisation**

- Planning a joint TTX exercise on transition logistics. Building on earlier work bringing our two organisations closer together through jointly drafting planning modalities for cooperation.

## **3. Conflict prevention and support to political solutions**

- Joint Conflict and Gender Analysis on the Central African Republic, including also the African Union.
- Setting up a practice of regular encrypted VTCs between our respective situation rooms.

**For the remaining five priority areas, if you are familiar with the 2015-2018 priority areas, you can clearly recognise yourself albeit with some language changes and tweaks.**

## **4. Cooperation between missions and operations**

- Ongoing in the field - work in increasingly defined roles.
- Have a HQ WG on field support holding ad hoc meetings to address any challenges that cannot be solved in the field (feeding into the UN-EU Steering Committee).

## **5. Facilitate EU Member States' contributions to UN peace operation**

- EU Member States competency - EEAS offer areas for the UN to address EU Member States.
- EEAS' follows closely on-going discussion between EU MS on some type of informal mechanism to better coordinate their contributions to UN PKOS, as a way to provide more predictability and transparency. (IE FFT-Paper)
- Increasingly including peacekeeping as a topic for discussion in security and defence dialogues with third countries.

## **6. Policing, RoL & SSR - widen the scope to include also penitentiary justice.**

- EEAS-UN/OROLSI initiative on conflict prevention and rule of law and security institutions (launched in BXL on 1-2 April).
- Also foresees to continue cooperation on the SGF - including in relation to training, and as much as possible, in cooperation with the AU.

## 7. Cooperation with and support to African peace operations (trilateral cooperation)

- In the process of seeing more interaction between our principals in the Central African Republic (Khartoum agreement and its implementation), but also in the Sahel. (UN-AU partnership framework, and EU-AU MoU on peace, security and governance)
- To be matched on a working level - efforts to be stepped up this year. The conflict and gender analysis in CAR is a good first step. Will need to be based on pragmatism and concrete deliverables clear from the outset.

## 8. Training and capacity-building

- Also EU Member States competencies so here we are working with the ESDC - who will talk to you more about their structures and work tomorrow morning.

There is an ambition for the ESDC to better link up with the UN-ITS, and to regularly reach out to the ESDC network on peacekeeping training needs. Also, on-going mapping of training already provided by EU MS in support of UN peacekeeping to get an overview what is being done, where there are duplications and where there are gaps. Encourage you all to cooperate.

- What the EEAS can do, is to ensure that our training policies are in line with the UN training policies and standards. And this is already being done through regular contacts between HQs. Recently there has been particular focus on conduct and discipline as the EU has strengthened our structures in this regard, but also on the Strategic Guidance Framework for police peacekeeping (SGF).
- Another focus is to further engage the UN in EU exercises (which is also ongoing).

As you can see, the priority areas intersect and overlap. They are essentially a working document, to help steer our cooperation, but without dictating it. Just because something is not mentioned, it does not mean that we are not, or cannot, work on it.

**Now, Going forward**, we face multiple challenges, not just threats to peace and security, but to multilateralism and global governance.

We have our differences, and we all face our own internal challenges. But we also share

a few challenges that we can address jointly.

We are all expected to achieve more with less, to optimise resources, obtain maximum effectiveness and deliver impact. This has taken quite a lot of resources on all of our parts in the last year or so, to look inwards and restructures and re-organise to our best abilities. But as we are now starting to look outwards, embarking on implementation, we are seeing that we are in fact, still trying to achieve more or less the same thing.

This means that there are indeed, potentially more opportunities not only for reinforcing partnerships, but also for forging new ones. With some partnerships weakening, opportunities for other partnerships open. And we have to think innovatively and be pragmatic. We have to continue to manage expectations, be transparent and invest in strategic communication.

EU Member States are showing an unprecedented commitment to UN-EU cooperation. For the first time, the Council of the European Union issued conclusions specifically to endorse the 2019-2021 UN-EU priorities. President Tusk attended the UN General Assembly high-level week in September, and delivered a statement in support of the UN Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

And the third joint UN-EU statement on the strategic partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management was issued that same day to mark the agreement of the 2019-2021 joint priorities.

So I come to where I started. The EU will continue to be at the forefront, advocating for a more effective UN, in full support of the UN Secretary-General's Reform agenda and A4P.

Training is a central aspect and I look very much forward to our discussions in the coming days where I will be looking in particular at what more the EEAS can do on this.

Thank you.