



Ethical Basis of Human Security

Towards Renewal of Peace Operations Training

Cover photo and design Luukas Piironen, Finnish Naval Academy
© Finnish Defence Forces International Centre and contributors

ISBN 978-951-25-2927-8 (pbk)
ISBN 978-951-25-2928-5 (PDF)
ISSN 1797-8629 (print)
ISSN 2489-4788 (online)

Puolustusvoimien Kansainvälinen Keskus
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Printing: Juvenes Print
Tampere 2017

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

FINCENT Publication Series 1/2017

ETHICAL BASIS OF HUMAN SECURITY

Towards Renewal of Peace Operations Training

Edited by Arto Mutanen

Puolustusvoimien Kansainvälinen Keskus
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
Helsinki 2017

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	4
PREFACE.....	5
1. Introduction	6
I THEORETICAL BASIS.....	18
2. The Scopics of International Conflicts.....	18
3. Opinions, Bots, and Public Spaces	26
II ETHICAL BASIS	35
4. From Ethics to Ethical Action Competence	35
5. Bridging the Gap of Understanding: Dialogue Competence in the Renewal of UN Peacekeeping and Civil Crisis Management.....	50
6. Instrumentalization of Education As a Threat to a Good Life: An Introduction to Education in the Midst of Wicked Problems.....	68
III APPLIED PERSPECTIVES.....	76
7. A Practitioner’s Reflections: Ethical Action Is Not Performed; It Takes Place	76
8. Global Ethics and Ethicality in Peacekeeping – Experiences from the Field.....	91
9. Universality of Human Rights.....	96
THE AUTHORS	100

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The project of preparing this book was organized by the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT), with Commander Jukka-Pekka Schroderus acting as project leader. As editor, I found that the inspiring atmosphere created by FINCENT made the entire project possible. Moreover, I wish to thank the Finnish Naval Academy for allowing me to take the necessary time to complete the project. Most importantly, however, I want to thank all the authors, each of whom made an important and valuable contribution to the book. All the papers contribute strongly to the research and teaching arranged by FINCENT.

The cover design and photo are the work of Luukas Piironen, and we are all grateful for his contribution too. The language of the book was checked by Grano/Multidoc and we are grateful for the contribution. Numerous people have helped in the production of the book and we are grateful for all of them.

The editor

PREFACE

FINCENT is responsible for the Comprehensive Crisis Management research at the Finnish National Defence University. FINCENT continues its leadership, management and action competence research from the Comprehensive Approach point of view.

The fundamental principles in the missions are 1) Do No Harm, 2) Respect, 3) Protect and Prevent, and 4) Promote. Peacekeeping is a very ethic-laden activity. The experience gained from UN multidimensional peacekeeping practises showcases the need for a deeper understanding of ethics and ethicality.

The present book project was formally started on December 9th, 2016 when the project was introduced to the UN Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations Hervé Ladsous at the Finnish Defence Command.

The book is intended to answer the need for knowledge about ethics and ethicality in UN peacekeeping operations. The book can be used as a text book at peacekeeping education courses and as a sourcebook for further study.

I thank all the authors, each of whom made an important and valuable contribution to the book.

*Jukka-Pekka Schroderus
Commander (GS)
Commandant FINCENT*

1. INTRODUCTION

Arto Mutanen & Jukka-Pekka Schroderus

According to the Western education tradition, a human being is never ready-made. We are always incomplete. Our knowledge and skills are especially incomplete, in a profound way. Human reality is not purely material but also psychological, social, historical, and ethical. The complexity of human reality is very great, which can be easily seen from such arenas as those of international disputes. If our knowledge is profoundly incomplete, then our capabilities of acting become restricted too. This implies that the skills and knowledge needed are generic.

An individual's humanity is never completed – it progresses via a process of cultivation. The ideal of humanity cannot be achieved within our incomplete world. The ideal, by definition, is something we do not yet possess. Also, it is something forever developing: there is no once and finally fixed ideal humanity. Changes in the ideal that we pursue presuppose delving deeply in our philosophical analysis, as the example of Antiquity demonstrates. Because the ideal is necessarily something not yet actualized, we humans live in a reality in which tension between the ideal and the actual is always present.

Ethicality refers to this tensional field of life in which we intend to become better and better while recognizing at the same time that the ideal eludes our hands. This is not our “mistake” but entailed by the very essence of the ideal. Naturally, the tension has been present throughout the history of humans. Ethics is theoretical study of ethicality.

We endeavor to manage the tension between ideal and real by means of education. In *Meno*, Plato problematizes the possibilities of education by asking whether virtue “is acquired by teaching or by practice.” Plato urges us to think about the possibility of educating in ethicality. It is obvious that theories and codes of ethics can be taught, but how are these related to ethicality? If we are to tackle the problematic, we should proceed from characterizing the problem of “what is good?” – a very fundamental problem of ethics. However, that seems to be an extremely difficult question. Besides this fundamental question, we should ask more practical ones, such as “what should I do?” These questions of practice seem to be context-sensitive, and there appears to be a danger of blatant relativism. Ethics and ethicality involve study of the human good, which has been the domain of practical philosophy in the Aristotelian sense. However, the question of how to live as a good person in such a tensional world is essentially a pedagogical problem.

The ideal must be transcendent but simultaneously something that is, in principle, achievable, even though both cannot be fulfilled at the same time. Plato refers to the problem of the ideal by stating that “I literally do not know what virtue is” and hence “much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.” This is not merely a mark of the “irony” of Socrates but a more serious and deep-rooted problem. The difficulty of the problem is connected partly to the foundational teleological focus of the culture of Antiquity. It is also related to the idea that the definition is neither just a (stipulative) definition nor a factual (or real) definition; instead, it is a recipe detailing how to achieve the thing defined. That is, the definition of

virtue does not simply tell us what virtue is; it also addresses how to behave well, and how virtuousness would be teachable and learnable.

Our lack of knowledge about the true character of virtue – or of the moral good – does not pose merely a philosophical problem. This absence of knowledge affects real-world situations. The uncertainty in practical situations is of both conceptual and empirical character. One does not know what good or right really means, but equally one does not know what is good and right (or the opposites of these) within the concrete circumstances that present themselves. For addressing both domains, there are several distinct theoretico-conceptual approaches to ethics. Can one learn all of them? If so, how? Which of them should one choose? Which set of ethics rules is the best? How can a given rule be applied in practice? These are not merely theoretical questions; they lurk behind all of our practical conduct.

To our good and bad fortune both, there is no way to arrive at a single, unified set of ethical norms that would solve all the ethics problem we face. Our understanding of ethics and ethicality cannot be completed via formulation of better and better rules: codes and rules of ethics have only a preliminary role in ethics and ethicality. Ethics rules are linguistic expressions of ethicality that may be theoretical or serve as practical “rules of thumb.” However, ethicality is acted out in everyday actions, and there is always a gap between the theoretico-conceptual (ethics) and practico-conceptual (ethicality) level.

In formulation and interpretation of ethics rules, and theories of ethics more generally, we may reflect on ethics problems or how ethicality occurs in practice. Ethicality is a personal responsibility that shows itself in action. However, ethicality is, at the same time, connected to the universal. There is no “my ethics” or “our ethics,” even if the way the ethicality manifests itself varies. Ethicality is essentially connected to the general (or universal) ethical good. No one knows how to be a good person or to act in an ethically correct manner. One of the core pedagogical tasks is to develop our understanding of ethicality. That is, the development of our ethicality is a pedagogical process. Pedagogy is not teaching but facing another person in ethical dialogue. That dialogue is a key factor in more general negotiation between different kinds of actors.

Present-day discussion of ethics and ethicality is related to the fundamental questions of humanity, as Jonathan Glover (1999) clearly demonstrates. However, they are not the stuff of empirical inquiry, even if they do have a bearing on empirical and practical matters. The subtitle of Glover’s work refers to it as a moral history, set in world history, not the history of philosophy. With his book, he aimed to characterize the ethos of the world of the twentieth century or “construct a more empirical form of ethics, which looks at the psychology which has contributed to this set of man-made disasters” (*ibid.*, 43).

Glover shows that these man-made disasters are products not of isolated individuals’ actions but “of interaction, of people misunderstanding each other, putting pressure on each other, hating each other, obeying others, fearing other, and so on” (*ibid.*). The situation characterized by Glover is brought about in interaction of people, especially in the context of peace-keeping. Our task is to seek means for overcoming the misunderstandings and disrespect. It is incumbent upon us to establish respectful dialogue between people, independently of their background. That respectful dialogue is not a transcendent entity but a human skill

that can be studied and exercised. The foundation for the dialogue is a very philosophically oriented understanding of humanity in all our practicality and vulnerability.

When engaging in such dialogue, we have to understand the lesson of history laid out by Glover and the others. However, even more important is to have a conceptual sensitivity that has been created through philosophical analysis of ethics and ethicality. Our understanding of ethics and ethicality is anchored to the history of these notions, no matter how well we may or may not be aware of it.

In military pedagogy, the problem of humanity has been of central importance. Humans are not understood as containers of various kinds of capacities but viewed as holistic units and responsible actors. The central intent with the notion of action competence is to characterize this conceptualization. Action competence is understood as a holistic entity composed of physical, psychological, social, and ethical aspects of action competency. For simplicity, these may be called physical, psychological, social, and ethical action competencies if doing so does not cause any conceptual confusion.

Physical action competence refers to physical aspects of human action. Reason dictates that there is no human action without intention and, hence, without a psychological aspect. We may think that the power of a human's psyche keeps the human working hard – “pushes” an individual to great achievements, but no psychic or any other power can “push” an individual to exceed his or her physical capacities. Similarly, no action is, as Glover showed, of the individual alone. All have a collective or social element. Our imagination is not only the individual's; it is partly a product of society. Hence, we recognize that these aspects of action competence are always interrelated. This does not mean, however, that the physical, psychological, social, and ethical action competencies would not have relative independence: it is possible and natural to characterize, for example, an individual's physical capability to act. For example, it is a verified fact that if an individual does not have a certain oxygen uptake, he or she is incapable of certain physical tasks. It is important to study such factual elements.

Ethical action competence refers to deeply humanistic aspects of human action. It refers to value bases of human action that manifest the values held by the individual. Glover (*ibid.*) speaks of moral resources on which individuals' actions are based: “These disasters show [a] weak point in the moral resources we rely on to restrain savagery. Our moral resources either turn out not to work in a particular context, or else they are deliberately neutralized or overridden.” The notion of moral resource is closely related to ethical action competence. As are other aspects of action competence, ethical action competence needs to be exercised. The moral resources of an individual are not a fixed container but a dynamic potentiality, which may flourish via conditions of good exercise and fade in conditions of lack of exercise.

Action competence should be understood as a potentiality that a human being can further develop. That potentiality has several aspects. Firstly, an individual has some skills that, while not “in use,” exist in him or her: he or she is able to do the things that presuppose that skill and may or may not decide to do them. Another kind of potential exists in the room for an individual to gain new skills, ones that he or she does not already possess. Both aspects of potentiality are connected to education: With regard to the first, we may speak about exercising the skills and knowledge one has. When considering the second kind of potentiality,

we may speak about widening the scope of skills and knowledge. These days, it is common to speak about resilience, which essentially belongs to the first class of potentiality.

The essential pedagogical question is not of how to explicate or to widen the potentiality but about what kind of combination is optimal. This is a very difficult topic to manage. One might see experts, especially peacekeepers, as technical experts, for whom so-called technical competence plays the central role (Chochinov 2013). Accordingly, an expert is understood as a practical problem-solver who solves given problems by using given methods and tools. True experts should have, in addition to the technical skills and knowledge, ethics skills and knowledge – i.e., ethical competence (ibid.).

An expert is a responsible actor, epistemically responsible (through technical competence) but also ethically responsible (with ethical competence). Because an actor causes the act and its consequences, he or she must bear the responsibilities related to his or her actions and the consequences of those actions (von Wright 1971; Woodward 2002). Moreover, an expert is responsible for his or her skill and knowledge base, for an expert is obliged to update said skills and knowledge. The responsibility is both legal and ethical (von Wright 1971, 65). How far does the responsibility go? In the courtroom, the decision on legal responsibility is the final determiner, while the ethical responsibility has no ultimate gatekeeper. In the realm of ethics, each actor is responsible for all the consequences of his or her actions. Moreover, that ethical responsibility is not dependent on the intentions behind the action. Here it is separate from legal responsibility. Guilt is one expression of ethical responsibility, which is something personal, something that the agent cannot give away or share. Ethical responsibility is not norm-based but a personal element, which can be characterized as the ethicality of the actor.

Expertise is conditional on education and experience, which implies that there are several possible extents of expertise. Hubert Dreyfus (2006) classifies expertise levels thus: i) novice, ii) advanced beginner, iii) competence, iv) proficiency, v) expertise, vi) mastery, and vii) practical wisdom. His classification refers to the depth of the relevant knowledge and skills. The beginner follows explicit rules and is not adept at identifying the context of application. At mastery level, the knowledge and skills are of high quality, making the expert fluent (or intuitive) in action. Practical wisdom, the ideal level of expertise, presupposes mastery-level competence – both technical and ethical competence. Epistemic and ethical responsibility go hand in hand for the competence of an expert.

In Western societies, experts play a central role. There is a strong belief that these people's epistemic competence solves the problems we face (Feyerabend 2006; Horkheimer & Adorno 1944). However, nowadays we know that this trust is not well-founded: technical competence is not good enough, for there is a need for proper ethical competence. The latter competence is a central part of competence at all levels of an expert's competence. We have to answer the question "what is ethical expertise?" It is obvious that ethicality is not merely rule-following activity (Dreyfus 2006). While ethicality and ethics rules are not independent of each other, ethicality entails **context-sensitive** commitment to the good. Ethics rules have a pedagogical role in the search for ethicality; they give linguistic expression to how we understand ethicality and how to make our action more ethical. Conscience tells us that something is right or is not right, and in this sense it is an internal "moral alarm bell." Ethics

rules are explicated codes for how we understand, or should understand, right and wrong, and in this sense they are external “moral alarm bells.”

In an individual’s formative years, ethicality must be awakened. This can be done via ostension (“This is right”), teaching of rules (“Lying is wrong” etc.), or demonstration by one’s own actions. In Finnish, the command “Mene itseesi!” says, “Now in this case, your internal ‘moral alarm bell’ should ring! Please, look at this very carefully!” and thereby forces the listener to awaken to ethicality. The Finnish sentence is used from early in life to adulthood. At higher levels of expertise, the level of conscious reflection allow one to perform evaluative reflection on rules and actions, which means that one is also capable of deliberately formulating ethics rules and teaching ethics and ethicality such that one can initiate dialogue about rules and ethicality, perhaps even behaving as an “icon” who shows what ethicality is while still being just an ordinary person. This is a goal for ethical action competence. The notion of ethical action competence is one that scales; i.e., there is no **complete** ethical action competence. One can, and ought to, engage in an endless learning process.

Ethics-related concepts have a hierarchical structure. Ethicality, the foundational notion, is relative to the actor. This does not imply that it is a relativistic notion; rather, it refers to something we humans share and that is an assumption underpinning our common social life. Ethics rules are not a unique set of norms; the hierarchical set of rules starts with direct prohibitions or orders and eventually ends with cultural and philosophical principles or declarations. The hierarchy is not well-defined, and the boundaries between its levels are not clear-cut. Also, it is of strategic character: in argumentation, if one does not distinguish between levels, he or she is committing a mistake of category. Sensitivity to the levels and understanding them well is one of the core skills of dialogue competence.

In peacekeeping operations, the local people should have good reasons to trust the peacekeepers who are protecting their security. This protection is an ethics-laden task. It is not enough to prevent direct violence; peacekeepers should also allow the local people to build their safety. However, security and safety differ in the logic involved. Accordingly, in certain circumstances it may transpire that one excludes the other. In peacekeeping contexts, the peacekeepers protect security while the local people expect safety. The peacekeepers should be educated to safeguard safety too.

Peacekeepers must possess strong technical competence but also extremely high ethical competence: a peacekeeper is connected to local people either directly or indirectly, which presuppose an ability to express empathy (Marcum 2011). The characterizations of ethical competence may remain thin because they express only ideals. In engineering science, the expectations seem to be more explicit: It is good enough for an expert in engineering science to be acquainted well with the relevant aspects of technology.¹ Regrettably, peacekeepers cannot be identified as “technical experts” who merely manage the problematic situations in technical terms. Ethical competence is among the core competencies they need, so what is the core knowledge for ethical competence? History (of philosophy) has a long tradition of seriously asking whether it is even possible to have true ethical or moral expertise. Is it, in principle, teachable and learnable?

¹ Nowadays, expertise in engineering science presupposes ethical competence.

Plato in *Meno* argues that virtue (i.e., ethicality) cannot be taught. He cites as evidence that there are no teachers and teaching tradition for it, which seems to make ethicality a very special kind of topic. Peter Singer (2006, 187) says that it is usual in philosophy to think that “there is no such thing as moral expertise; in particular, moral philosophers are not moral experts.” The Enlightenment tradition anchored morality to human rationality. As a foundation of the Western education system, the Age of Enlightenment has had remarkable consequences. However, the close relationship between ethicality and rationality causes some problems, as demonstrated by, for example, the “Socratic paradox”: why do we humans do something bad even if we know it is bad?

In ethics, the fundamental assumption has been of universality and categoricalness. Regrettably, the history of ethics shows that, in practice, there are diverse kinds of understandings about ethicality and there are several varieties of theories of ethics, of one sort or another. We will not discuss whether relativism is a necessary condition in the realm of ethics, but we do remind that moderate relativism may render respectful dialogue possible, and the latter forms an essential part of ethical competence.

That moderate relativism means at least that a peacekeeper must take ethicality seriously; ethical responsibility may not be reduced to “technical” competence, by which we refer to fixed rules that should be applied in every case. The attitudes and behavior should not be too “scientific” in nature, even if one has to “perform or conduct practical and specific protocols and procedures in a correct and an efficient or effective manner” (op. cit., 148). The rule-governed technical competence of peacekeepers may reduce the possibility of empathy and, hence, also the role of ethical competence.

Practical problems that require an immediate solution – as the problems in peacekeeping usually are – allow no time to reflect on the theoretico-conceptual basis for problem-solving activity. The solution must be attended to immediately within the context. In such a situation, one does not see a need for philosophico-conceptual research. Ethics is a branch of philosophy, and military ethics is a branch of (general) ethics, a branch that, as an academic discipline, has no direct connection to peacekeeping practices. The study of ethics and also of, to some extent, applied ethics **should** be conducted in an “ivory tower.” Such a foundational enterprise can refresh our ethical understanding and even lead us to revise it, as the example of Plato demonstrates (MacIntyre 1985; Hintikka 1969).

The need for refreshing notions and ideas can be seen when the problems faced gain extreme complexity, as in the case of international disputes. The characterization of complex problems presupposes a very clear conceptual framework in which notions of technical competence and ethical competence work together. Ethicality becomes an essential part of the practical problem-solving. The conceptual knowledge helps the decision-maker reflect well on the situation in context and to learn from the decisions made, but, most importantly, it helps us with the problem-solving processes.

If we are to understand such messy fields as ethics of peacekeeping, the fundamentals of ethics should be kept clearly in mind, because the “great difficulty which arises in ethical discussions is the difficulty of getting quite clear as to exactly what question it is that we want to answer” (Moore 1978, 5). Discussion about ethics of peacekeeping ranges from

deep philosophico-conceptual questions to practical problems of peacekeeping and mundane evaluations by civilians.

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle writes, “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” (I 1.1). That is, according to Aristotle, human beings are intended to achieve some ultimate good or human well-being, so a person who aims for the ultimate good is, on conceptual grounds, virtuous. Hence the virtues of the profession are realized in the activity of the professional, but in ethicality we have to keep in mind a requirement of moderation.

G. E. Moore in his *Principia Ethica* (1986, 2) characterizes ethics by saying that it is “concerned with the question of conduct – with the question [of] what, in the conduct of us, human beings, is good, and what is bad, what is right, and what is wrong.” However, even if this is true, it does not tell us what “the conduct” we are asking about in ethics is. According to Moore (*ibid.*, 3), the fundamental question of ethics is that of what good is. The meaning of “good” in an ethical sense is not easy to grasp, because “the so-called **moral** sense of ‘good’ is a derivative or secondary sense, which must be explained in the terms of non-moral uses of the word” (von Wright 1996, 1 – emphasis in the original). The same holds for other notions in ethics, among them “ought” and “duty.” This makes the study of ethics extremely difficult. The rigorous conceptual sensitivity is a presupposition behind all study of ethics and ethicality.

Offering a positive characterization of notions for ethics is a difficult task, because the usual general characterizations are very thin on content. Accordingly, ethics and moral philosophy have, “since antiquity, been understood as an examination of the good life” (Pihlström 2014, 13). A kind of mirror image of this argumentation is Moore’s (1986, 7) characterization of ethical notions as not simple; i.e., they cannot be defined or reduced to something more fundamental. Moore’s idea of the naturalistic fallacy refers to this error: it is fallacious to try to reduce ethicality to something more fundamental, especially to natural properties of some sort.

However, we do recognize when principles of good ethics have been violated. In many individual cases, we may know that “This is wrong!” Accordingly, it would be a good strategy to approach ethics “not primarily in terms of what is ‘positively’ real or good but ‘through negation’” (*op. cit.*, 13). This negative methodology is very fruitful, especially in messier contexts, such as many that are found in peacekeeping. It is not easy to characterize explicitly what should be done, but in many cases it is possible to recognize what is wrong. This is not a conceptual trick but a valuable methodological and pedagogical principle that helps us consider the ethics problematic systematically.

The purely positive approach in ethics may consign evil to the shadows and thereby make it difficult to recognize violations of ethical principles. Ethics is, of course, searching for the good, but ethics still “should react to the undeniable presence of evil and suffering” (*ibid.*, 2). Such “a negative approach in moral philosophy leads to an understanding of human beings’ place in the world,” which is extremely important, especially within the context of peacekeeping.

The negative methodology lets us explicitly consider the ethicality of an individual. This refers to the factual moral character of an individual (his or her conscience); it is present in the individual's day-to-day life. That ethicality does not “grant us a moral holiday, an opportunity to think that everything is, in the end, well and fine without our attempts to contribute to the moral progress or ultimate salvation of the world” (ibid., 2). Accordingly, ethicality poses an extreme challenge, which may be too much for an individual to bear, as Ville Kivimäki has shown in several publications. Ethicality can be understood as a pillar of humanity that may be recognized but not positively characterized. Perhaps we could use Wittgensteinian wording and say that ethicality shows itself but cannot be said.

There is need for proper ethical “theory” that addresses ethics. In the field of ethics, there are three main theoretical approaches, known as virtue ethics, utilitarianism (consequentialism), and deontology (ethics of duty). All of these are well-established traditions. When considering ethicality, we do not need to be committed to any of them in particular. Ethicality is connected to the character and moral deliberation (virtue ethics) and to all the possible consequences of our actions (utilitarianism) but also to the ethical rules to follow (deontology). Of course, as Kant famously said, it is ethically valuable “to do one’s duty for duty’s sake,” but at the same time we have to remember that not all duties are ethical and that it is not necessarily a simple task to perform the ethical duties in a given situation. According to consequentialism, carrying out the best possible act presupposes that we evaluate all the consequences of every possible act end then choose the best from among all of these. Each act has an infinite number of possible consequences, and we have an infinite number of possible acts before us. Evaluating an infinitude of infinitely long processes takes infinite time. Hence, the infinity of ethics and ethicality becomes evident independently of what kind of theory we subscribe to.

The theory–practice distinction does not do justice to ethical study. Moore says that some aspects of ethics are rather a study of casuistry that “aims at discovering what actions are good, **whenever they occur**” (emphasis in the original). This is not a topic of proper ethics; it is reminiscent rather more of a study of physics and chemistry than of proper ethics. That is study of a “theoretico-conceptual framework” that can be applied in various situations that arise in practice.

Ethics should not be a philosophical endeavor alone; it must have some “relation to conduct.” That is, ethics should consider also the question “what ought we to do?” This is, of course, connected to, for example, consequentialist calculations, which are rather more theoretico-conceptual than practical tools. However, in practical situations, one has no time to deliberate, so there is no possibility of making – finite or infinite – calculations. There is a pressing need for “practical orders” stating what one must do and what one must not do. These are not rules of ethics *per se*. They can be understood instead as “frozen” ethical norms if they are based on sound ethical deliberation of an expert within a context. In the intended context, they are very useful (cf. Kahneman 2012).

The structure of the book

This book is a philosophico-conceptual analysis of the ethicality of peacekeeping. We do not support any specific ethical theory or have an attachment to any other discipline. The intent is to have a many-sided view of the larger problematic tackled by the book. Rather than posit any set of rules for good ethics, we consider conceptual tools that allow reflection on ethical problems and, especially, (personal) ethicality. Together, the papers provide a good characterization of the topic. However, each is a self-contained chapter that can be read independently of the other contributions to the book.

The five papers presented first are of a theoretical and conceptual character. The first two characterize the theoretical framework in which the phenomena of interest take place. International disputes are not isolated, compact phenomena that have clear or well-defined boundaries. International disputes have long roots in history and are multidimensional. International law has the nature of dialogue, and it is more on the order of negotiation (or arbitration) than judging. **Heiskanen** supplies a good conceptual characterization of the problematic.

While international disputes are multidimensional and complex, the international context is filled with information. Regrettably, there is complication in this: Many kinds of information are present. Also, there may be too much or too little information. There is true information and false information, but also some information goes beyond truth and falsity. We cannot “clean up” the messy information landscape, so we have to live with it. The situation is especially difficult with regard to the context of international disputes, which are extremely complex by their very nature. **Wiewiura** and **Hendricks** explore how to manage within such a complex information situation.

After these two papers, which present the conceptual framework for the book in very general terms, the others are set within that framework: the next three papers offer a philosophical characterization of ethics and ethicality. Sometimes it happens that one recognizes “This is wrong!” but cannot clearly say **why** it is wrong or what should be done instead. The conscience, the “moral alarm bell,” indicates that something is wrong; however, the conscience may be fallible. Moreover, it does not present arguments or reasoning. We feel guilt, but it does not imply that we know what we ought to do or what we ought not to do. To sharpen our ethical consciousness, we have to clarify the conceptual basis for our thinking.

Ethics and ethicality are connected to the real-world conduct of a human being, while ethical theories are theoretical constructions. Ethicality takes place in practice but is extremely difficult to conceptualize. The ethical responsibility can be recognized: the guilt about the decisions must be borne. There are no ethical holidays for us. Ethical responsibility is a foundational element for reliability, which is of fundamental value in our social life. The more challenging the situation is, the more reliability is needed. The philosophical papers are presented in an effort to clarify the situation.

Toiskallio characterizes the foundation of ethicality: how should a human being act? Ethicality is not a body of external knowledge but part of the essence of a human being’s personality. The contexts of peacekeeping are extremely complex and messy, thereby creating

many difficulties for peacekeepers. It may be that the situations do not offer any acceptable ways to act – all of the possibilities may be wrong. Still the peacekeeper must do something; he or she has to act in an ethically sustainable way. In such a situation, the skill to deliberate ethically becomes the most important skill. In general, we refer to this skill as ethical action competence.

In a peacekeeping context, individuals are not separated entities and the disputes are not between individuals. Nonetheless, individuals play a central role in resolving and managing the disputes. The situation of working to solve the problems and manage the disputes is an ethics-laden one in which respect for humanity, reliability, and ethicality have a central role. However, the core element required is not a formal skill or knowledge but context-sensitive consideration. **Heinonen** shows the conceptual structure of these notions and gives an idea of how they can be used. His paper details how they generate dialogue competence, which is the core skill and knowledge in negotiation situations. There is a tight link here to Toiskallio's conceptual analysis of ethical action competence.

Ethical action competence and dialogue competence are not innate skills but skills that need to be learned and exercised. This kind of ethics-laden learning and teaching is not mere training but education that runs deep and in which the relationship between the teacher and learner is an intimate human connection. The education is best understood as set within the society and hence not divorced from that society's moral understanding. However, the education must be reflective: it must go beyond preservation of society's prevailing values, to reviewing and rethinking the foundational values. The analysis by **Värri** shows that education is rooted in ethicality. We have a circle here; fortunately, we do not have a vicious circle. The three presuppose each other, hence illustrating why ethicality is so difficult to characterize – reflection on ethicality is an education process that partially renews the ethicality and, at the same, develops our understanding about ethics. A similar thing can be seen if we look at dialogue competence.

As very philosophically oriented works, these three papers do not give us answers, either simple or complex. Instead, they show us how to ask relevant questions. Asking the right questions presupposes rich conceptual underpinnings, a well-developed structure forged through reflection and education. Because the questions determine what kinds of answers can be found, the conceptual research clearly is not only theoretical contemplation – it is true foundational study.

The papers on applied ethics and ethicality show how the authors faced ethics-laden situations. The person in the course of his or her duty is not just carrying out the mission but fulfilling an ethical duty. Deliberations before, during, and after the action all require the actors' deep ethical commitment. The papers show how multifaceted the situations that arise in practice are. Decision-making is not rule-following activity but deliberative activity. Formal rules and duties guide the actions but cannot determine them. The final decisions are based on ethical deliberation. In this deliberation, abstract declarations may be effectively used in directing the actions, which, at the same time, renew and concretize the content of the declarations as **Ranta's** paper illustrates. All of these papers show in a personal way how ethical responsibility is actualized or how ethical competence can be understood.

Ethicality is committing to the good. However, making such a commitment is not a simple task: in committing to something, one simultaneously excludes something else. What is excluded is not only something bad and something that should be avoided but also something good and desirable. Regrettably, a commitment to something good does not entail just something that we should or would like to pursue; it also carries with it something we should or would like to avoid. This shows why it is so difficult, or even impossible, to be ethical. Indirectly it points to why rules or codes of ethics or general ethical principles cannot give us a final road to ethicality that can be seen from the papers written by **Kullberg & Mero** and **Rautjärvi**. There is a need to assimilate ethicality but at the same to reflect ethicality in codes and principles. At the same time, we have to update our ethical education in order to prepare new generations of peacekeepers and security personnel.

Questions surrounding ethics and ethicality have a strongly philosophical nature. However, the task of asking and answering them is not for philosophers alone. It belongs to the entire community of professionals, whether theoreticians or practitioners, and including soldiers, police personnel, and civilians in the field. The book offers multiple points of view on asking and answering the questions – perspectives that remain tightly interconnected. Hence this work is suitable as a textbook for ethics courses, but it should also be valuable as a sourcebook that provides a wealth of information on the topic and much food for thought.

We are deeply grateful to the writers, all of whom have made important and valuable contributions.

References

- Aristotle, 1952, *The works of Aristotle*, W. D. Ross (ed.). Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.
- Chochinov, Harvey Max (2013). Dignity in Care: Time to Take Action. *Journal of Pain and Symptom Management*, 46(5), pp. 756–759.
- Doyle, Arthur Conan (1989). *Sherlock Holmes*. Ware: Wordsworth Editions.
- Dreyfus, Hubert (2006). How Far Is Distance Learning from Education? In: Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease (eds.), *The Philosophy of Expertise* (pp. 358–369). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Feyerabend, P., 2006. How to Defend Society Against Science. In: Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease (eds.), *The Philosophy of Expertise* (pp. 196–212). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Glover, Jonathan (1999). *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Hintikka, Jaakko (1969). *Tieto on valtaa* ["Knowledge is Power"]. Porvoo, Finland: WSOY.
- Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, Theodor W. (1972 [1944]). *Dialectic of Enlightenment* ["Dialektik der Aufklärung"], New York: Seabury
- Marcum, James A. (2011). Care and Competence in Medical Practice: Francis Peabody Confronts Jason Posner. *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy* 14(2), pp. 143–153.
- Moore, George Edward (1986 [1903]). *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Moore, George Edward (1978 [1912]). *Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pihlström, Sami (2014). *Taking Evil Seriously*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Plato, 1997, Complete Works, John M. Cooper & D. S. Hutchinson (eds.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub cop.
- Selinger, Evan & Crease, Robert P. (eds.) (2006). *The Philosophy of Expertise*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Singer, Peter (2006). Moral Experts. In: Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease (eds.), *The Philosophy of Expertise* (pp. 187–189). New York: Columbia University Press. Originally published in *Analysis* 32 (1972), pp. 115–117.
- Woodward, James (2003). *Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation*. New York: Oxford University Press
- von Wright, Georg Henrik (1971). *Explanation and Understanding*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

I THEORETICAL BASIS

2. THE SCOPICS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

V.A. Heiskanen

International conflicts are typically conceptualized as conflicts that take place somewhere else – outside or between nation-States or, more informally, countries, rather than **within** States or countries. This implies that if international conflicts are to be managed and solved, they must be managed and solved not at the national or local level, but on a higher level – on the international level or, in more technical terms, on the international plane.¹ However, terms such as “international level” or “international plane” are potentially misleading metaphors. There is no “international level” or “international plane” on which States and other international actors such as international organizations operate – except metaphorically. While metaphors, when understood literally, are potentially effective as tools of philosophical analysis – and, perhaps even more so, of philosophical synthesis² – terms such as “international level” and “international plane” are not literal metaphors.³ They are **metonyms**, and as such literally beside the point: they draw a parallel – indeed draw on a parallel – rather than aim at conceptual accuracy.⁴ Therefore, they should not be taken literally – except in the sense that, as metonyms, they are literally, that is, by definition and therefore precisely, beside the point. Their whole point is not to be on point, but beside the point.

This is not to suggest that there is, or could be, a more accurate, literal metaphor, or a precise concept that is precisely on point, to describe what is metonymically referred to as the international level or international plane. What is generally referred to in these terms, or in terms of a place located somewhere else, on another plane or in another place, is not really a place in the first place. What “international” refers to is in reality action rather than a place. More precisely, it refers to **motion** rather than a place or a state, or a State.⁵ Just as in physics one must distinguish between statics and dynamics, or rest and motion, in philosophy one must distinguish between the State – which is by definition a static place rather than a

1 See, e.g., the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides, in Article 2(1)(b), that “[f]or the purposes of the present Convention ... ‘ratification,’ ‘acceptance,’ ‘approval’ and ‘accession’ mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes *on the international plane* its consent to be bound by a treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331. (Emphasis added.)

2 This is because they facilitate bridging philosophy of science and philosophy of art, and addressing other related philosophical schisms. See generally Heiskanen (2015).

3 Thus, for example, the word “literal” is in itself a literal metaphor – it literally de-scribes the image of the letter. Its literal and metaphorical meaning therefore co-incide perfectly; they are on point, or the same point, *i.e.*, they are in a symmetric (super)position.

4 See the definition of metonym in Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989): “the use of a name of one object or concept for that of another to which it is related or of which it is a part.”

5 Consequently, the distinction between the local and the international is merely a conceptual one between the statics of the State and the dynamics around it, rather than a distinction between two places, a real one (the State) and an imaginary one (the international plane). The dimension of the “international” is therefore a parallel of an imaginary number. Just as an imaginary number tracks rotation around an imaginary axis, the international plane can be understood as an imaginary axis that stands vertically on the border between two States. The rotation from the plane (or territory) of State A to the plane (or territory) of State B stands for the “international” movement (*i.e.*, across the border). For background see, for example, Paul Nardin, (2007).

moving target⁶ – and the international – which by definition is dynamic, that is, in motion. This fundamental distinction – which is neither purely conceptual, or qualitative, nor purely quantitative because it is, precisely, a distinction between what can be literally conceptualized or accurately quantified, and what cannot be – explains why there cannot be a literal metaphor, or a precise concept, for the “international.” What is “international” can only be referred to obliquely, by way of drawing a parallel, that is, by way of a metonym. This fundamental inaccuracy therefore parallels Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle – or more accurately, inaccuracy principle – thereby making it more accurate in parallel: pure motion, as such, cannot be literally conceptualized or qualified, nor accurately quantified or measured as such, as concept or quantity. Motion, as pure motion, constitutes a continuum that by definition continues *ad infinitum* – which is not to suggest that it is a line; on the contrary, it rotates around itself, or its own axis, being in motion and rest simultaneously and thus enabling its own counting and accounting.⁷

The realm of the “international” is therefore not really a place, or a position on a map, whether real or imaginary. It tracks continuous movement about a place, but is not itself a place, or position, that can be pinned down as something present in any particular place, even as a point. It can therefore be said that, while the international level, or the international plane is “actual” – or, in Hegelian terms, *wirklich* – in the sense that it is present in time, it is not really “real” since it is not present in any particular place, and “real” by definition implies presence in both time and place.⁸ In this sense, the international level, or the international plane, and by implication also international law and international policy-making and regulation, possess a certain degree of artificiality, or virtuality; as laws, policies and regulations developed on the international level, they are virtually real rather than fully real or full-fledged laws, policies or regulations. In this sense, the distinction between the international and the local (or the State) is like the distinction in physics between the quantum state and the classical reality. The quantum world is like the world of the international: it is the world of the potential, or a world of Aristotelian *potentia*, rather than the world of the real, because it is the world of pure motion, and pure motion becomes real only once it is measured as a motion of **something**.⁹ This something may be anything – a particle of matter or a quantum of energy – so long as it is something that can be measured in time and place. As long

6 According to the generally accepted definition of State in international law in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, a State is composed of a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The first three criteria constitute the core of the definition and establish the State as a static, localized entity, the fourth already pointing towards a potentiality of interaction with other States – that is, its capacity to enter the “international plane.”

7 A line cannot be counted, but rotation can be, since one can count the number of times that the one that rotates has rotated around its own axis; in this sense, rotation is the conceptual expression of multiplication (as opposed to addition) – one rotation around itself is one times one; two rotations around itself is two times one, two rotations around two rotating selves is two times two, that is, four, etc. Similarly, while the suggestion that a system can simultaneously be both in motion and at rest sounds paradoxical (as it indeed is), it is not illogical because there is one phenomenon that can be both at the same time without a logical contradiction and this is of course, by definition, the chronological measure of history, i.e., the time itself. Assuming Aristotle, Hegel and Einstein were synthetically correct – i.e., that time rotates around its own axis (and is therefore curved, just as space is) – then it will by definition be in motion and at rest at the same time, the sphere around the axis being in motion and the axis at absolute rest. Consequently, if time is by definition the number that counts how many times (sic!) time has rotated around itself, it can conversely be defined as the ratio between the two, motion and absolute rest, i.e. $T = a/r$, and since $r = 0$, it follows that $T = \infty$; but at the same time, from the rotating motion it follows that $\infty = i$. In other words, time rotates around itself, *ad infinitum*, in *perpetuum mobile*.

8 See G.W.F. Hegel (1970), p. 281 (“Die Polemik des Aristoteles gegen Platon besteht dann näher darin, dass die Platonische Idee als bloße *Dunamis* bezeichnet und dagegen geltend gemacht wird, dass die Idee, welche von beiden gleicherweise als das allein Wahre anerkannt wird, wesentlich als *Energie*, d.h., als das Innere, welches schlechthin heraus ist, somit als die Einheit des Inneren und Äußeren oder als die Wirklichkeit in den hier besprochenen emphatischen Sinne des Wortes zu betrachten ist.”)

9 See The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, Barnes (1984), 1009(a) 31-35, *passim*. See also Werner Heisenberg (1962), p. 11 (“The probability wave ... meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of ‘*potentia*’ in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.”)

as it remains unmeasured, in its quantum state, it remains *potentia*, that is, it is present in time only but not in any particular place. Similarly, just as motion cannot be measured as such, as pure motion, but only as the motion of something concrete – whether of a particle of matter or of a quantum of energy – the international cannot be conceptualized in itself, as something purely international. It can only be conceptualized as a movement of something concrete – whether goods, services, capital or people.¹⁰ The “international” is therefore simply a concept that purports to track what moves across or between – “inter” – the borders of States – the “national.” Consequently, just as the quantum state is non-local, that is, present in time only but not any particular place – until the moment it is qualified and measured as a motion of something across the quantum/classical boundary – the world of the international remains non-local and present in time only – until it is qualified and measured as a movement of something across an international border.¹¹

Therefore, what is commonly referred to as the “international” is not a place, not even in the sense of a two-dimensional “level” or “plane.” It refers in reality to the movement of something – of goods, services, capital and people – across borders between States or, in legal terms, jurisdictions. The movement of goods, services, capital and people may be voluntary, in which case it qualifies as a socio-economic phenomenon, but it may also be involuntary, e.g., if there is no consent or agreement on the part of the people who are moving across borders – they may be forced to flee their country of residence because of the circumstances – or if there is no consent or agreement on the part of the receiving country. Such movement may be small-scale – **microscopic**, and as such involve only limited resources – or it may be **macroscopic**, that is, it may involve a large-scale transfer of resources across the border, with the involvement of one or both States. When all of these categories of resources – goods, services, capital and people – are mobilized deliberately and on a large scale by one country **against** another country – that is, when these resources are moved from one country to another in a planned, organized and systematic fashion, without the consent of the target State, such movements amount, by definition, to an international conflict, and are also likely to result, in practice, in an international armed conflict in the event that the target State chooses to engage in armed resistance. Such a conflict is “armed” precisely because it consists in an organized mobilization of armed resources – military goods, armed

10 This movement can take place both by means of transportation (carriage of people and goods) and by means of communication (carriage of services and capital). Therefore there are conceptually two categories of movement, the categorization depending on whether the means of carriage move themselves with what they move (means of transportation for movement of people and goods) or remain static and do not move themselves while what they move, move (means of communication for movement of services and capital).

11 Squaring of Schrödinger’s wave function represents this action mathematically – it translates the quantum state into a probability of locating something in a particular place by multiplying the wave function by itself, *i.e.*, by rotating the wave function from an imaginary axis to a real one. This translation is neither purely quantitative (or a result of measurement alone) nor purely qualitative; it is both at the same time and hence an asymmetric operation. As such, as an asymmetric operation, it breaks down the coherence of the quantum state and results in “decoherence,” *i.e.*, the collapse of the wave function. The loss of coherence is therefore not a consequence of measurement alone or, for that matter, its qualification alone, but results from the asymmetry of this complex operation which consists simultaneously of both measurement and qualification, which in turn by definition (that is, naturally, or intrinsically) breaks down the superposition because it measures and qualifies (*i.e.*, limits) the scope of the variable that is in the superposition in question by privileging one of the possible values of the variable and by excluding the other. This operation – which as an operation that takes place in time and place is not based on a purely conceptual reasoning or mathematical calculation – thus has nothing to do with “consciousness.” It is rather a consequence of the interaction between the quantum system (which is present in time only, but not in any particular place) and its environment (*i.e.*, the classical state of time *and* place). For discussion of decoherence see generally Schlosshauer (2007).

Similarly, in law, the parties to an international treaty or a private contract are in a symmetric (super)position so long as a dispute has not arisen between them – they are simultaneously both a potential claimant and respondent. However, as soon as a dispute arises between them, the symmetric superposition breaks down, or decoheres, and one of the parties becomes a claimant and the other a respondent, with their respective (asymmetric) claims for relief. Just as the decoherence of the quantum state into a measured particle is a matter of probability, the emergence of a dispute is a matter of probability – there is no deterministic certainty that a dispute will ever arise under the treaty or contract in question.

services, military capital equipment and military personnel – across the border. This may be an uncommon way of characterizing international armed conflict, but this is what an international conflict in terms of its socio-economic reality really boils down to, when viewed in terms of its simple scopics rather than through any distorting lens of the surrounding political and as such necessarily metaphysical rhetoric. In reality, an international conflict can be understood simply as forced or non-consensual movement of resources across borders. It is the movement over the border that makes the conflict international, and it is the aim to cross the border forcefully, without the consent of the target, that turns the cross-border movement into a conflict.

International macroscopic conflicts involving large-scale movements of heavy military resources are by definition “political” to the extent that they are aimed at either a permanent or a provisional change of the border between the two countries. In the classical system of nation States, borders between States constitute the very ontological foundation of the international system – the classic international system is founded on borders between States, not on the States themselves; it is what is in between, rather than within, the States that counts. International politics may therefore be said to be “ontological” in the phenomenological sense that it is about questioning, changing or even eliminating these boundaries, whereas international law, policy-making and regulation is “ontical” – it operates within the existing boundaries and is not aimed at changing them – except with the consent of all relevant parties.¹² International peacekeeping operations fall, precisely, into this category. They are a tool of international policy-making and regulation rather than international politics. They seek to manage international conflicts by occupying, with the consent of the parties to the conflict, the boundary between them, whether an internationally recognized border between two countries, or a provisional boundary, that is, an interim line drawn on the ground to separate the parties to the conflict, in an effort to suspend the conflict and convert it into a dispute, thereby creating space and time for a potential diplomatic or legal – i.e., agreed – solution. The difference between a conflict and a dispute is therefore a technical one, lying in the means used: while in a conflict it is the military that occupies the front lines and bears the brunt, in a dispute it is diplomats and lawyers that are deployed. It may be said, in metonymic terms, that in this shift from conflict management to dispute resolution, the extraordinary world of ontology, or the world of uniforms, is replaced with the ordinary world of the ontical, or the world of law and other, less uniform (i.e., asymmetric) suits. As such, it constitutes a step towards a more peaceful or amicable settlement of the dispute, in which the war of swords is replaced by a war of words.¹³

12 Therefore the distinction between the ontological and the ontical is both conceptual and historical: while the existing boundaries between States are relatively stable, or static, and as such may be said to constitute the ontological foundation of the current international system as a system of States, they are also historically contingent – they have not fallen from heaven, but are an end result of dynamic historical developments that are at their root socio-economic. The distinction between ontological and ontic was re-introduced into philosophical debate by Martin Heidegger; see Heidegger (1962), p. 11 *et seq.* (“Ontologisches Fragen ist zwar gegenüber dem ontischen Fragen der positive Wissenschaften ursprünglicher.”) The distinction between deontological and deontic serves an analogous purpose in the philosophy of law, the former referring to the creation of legal positions and assertion of legal claims (as reflected in the Hohfeldian deontological modalities) and the latter referring to the creation of legal norms and the qualification of normative action (as reflected in the deontic modalities).

13 Similarly, unlike a war, a conflict is not a state; it consists of action at and around the border, whereas war is a state. It is a state of war between two States, which have temporarily merged into one state of war, *in flagrante*. Unlike a State, which is by definition, or intrinsically, static or stationary, the state of war is a state of pure action between the States – that is, a dynamic state and accordingly a contradiction both in terms and in arms. In other words, it is a paradox and as such a perfectly symmetric superposition of statics and dynamics. War is an attempt to restore a broken symmetry and as such a fundamentally romantic phenomenon – an attempt to return to an idealized past that never existed in reality

This is the classic approach to international conflicts – they are conflicts between “States,” or technically less (but factually more) accurately, “countries.”¹⁴ The classic approach to international conflicts is “static” in the sense that it focuses on the maintenance and protection of State boundaries rather than on the dynamics of the underlying socio-economic reality – the movements of goods, services, capital and people across borders. While a State may look immutable and indeed infinite and as such “sovereign” from the inside, in reality States come and go – old ones die, new States are born, often on one and the same spot, and some States may disappear from the map altogether as they are merged into, or divided between, other States. The classic approach to international conflicts is about these inter-State conflicts in which boundaries between States are questioned, challenged, crossed, redrawn, erased or left as is, depending on the outcome of the conflict. However, this classic approach is increasingly being questioned, within and beyond academia, largely as a result, and in the context, of the dynamics of what is commonly referred to as “globalization.” As opposed to the statics of the classic international system, globalization is about the dynamics of the system or, more precisely, about the dynamics of the underlying socio-economic reality that can be understood in terms of its globalization – that is, in terms of the speed with which goods, services, capital and people move across borders during any particular historical era or epoch. Contrary to conventional wisdom, globalization as a socio-economic phenomenon has always been there: broadly understood, globalization covers both **acceleration** of the movement of goods, services, capital and people across borders – this is globalization in the narrow sense of the term – and **deceleration** of these movements. Just as the concept of acceleration in physics covers any change in velocity, encompassing both acceleration in the narrow sense, i.e., increase in speed, and deceleration, deceleration of globalization too may be understood as a reverse form of accelerating globalization, that is, as a form of “localization.” In this broad sense, globalization is not a novel phenomenon – not even in its accelerating form.¹⁵ Nor does it take a great deal of effort to identify relatively recent examples of decelerating globalization – and indeed, we may be on the knife’s edge, that is, between the periods of accelerating and decelerating forms of globalization, at least if globalization is measured in macroscopic terms, or on a global scale, rather than microscopically and therefore selectively, that is, in a particular place.¹⁶

The acceleration of globalization has had an impact not only on the speed at which goods, services, capital and people cross borders; it has also had affected the forms of international conflicts that are likely to arise, and have in fact arisen, in this increasingly dynamic context. In this novel context, there has been a notable shift from classic inter-State conflicts, and even from large-scale intra-State conflicts, to a microscopic form of conflict – a form of conflict that is colloquially often referred to as international “terrorism.” An international armed conflict in the classic sense is a macroscopic phenomenon; it typically requires accu-

14 “Country” rather than “State” because there is conceptually only one State – there can be only one State at a time in any particular place; unlike the international, the State is not a quantum state, but classical; it exists in time and place. In this sense the State is infinite in terms of its place because there is necessarily always a State on the ground, whether or not it is recognized as a State by other States (and although it is not necessarily always the same State as States come and go). Conversely, the “international” can be said to be infinite in terms of time because the potential for cross-border movement is always out there (although it may not necessarily take place in any particular place at any particular time).

15 The age of the Roman Empire and the 19th century, for instance, were eras of globalization in the narrow sense of this term – they were, globally speaking, times of greatly accelerating movement of goods, services, capital and people across borders.

16 Locally accelerating globalization may exist in parallel with decelerating globalization in another location, at least up to a point, that is, up to a point in time.

mulation and mobilization of the public resources of the moving State (although such conflicts may also be initiated by non-State actors, but the State is even then invariably involved as a party to the conflict). However, unlike a classic international conflict, international “terrorism” is in effect a microscopic phenomenon; it proceeds in the interstices of the international socio-economic realm; that is, it moves around as does by definition anything that qualifies as “international.” An international microscopic conflict is not, nor can it become, a “frozen” conflict.

While international microscopic conflicts, just as macroscopic conflicts, are deliberate in the sense that they are typically planned and organized, they are not systematic in the same way cross-border movements of armed force are, in terms of their time and space. They are typically *ad hoc* – their timing, and the place at which they take place, are much more difficult to pinpoint. Moreover, whereas classic inter-State conflicts turn around the differences between countries, that is, the officially drawn boundaries between them, microscopic conflicts are not typically aimed at a permanent or even interim change or modification of existing State boundaries. Microscopic conflicts target boundaries that are not physical, even in the virtual sense in which a boundary between two countries is physical; their target is boundaries drawn on the mind rather than the ground. Their aim is to cross and change, if not eliminate, socio-economic differences – differences in language, race, color, gender, sexual orientation, political conviction or religion, or any other socio-economic differences that in the particular socio-economic context in question are seen as a limiting boundary. While crossing, changing or elimination of these differences, or these boundaries, is not always the overt or even the stated goal for microscopic conflicts, this is what they are aimed at in effect. In other words, instead of seeking to settle the socio-economic differences that they are concerned with, by legal or other socially more legitimate means, international microscopic conflicts aim in effect at eliminating those differences altogether – and in this sense they are analogous to macroscopic international conflicts. They are absolutist in the conceptual (Hegelian) sense that their ideal is, and they operate on, the level of the logic of being – a conceptual level where there are, and can be, no differences, opposites, and contradictions. As the differences that microscopic conflicts are aimed at eliminating are drawn not on the ground but in the mind – they move with the people who embody them – they cannot be situated in any particular geographical location; they are purely virtual and, as such, actual. They are therefore fundamentally “global” – they are moving differences, or differences that are moving around, with the people who are moving around. Just as globalization is about acceleration of the movement of goods, services, capital and people around the globe, international microscopic conflicts are a global phenomenon that keeps moving around, from one place to another, without anyone really being able to predict, with any reasonable certainty, when and at which precise location the next conflict will take place. This is not possible, precisely, because an international microscopic conflict is a conflict in motion, or a traveling conflict, and as such it cannot be fully predictable as a local phenomenon.

International microscopic conflicts may be understood as a symptom of the process of globalization. They may be viewed as symptomatic of a process in which something appears to have seriously malfunctioned, at least in socio-economic terms. What is this something that appears to have malfunctioned? It must be something that international law, policy-making and regulation – the mechanisms for converting the international ideal first into something actual and then into something real – have failed to deliver. In other words, the root cause

of international microscopic conflicts must be something that intervenes in the constructive conversion of excess energy into useful work; something that intervenes when international law, policy-making and regulation is being squared, that is, when it is being given effect and converted into action in the real world, and thus produces a violent and destructive reaction rather than constructive action. There must be something in the international law, policy-making and regulation of the movement of goods, services, capital and people across borders that does not work and therefore results, in socio-economic terms, not in useful work but in useless work, that is, destruction rather than the production and reproduction of goods, services, capital and people, or labor. Without underestimating in any way the complexity of the underlying socio-economic mechanisms, the likely root cause of the problem is, realistically,¹⁷ visible on its face. While the focus in international law, policy-making and regulation since World War II has been on liberalization of the movement of goods and services across borders, and to a lesser extent and in a more local context, on liberalization of capital movements, there has been almost no effort to liberalize the movement of people and labor across borders, with the exception of certain regional efforts such as those undertaken within the European Union. Herein lies a fundamental policy imbalance that cannot be addressed by attempts to control uncontrolled international migration more effectively since uncontrolled international migration is in itself largely a result of the very same fundamental policy imbalance. Therefore the existing fundamental policy imbalance can be addressed only by more systematic, more efficiently regulated and more effectively managed liberalization of the movement of people and labor across borders. There is no other option since the only available alternative – scaling back of free movement of goods, services and capital, in an effort to establish a new balance at a lower level of movement – would not provide a solution. It would just result in further and even more radical and fundamental denial of socio-economic opportunity. In other words, instead of resolving the problem, it would make it even more complex.

While the perceived target of international microscopic conflicts has been, at least until recently, social differences – differences in language, race, color, gender, sexual orientation, political conviction or religion, or any other socio-economic differences that are perceived as embodiments of systematic denial of opportunity – rather than anything openly economic, it is not excluded, and indeed is perhaps even likely, that sooner or later these conflicts will mutate, by their own intrinsic dynamics, from blind, reactive and therefore apparently irrational attacks into something more articulated and coherent. In other words, it cannot be ruled out that they will shift from predominantly social conflicts toward more overtly economic conflicts that are deliberately targeted at the socio-economic structures of the global socio-economic reality. This development is not only possible but indeed probable unless those responsible for international law, policy-making and regulation make an effort that is at least partly successful in addressing the root causes of international microscopic conflicts – the widening gap between the opportunities available for free movement of goods, services and capital, on the one hand, and for the free movement of people and labor, on the other, and the resulting widening gap between those who have an opportunity to succeed in the global economy in the first place, and those who have not.

¹⁷ That is, excluding political and as such metaphysical explanations which by definition cannot be tested. See generally Heiskanen (2015).

For the time being, the fact that international microscopic conflicts remain a predominantly social rather than economic phenomenon renders it difficult to manage them. Indeed, it is unlikely that, so long as they maintain their current dynamics, they will ever be fully manageable, precisely because they are fundamentally ad hoc in their time and place – i.e., in terms of when and where they tend to take place. They can only be managed by eradicating their apparent root causes – the disparities in socio-economic opportunity that fuel them, even if in only an inchoate and unarticulated manner. This should be one of the fundamental goals for all international policy-making and regulation in the field of international peace and security, lest we soon face a form of conflict that will finally convert Marx’s theory of class struggle into a grim global reality.

References:

- Barnes, Jonathan (ed.) (1984). *The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2*. Princeton University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1970). *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse: Erster Teil – Die Wissenschaft der Logik*. Suhrkamp.
- Heidegger, Martin (1962). *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag (sechzehnte Auflage).
- Heisenberg, Werner (1962). *Physics and Philosophy*. Penguin Books.
- Heiskanen, V. A. (2015). Kompleksin filosofia: fakta, fiktio ja metafysiikka tieteessä ja politiikassa [“Complex Philosophy: Fact, Fiction and Metaphysics in Science and Politics”]. *Tiedepolitiikka* 2015(4), pp. 23–30.
- Nahin, Paul (2007). *An Imaginary Tale: The Story of $\sqrt{-1}$* . Princeton University Press.
- Schlosshauer, Maximilian (2007): *Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition*. Springer.
- Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (1989), Portland House, New York.

3. OPINIONS, BOTS, AND PUBLIC SPACES

Joachim S. Wiewiura & Vincent F. Hendricks

1. Opinions – their generation and distribution

What is the real distribution of various attitudes or opinions across social media? A lesson from social psychology gives reason to believe that people, with negligible exceptions, assess and navigate socially on the basis of **what other people express** to believe or know. This is in line with the principle of **social proof** (Cialdini 2007) – referring to the group dynamics that are created when people make decisions upon what they believe other people believe or know. While social proof is signal-based, **the reason for the signal may be hidden**: When somebody expresses something on a digital platform, different digital expressions are available such as “Like”s, becoming a “follower,” sharing of content, up-votes, and comments. But in the digital world, it is not always obvious that liking or sharing something articulate endorsing what is liked or shared. The motives can be different from person to person, and sometimes if content is auto-generated by fake profiles then motives may not exist. Signals – however – do persist.

Public signals may, through social proof, stimulate collective action or opinion-formation. On “bad days” within a network, social proof may lead groups to collective adoption of more polarized or extreme views than the individual members are willing to hold on their own (Sunstein 2009). Social proof may strongly guide group-related behaviour and sentiment in certain directions.

Comprehensive automated activity through social media (from “bots” to online filtering, sorting, news-feed manipulation, and the adoption of certain algorithmic templates for politically relevant public sources such as newspapers and magazines) may force us to realign our understanding of digital social proof – and public opinion. Adjusting the concept to encompass **machine-generated** signals of social influence in digital public spheres entails revisiting digital public spheres and the signals transmitted within them.

2. Problems in forming of public opinion

Understandings of public spaces vary with the political and normative philosophy it is inscribed in and, equally, with its relation to central concepts such as knowledge, freedom, choice and deliberation, and privilege. Jürgen Habermas (1962; cf. 1974) sketched an “ideal-type” model of the public space (Wodak & Koller 2008, 2) in which citizens’ discursive interactions should “transform political into ‘rational’ authority within the medium of the public sphere” (Habermas 1974, 53). This is known as the **liberal model**, which, according to Habermas, flourished in the 18th century’s bourgeois society and emphasized the importance of deliberation as inherited from the time of the Enlightenment. The public sphere is here made up of rationally ordered communication without any structural privileges that could obstruct the space and thereby hinder communication. As such, “[t]he idea of deliberation

points to the procedures of open discussion aimed at achieving rationally motivated consensus” (Dahlgren 2005, 156).

The public sphere is a medium “in which something **approaching public opinion** can be formed” (Habermas 1974, 49 – our emphasis). The necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for Habermas, then, is to maintain that a socially integrated and rationally constituted conversation of political importance may converge to count as a common “public opinion.”

Within this structure of developing rational consensus – wherein the superior arguments ideally outweigh the bad ones – there is little conceptual room for any group-related distortion or inflation of, for instance, political and scientific ideas or cultural, ethical, and social values. Within this theoretical framework, group-related dynamics (i.e., structures of social proof) that could distort the overall communication taking place are not allowed to be manifested, not even sporadically.

To be sure, Habermas does list several dysfunctionalities that contorts the public sphere, for example when commercial interests strategically dominates or overtakes rational communicative motivations (Wright 2008, 29f). In regard to information structures, they are not only vehicles of some sort of domination but can also be an internal feature of communication itself: deliberation within a group may occur, but that it happens within a group may distort the rationality of the outcome (Hendricks & Hansen 2016). Hence, considering Habermas’s strategic domination does not seem to directly address the problems of social proof; regrettable information states such as pluralistic ignorance, effects of bystanders, “lemming” behavior, or “bandwagon effects,” may all disturb communication within the public sphere.

Scholars of public sphere studies have, not surprisingly (but not always fairly either) criticized Habermas’s model as both problematically unrealistic and highly idealized: power structures and privileges are prevalent factors that pervert, disrupt, disable, and act counter to any genuine sphere of deliberation (e.g., Bruell et al. 2012; Fraser 1990, 65; Plummer 2003). The public space is not governed solely by constructive deliberation and rational communication; it is influenced also by political perspectives (e.g., leftist and rightist stances, cf. Mouffe 1999, 2; 2005), interests, affection, irony and satire. Deliberation is not the only value – or ideal – in political argument but merely one among others that are necessary for checking or moving any dominating political framework and its communication-related prescriptions.¹ The central problem is one of hegemonic representation – structurally or intentionally – leaving out minorities, of whatever kind, as well as representing overarching populist narratives such as “We the People,” whoever “We” may be.

However, the problem of bots (discussed below) and generally automaton-generated content within public spheres presents new challenges with regard to the nature and purpose of public space: these new agents and sorts of content may further distort and encumber the already-restricted space. The problem of automatically generated content in public spheres points to a problem of representation – namely, the possibility of assessing any form of hegemonic or heterogenic representation of any **kind of humanly generated opinion** – at individual level and in groups.

¹ See, for example, the case study in Jeffrey Wimmer’s work (2005, 105) of so-called counter-public spheres, which may “revive a paralysed public sphere” by comprising “alternative media content, alternative media practice and strategy.”

Bot-generated content and automated opinion is not equivalent to human opinion, either in its production or in the process, and social proof for bots seems *prima facie* to be different from social proof for humans. In turn, a public space inhabited by bots and humans in concert is a new configuration, in contrast to a public sphere composed of only human-to-human discursive relations. And what sort of public space does the mixture of bots and humans amount to?

3. Misinformation and auto-generated digital public space

On August 2, 2016, a report was released on the proliferation of digital misinformation and the challenges such information presents to global society and security. This report, published by the Center for European Policy Analysis, considers misinformation to be a type of global warfare. The report describes how traffic among users on digital platforms is conducive to political manipulation. This report centers on the potential of Russian information warfare in Eastern Europe.²

Moreover, the World Economic Forum has added **the proliferation of misinformation and digital wildfires in the public sphere by digital means** to the list of the great challenges of our time: “The global risk of **massive digital misinformation** sits at the centre of a constellation of technological and geopolitical risks ranging from **terrorism** to **cyber attacks** and the **failure of global governance**” (emphasis in the original).³ And now, in 2017, against the backdrop of Brexit, the 2016 US election, the rise of fake news and “alternative facts,” and growing public mistrust (in business, government, media, and NGOs), the World Economic Forum has, in its Global Risks Report 2017, reiterated the message, emphasizing again the view that misinformation indeed is a clear and present danger to democracy and governance worldwide.

In 2012, Harvard University’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society published a report on Russian cyberspace and its possible vulnerability to digital control.⁴ Even though Russia’s government do exert stronger controls on traditional printed media than digital media, the report claims that the possibility of taking part in digital political activism by sharing viewpoints, which is more cost-free than in the equivalent with traditional media, paves the way for new possibilities in control and manipulation strategies aimed at the digital public: When the costs of participation are low to nonexistent, it is easier for the average citizen to “chip in” and join the political debate on the digital platforms available for such exchanges. This again leaves governmental powers with new venues for distributing propaganda, engaging in monitoring, and even interfering via their favorite means – from Twitter “armies” to Facebook followers to bloggers using various online platforms.

Pre-digital propaganda has time and time again fostered false narratives or the spreading of untruthful information, through the pivotal nodes of modern society: newspapers, political

2 See <https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/publications/winning-the-information-war-recommendations-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=2> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

3 See <http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/risk-case-1/digital-wildfires-in-a-hyperconnected-world/#read> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

4 See http://observgo.quebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/42526_GRI12a.pdf (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

speeches, and other forms of one-way communication. With social media and the Internet, our digital world has become a flow of network interaction and information directed toward both individuals and crowds. Everyone now has access to the digital public. Everybody is now a broker of information, but the information need not be true to be noted, engaging, or shared online among peers.

The new battlefield on which propagandistic movements – nation-level or rebel groups – fight may inundate the digital arena with specific narratives or stories exploited to their advantage. They are narratives for us to see, and we might even share them with others as an influential voice in our ultra-local digital network. As is evident from social-psychology research, information-based cascade effects may result in everyone in a group believing something that is not the case. Worse, while not every member may believe it to begin with, the individual mind is convinced to believe such-and-such about the matter at hand because everyone else apparently seems to believe it, and as such it becomes the general opinion in the network. A variety of this state – so-called pluralistic ignorance – may be cunningly utilized on the digital battlefields of opinion. If one can get specific sections of the population, such as crucial swing voters, to believe that something is the case only because they are led to think wrongly that everyone else believes it (in so doing, adapting to the presumed crowd opinion), that may be just what is needed to beat the democratic election system.

We know from various studies that Twitter is being (mis)used to create profiles that automatically generate or share tweets. Accordingly, these profiles are referred to as bots (an abbreviation for “software robots”). In this venue, one can program publishing power, because “Twitter has transformed from a personal micro-blogging site to an information publishing venue” (Chu et al. 2012, 811). To avail themselves of the opportunity to spread information to people in large numbers, users may utilize Twitter bots to spread that information. Chad Edwards et al. (2014, 375) found that “Twitterbots can be viewed as credible, attractive, competent in communication, and interactional, and might be an appropriate program to transmit information in the social media environment.” If Twitter users are not able to distinguish between social proof of humans and that of bots (“who” have a programmed competency to generate (pseudo-)social proof), then auto-generated content does seem to distort the normal workings of the signals of social interaction, opinion-formation, and navigation in digitalized social-media environments.

E. Ferrara et al. have written the following:

Social media ecosystems populated by hundreds of millions of individuals present real incentives – including economic and political ones – to design algorithms that exhibit human-like behavior. Such ecosystems also raise the bar of the challenge, as they introduce new dimensions to emulate in addition to content, including the social network, temporal activity, diffusion patterns and sentiment expression. A *social bot* is a computer algorithm that automatically produces content and interacts with humans on social media, trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior. Social bots have been known to inhabit social media platforms for a few years” (emphasis in the original).⁵

⁵ See <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1407.5225v3.pdf> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

Some bots are so convincing that it is extremely hard to distinguish them from those profiles that are the voices of real human beings. If one can mobilize a network that is apt enough to create a “shitstorm” or in which real humans are likely to jump on the bandwagon, the scandal is mobilized unrestrainedly. At their worst, these bots are simply there to fuel the digital wildfire.

The aforementioned Harvard report notes how the mobilization of political initiatives may be strategically stimulated by Twitter bots in the Russian public sphere: there was “evidence that one cluster of Twitter users – those centered on the Medvedev policy of modernization – is popular primarily because it is promoted by bots and instrumental Twitter users” (Alexanyan et al. 2012, 11). Moreover, Twitter bots were used also in 2011 for, by their quantity, drowning out anti-Kremlin tweets and thereby divesting them of their potential political reach and influence (ibid., 11; Krebs 2011). In other words, Twitter bots were utilized to outcompete specific types of sentiments held by the local public for purposes of diminishing their impact and influence on specific Twitter networks. Accordingly, bots may be said to be a sort of quantitative diluter of truthful or legitimate political messages, or simply of expressions of **actually held** views. Bots dilute specific points of view by way of quantitatively hijacking specific networks. This is not direct censoring of the public but an attempt to drown out other stances to the point of the latter being negligible or downright disappearing.

In 2016, Bloomberg Businessweek interviewed political hacker Andrés Sepúlveda, a man who in Latin America “led a team of hackers that stole campaign strategies, manipulated social media to create false waves of enthusiasm and derision, and installed spyware in opposition offices.”⁶ He carried on these activities for a decade, ceasing only in 2015. Another example of possible digital manipulation is related to the Republican politician Newt Gingrich, who, besides having been one of President Donald Trump’s loyal supporters, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives in 1995–1999, and *Time Magazine*’s Man of the Year for 1995, has been accused of buying himself Twitter followers, with 92% of his 1.3 million followers being revealed to consist of fake Twitter Followers.

This represents the dawn of manipulation of the digital public sphere that may be initiated by nations against other actors or geopolitical areas (for example, the Eastern European countries’ public spheres could be attacked via pro-Russian flows of information). In this environment, also terror groups can readily disseminate narratives about the moral decadence of the West and their hatred directed at the European intellectual history of free speech and thought.

A key English scientist, philosopher, and statesman of the Enlightenment, Francis Bacon penned the well-known statement that **knowledge is power**. One could, by way of crude summary, state that since Plato’s time the distinction between knowledge and belief has been that knowledge must be truthful while no such criterion is necessarily attached to belief, opinion, or whatever one is informed about. Bacon thought that true belief that is reliably

⁶ See <http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-to-hack-an-election/> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

derived – hence creating knowledge – is an instrument of power, since military strategies rely on pragmatic knowledge of artillery. Today, in the digital age, **information is an instrument of power and manipulation** that neither must be truthful nor needs to be reliably derived from facts or in line with them.

4. Assessment of crowd opinion

So who are “the many” online? Who is the crowd? Recent studies go to show that it is surprisingly easy to create bots that are hard to distinguish from human agents and that just as easily gain followers in significant numbers (Lehmann & Sapieżyński 2013). If there is no method for immediately distinguishing between social proof and auto-generated quasi-social proof within the digital public space, it becomes increasingly hard to assess actual crowd opinion – in other words, the real representation of held opinions.

The new generators of social proof constitute another kind of dynamic: algorithmic attitudinal input in the digital public sphere that has impact upon the administration, creation, and impact of political narratives. For instance, shitstorms may be generated automatically, a fact that gives those in control the opportunity to generate specific types of social proof targeted at other bots to – in an application of centripetal force – generate massive traction via volumes of social proof and thereby create further bandwagon effects. Hence, people join because they believe that everyone else is joining (Wiewiura & Hendricks 2017), and bot-generated social proof leads to the prevalence of a high risk of shitstorms.

The traditional understanding of opinion, its formation, and the responsibility for its formation is typically tied to a single individual. Understood in such a one-to-one framework, with regard to opinion and responsibility for that opinion, bots are by definition not responsible opinion-generators. In the end, it is humans who vote, who are responsible, not machines or dynamic algorithms. Ultimately, the Enlightenment’s *sapere aude* (dare to be wise!) principle is not reflected in bots.

Some of the dangers that can be identified in relation to automata-generated content are

- i. inability to assess on what grounds opinions of publics are substantively formed;
- ii. the inability to register agreement and disagreement in opinion in a manner representative of democratic electorates; and
- iii. the inability to base political voting upon such an electorate, because of the possibility of elections being compromised: hacked by bots or controlled by biased or pre-polarized forces.

5. The grand challenge of digital public space

In a blog post related to an experiment in building Twitter bots, Sune Lehmann and Piotr Sapieżyński (2013) noted the following:

Most importantly, someone with more time [and] resources could easily put together a much larger system of coordinated bots that – in terms of advertisement – could be used to gently boost interest in an upcoming movie/similar. Or – with malevolent intent – could use a network of “sleeper bots” to systematically spread mis-information, e.g. injecting talking points into Twitter streams on a global scale.

An example may aptly illustrate how misinformation might proliferate with, for example, economically damaging consequences: On April 23, 2013, a “hoax tweet” was sent by the Associated Press, which appears to have had its account hacked. The tweet, which said, “Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is Injured,” caused widespread panic in the financial sector. The US stock markets crashed within minutes, and the CBOE Volatility Index, also known as the fear index, surged 10%. During this storm, the S&P 500, NASDAQ, and crude-oil prices all dropped 1%, while the wider market apparently lost almost US\$ 200 billion, according to *USA Today*. There was speculation as to whether the hacking of the Associated Press account was, in fact, an attempted terror attack intended to cause an irreversible crash of US stock markets.⁷

Bots, social media, and automated social proof may amplify irrational group behavior to proportions never experienced before, causing everything from financial bubbles and crashes, through unjustified Twitter storms and extreme opinion bubbles, to political, social, and religious polarization; cyber-bullying; and cyber-attacks – all of which destabilize groups, even entire societies, democracies, countries, and continents. Relying more and more on social media; crowd-based opinion-generators; and other online “democratic” rating systems, comment aggregators, or information-acquisition systems that can so readily be home to bots and be injected with auto-generated content not only makes such sidetracking possible and more likely to occur but also increases the number of people the spreading of false beliefs can reach and amplifies the consequences thereof, even if only unintentionally in some cases. When information spreads in this way without tracking the truth, the resulting phenomenon is referred to as an **infostorm** (Hendricks & Hansen 2016), and bots seem to be just the sort of tool needed to fuel the destabilizing wildfire of infostorms.

Which is better: to add to the mix bots that follow algorithms that are both very good at assessing political arguments and dynamically sensitive to current scientific data, the social sciences, and issues of human rights (or to whatever other elements render a public more informed) and thereby create awareness through massive-scale spamming aimed at making humans more aware of their political environment – importantly, without taking the privilege of decision, reflection, or understanding away from humans – or to ban bots? The question remains unanswered. Banning fake accounts, essentially code or scripts, could lead to problematic entanglements in the realm of freedom of expression and the right to be

7 Vincent F. Hendricks (2014) addressed this in “When Twitter Storms Cause Financial Panic,” a *New Statesman* article from January 22, 2014, available at <http://www.newstatesman.com/business/2014/01/when-twitter-storms-cause-financial-panic> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

anonymous or to privacy, among other issues involving barriers of ethics, social duties, and political responsibilities (Coleman 2009;). The question to be asked for further inquiry is whether it is possible to reorganize the infrastructure of public platforms such that automated content is impossible to generate without compromises to values that must not be comprised.

Acknowledgments

The work of the Center for Information and Bubble Studies is made possible by a generous grant from the Carlsberg Foundation and the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Copenhagen.

References

- Alexanyan, Karina; Barash, Vladimir; Etling, Bruce; Faris, Robert; Gasser, Urs; Kelly, John; Palfrey, John G., & Roberts, Hal (2012). Exploring Russian Cyberspace: Digitally-Mediated Collective Action and the Networked Public Sphere (March 2, 2012). Berkman Klein Center Research Publication 2012-2. Abstract available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014998> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).
- Bruell, Cornelia; Mokre, Monika; & Siim, Birte (2012). Inclusion and Exclusion in the European Public Sphere. *Javnost - The Public* 19(1), pp. 5–19.
- Chu, Zi; Gianvecchio, Steven; Wang Haining; & Jajodia, Sushil (2012). Detecting Automation of Twitter Accounts: Are You a Human, Bot, or Cyborg? *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing* 9(6), pp. 811–824.
- Coleman, G. (2009). CODE IS SPEECH: *Legal Tinkering, Expertise, and Protest among Free and Open Source Software Developers*. *Cultural Anthropology*, 24: 420–454. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2009.01036.x
- Dahlgren, Peter (2005). The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation. *Political Communication* 22(2), pp. 147–162.
- Edwards, Chad; Edwards, Autumn; Spence, Patric R.; & Shelton, Ashleigh K. (2014). Is That a Bot Running the Social Media Feed? Testing the Differences in Perceptions of Communication Quality for a Human Agent and a Bot Agent on Twitter. *Computers in Human Behavior* 33, pp. 372–376.
- Ferrara, E.; Varol, O.; Davis, C.; Menczer, F.; & Flammini, A. (2014). The Rise of Social Bots. *ResearchGate*. Available via https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264123205_The_Rise_of_Social_Bots (most recently accessed on July 4, 2016).
- Fraser, Nancy (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. *Social Text* 25–26, pp. 56–80.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1962). *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1974). The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964). Translation by Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox. *New German Critique* 3, pp. 49–55.
- Hendricks, Vincent F. & Hansen, Pelle G. (2016). *Infostorms: Why Do We “Like?” Explaining Individual Behavior on the Social Net*. New York: Copernicus Books / Springer Nature.
- Krebs, Brian (2011). Twitter Bots Drown Out Anti-Kremlin Tweets. *Krebs on Security*. Available at <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/12/twitter-bots-drown-out-anti-kremlin-tweets/> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

- Lehmann, Sune & Sapieżyński, Piotr (2013). You're Here Because of a Robot (December 4, 2013). Blog post at <https://sunelehmann.com/2013/12/04/youre-here-because-of-a-robot/> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).
- Mouffe, Chantal (2005). *On the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Plummer, K. (2003). Public Intimacies, Private Citizens: Inequalities and the Pluralization of Public Spheres. In *Intimate Citizenship: Private Decisions and Public Dialogues* (pp. 67-83). McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Rhodes, T. (2014). A Living, Breathing Revolution: How Libraries Can Use "Living Archives" to Support, Engage, and Document Social Movements. *IFLA Journal* 40(1), pp. 5–11.
- Sunstein, Cass (2009). *Republic.com 2.0*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Wiewiura, J. S. & Hendricks, V. F. (2017). Informational Pathologies and Interest Bubbles: Exploring the Structural Mobilization of Knowledge, Ignorance and Slack. *New Media & Society* 1, pp. 1–16.
- Wimmer, Jeffrey (2005). Counter-Public Spheres and the Revival of the European Public Sphere. *Javnost - The Public* 12(2), pp. 93–109.
- Wodak, Ruth & Koller, Veronika (2008). Introduction: Shifting Boundaries and Emergent Public Spheres. In: *Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere* (pp. 1–17). Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter.
- Wright, Scott (2008). Language, Communication and the Public Sphere: Definitions. In: Ruth Wodak and Veronika Koller (eds.), *Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere* (pp. 21–43). Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter.
- Cialdini R (2007) *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

II ETHICAL BASIS

4. FROM ETHICS TO ETHICAL ACTION COMPETENCE

Jarmo Toiskallio

“That man is capable of action [...] is possible only because each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.”

Hannah Arendt

“The humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for others, an extreme vulnerability.”

Emmanuel Levinas

1. Introduction

It is confusing that the word “ethics” is used in many ways and in connection with diverse views about the relations between “ethics,” “morals,” and “morality.” Adding to the confusion is the academic definition of “ethics” in the realm of moral philosophy, as if ethics were not practice but philosophical research on morals. Also, what about “ethicality”? Does this mean one’s possession of moral principles and behavior in accordance with them? When considered in greater depth, ethicality demands that we step outside our usual vocabularies and ways of thinking about ethics. Ethicality is the main constitutive element of our humanity as capability of action, as one’s personal action competence. That is where the two quotations above come in as the key to this chapter. Ethicality is conceived of here as a synonym for ethical action competence. Ethicality is one’s capability and responsibility in the face of the unknown. As Arendt says, action – different from labor and work – is always something new in the world.

Definitions of ethics focus mainly on two questions: a) How should one live? b) What ought I do? Speaking about ethical action competence seems to refer to the latter, but the story is not so simple. Ethicality is neither behaving in line with formal principles and codes nor one’s autonomous intentionality. Rather, it is experience that challenges me, that subjects

my ego and my intentions to question. Hence, ethicality as ethical action competence is not ethics in the usual sense of moral principles and right conduct. Neither is it competence in the usual sense: “to reduce human action to a constellation of terms such as ‘performance’, ‘competence’, ‘doing’ and ‘skills’ is [...] to deprive human being of **human being**” (Barnett 1994, 178 – emphasis in the original). It is competence beyond competence. Ethicality as a competence is quite clearly what Ronald Barnett calls “lifeworld becoming.” It is beyond “operational competence” (knowing how, for greater practical effectiveness) and “academic competence” (knowing **that**, for greater cognitive understanding). “Becoming” means that we and our world are not fixed and stable entities but in motion, in a state of endless becoming. The lifeworld is the world as immediately experienced in the subjectivity of everyday life. As such, it is the horizon on which things appear. In his three-dimensional theory of competence for education, Barnett (ibid., 191) says that within lifeworld becoming, students should be enabled to free themselves from the constraints under which they have been thinking and behaving. The world neither is constructed by the mind nor is the mind’s object; we live in it, with it, and from it, and we are embodied in it physically, historically, and linguistically.

“Lifeworld becoming” refers to the phenomenological interest in how meaning comes to be, how it emerges in our consciousness of the world, where phenomenology “is a way of becoming aware of where we are in the world” (Levinas 1986, 50). It is not knowledge but activity of consciousness in order to understand its own preoccupations, to reflect upon itself and thereby discover all the hidden or neglected horizons of its intentionality; instead of sensations and emotions, there is a question of “ontological ways in which we feel and find our being-in-the-world” (ibid., 50–51). It is crucial for the concept of ethical action competence that there is not “the human Being” (with a capital “B”) and that our being-in-the-world is to be as unique human beings with other unique human beings. Individual-level actions “become part of a web of other people’s actions, [...] a web never still and solid” (Young-Bruehl 2006, 88).

Actions of individuals are parts of a pluralistic web but not in the sense applied in structuralist approaches to philosophy, sciences, politics, and social practices, which have explained the human subjectivity out of the scene. The idea of structuralism is that human thinking and behavior are nothing but formations of some totalizing structures – historical, political, cultural, social, religious, linguistic, etc. The unique individual does not matter. I will argue in this piece that it is fruitless and absurd to talk about ethicality without putting a thinking, judging, and responsible human subject at the center of the action. There is no ethicality without individual subjects.

The concept of ethical action competence will be presented here not as a scientific construct but as a metaphor calling for one “to change one’s language and one’s life” instead of giving “a proposal about how to systematize either,” in the words of American philosopher Richard Rorty (1989). There cannot be any scientific theory of ethicality, and any serious thinking about ethicality should be conducted without a desire to have a “manual of ethics” as an end product. Rather, I hope to point here to certain aspects for consideration by educators and trainers, mainly approached through following in the footsteps of French ethicist Levinas (1906–1995) and German-American political theorist Arendt (1906–1975), quoted at the start of the chapter. This kind of thinking must go “beyond the limitations of knowledge,”

as Arendt (1973, 163) said. According to her, thinking means doing more with one's intellectual abilities than using them "as an instrument for knowing and doing" (ibid., 163).

Levinasian ethics takes us beyond knowledge, even beyond the knowledge of ethics; it has been called "ethics of ethics" and "ethics beyond ethics." Ethics (*l'ethique*) was the name he gave to our relationship to another human being before and beyond knowledge. This is the main path chosen for the discussion of ethicality in the present chapter: ethical action competence is our relationship to the lifeworld – to the interspace between us. As Arendt said, ethical action competence is fighting against "world alienation" and "worldlessness." It is fighting against a loss of the action that constitutes the space of meanings, memories, and stories. People as refugees or exiles, the stateless, homeless, and displaced of the earth are in danger of worldlessness, but so too is every one of us in a society that "demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning" (Arendt 1998, 322).

2. Pedagogical background

The background for this chapter lies in military pedagogy as developed since the 1990s (see Florian 2002; Kvernbekk et al. 2008). Military pedagogy means thinking critically about education and training of people in the defense forces – people who are individuals and citizens of a democracy in the midst of ever-changing complexities, difficulties, and cruelties of the world.

Human security, peace-building and peacekeeping, security-sector reform, and civil–military relations have been growing in importance. All of these have much to do with pedagogy. All of them demand processes with the aim of providing both civilians and soldiers with new ways to think about security, peace, and life. This is the task of military pedagogy, and that is why the roles of ethics and the concept of human security have been evolving in their roles in research and teaching (Micewski & Annen 2005; Toiskallio 2004; 2007; van Baarda & Verweij 2009). Most of those terms or concepts are institutional-political, but action competence refers to the agency of an individual, and precisely herein lies a profound challenge for military pedagogy.

At the Finnish National Defence University, there have been three main points of focus in military pedagogy: the foundational concepts are i) "action competence" as a holistic body with ethical, physical, psychic, and social aspects; ii) "soldiership" in the sense of who is a soldier and what it means to be an action-competent soldier; and iii) research done in the framework of a democratic society. Those three elements given focus are deeply intertwined: it is not enough to ask "what" one is – even in hierarchical and instrumental institutions such as the armed forces. The fundamental question is instead "who" one is. The "who" as a personal, responsible agent forms the core of action competence. If the person as "who" is reduced to a "what," existential holism is destroyed, broken into anonymous, neutral parts – action is reduced into predictable and controllable behavior or into plain physical movements. That is just what happens in traditional military training; individual soldiers are reduced to being cogs in the machine, or, as Prussian leader Frederick the Great once said, soldiers must be more afraid of their officers than of the enemy. In such a case, ethicality disappears, yet "morality" is quite often used as a totalizing word.

The concept of action competence goes back to basics. It describes the factuality of human existence. We are bodies of blood and flesh (**physical**), as individuals we live in the world with other individuals (social), each of us has an inner life (**psychic**), and as bodies with inner and social life we each day face events that challenge our ego and habitual ways of thinking and acting in front of others (**ethical**). Here, “in front of others” refers to one’s ethical situation and relation as a subject among other individuals or relative to the Other.

3. The need for ethical action competence

Every sane human can understand, without theory-based reflection, that it is ethically wrong and bad for peacekeepers to exploit the vulnerability of the people they have been sent to protect. By doing so, they would not only behave contrary to their professional codes of conduct but also destroy the other’s humanity and their own likewise, because they deny the responsibility of one human being to another.

Peace is always better than war, violence, hatred, and cruelty. That is why peace operations, as operations carried out to prevent conflicts, manage crises, and perform post-conflict rebuilding, are fundamentally moral activities. But institutions and organizations do not act; they operate. Only humans can act. Hence, institutions and organizations can be moral or immoral in their actions, while only humans as individuals can act ethically or unethically. Ethicality is a deeply personal, subjective challenge. But it is far from egocentrism. Ethical action competence of a subject does not simply refer to “private ethics” in the sense of searching for perfection in oneself, the self’s relationship to itself. There is the meeting of other people. Ethicality involves one’s actions as a moral subject among, with, and in relation to others.

The United Nations has detailed codes of conduct for peacekeepers. They are based on the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their aim is to ensure “the highest standards of conduct, professionalism and accountability of all [UN] personnel deployed globally, including the deployment of more than 100,000 civilian, police and military peacekeeping personnel” (UN Standards of Conduct 2016). The UN expects all peacekeeping personnel to adhere to the highest standards of behavior, but still “the persistence of serious crimes against vulnerable local populations perpetrated by some of the very individuals charged with protecting them puts at risk the sustainability of peacekeeping missions in the longer term. Indeed, the fact that the problem persists despite several expert reports commissioned by the UN over the last ten years only serves to exacerbate the perception that the UN is more concerned with rhetoric than action” (Deschamps et al. 2015). This self-critical text is found in a UN report; it is deeply moral, but it speaks at an institutional level, saying not a word about ethicality of individuals. The administrative rules and orders are not enough if the UN as an institution wants to take “concrete action to prevent future violations. In the absence of such a response, the integrity and credibility of the UN and of its Member States are put in serious jeopardy” (ibid.).

What do Arendt and Levinas have to say? The true perennial theme for both of them involved profound critique of totalizing philosophies, politics, and practices. For them, the Nazi concentration camps represented the most horrible loss of ethicality, and those camps are

not confined to the pages of history; the idea or logic behind them lives always, as a latent danger, always lurking in new and changing modes of terror all over the world. Humanism entails being awake at all times and everywhere in order to discover losses of ethicality, which Arendt called “banality of evil” and thoughtlessness and which Levinas referred to as blindness to our infinite responsibility and as “defacing the other.” These words refer to being imprisoned within a totality, which means losing one’s capacity, as a person, for action and thinking. We become thoughtless in the social and political situations of banality of evil in which we do not meet the face of the other and in which we lose our sense of infinite responsibility. The paradigmatic examples can be found in every kind of totalitarianism just as well as in war. In these situations, persons are forced to “carry out actions that will destroy every possibility for action” (Levinas 2015, 21).

Why should we follow the paths opened by Arendt and Levinas? In her recent book *Arendt, Levinas and a Politics of Relationality*, Anya Topolski (2015) gives a perfect answer: i) their philosophical contributions are responses to questions invited by the horrors of totalitarianism, ii) their commitment to the phenomenological approach is important, iii) both of them sought to understand what role the Western philosophical tradition played in preparing the ground for totalitarian thinking and government, and iv) their common horizon draws on philosophical anthropology of hope and represents a relational approach and responsibility.

Today it is clear that the grounds for totalitarian thinking had their roots not only in Western tradition, and once again we are confronted worldwide with what Arendt called “dark times.” In dark times, disorder, hunger, massacres, and slaughter thrive, and camouflage is provided by highly efficient talk and double-talk explaining away unpleasant facts and justified concerns (Arendt 2014, viii). Phenomenology investigates our being in the world, with focus on what is experienced by a subject, a living human being. From this point of view, Arendt’s and Levinas’s analyses of metaphysical traditions as grounds for totalitarian thinking will always be up-to-date. It will always be important to reawaken ourselves to how the particular is subsumed under something that is assumed to be greater, stronger, brighter, wiser, etc., be it “nation,” “religion,” “party,” “economy,” or “History” or “Reason.” To put it concretely, one could say that in totalitarian thinking, individual human beings are seen as cogs or tools in the system or structure, having to sacrifice themselves for it. Arendt pinned her hopes on individual, unique human beings, saying that “even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination,” which comes “less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light” from some men and women in their lives and works (ibid., ix).

The phenomenological asking for experience seeks a return to basics, to the issue in itself, experience beyond any *a priori* idea, science, theory, and everyday understanding. In situations involving ethics, one cannot manage only with universal moral principles or laws: my personal responsibility is non-transferable, and “it is ethically impossible to transfer my responsibility for my neighbour to a third party” (Levinas 1993, 44). Levinas states that “my ethical responsibility is my uniqueness, my election” (ibid.), but my ethicality, my ethical responsibility, is also investing of my own freedom: “I am instituted as non-interchangeable; I am chosen as unique and incomparable” (ibid., 125).

Experiencing stems from the reality that I as an individual live in the world with other people, other concrete individuals, who are not concepts but of flesh and blood with every person's inner life. Within this reality, to be ethical means to justify one's life and one's construal of the world in front of another whose body is vulnerable to hunger, thirst, pain, and misery (Perpich 2008, 6). In other words, one is responsible for everyone's, including one's own, action competence, because one cannot be alive without it. In this sense, ethicality is "normativity without norms" (ibid., 124–149): thou shalt not kill, so as not to take away anyone's action competence!

Refugees and immigration, climate change, promotion of democracy, and humanitarian interventions are some of the difficult contemporary problems that demand political, moral, and ethical decisions and actions. But in the everyday practicalities of life – beyond politics and moral absolutes – there are acting and suffering individual human beings. They are not a faceless mass or instances of principles or concepts but experiencing beings in the world with other experiencing beings. Only an individual in front of another human being can be ethical. Competence in this sense means not just a set of acquired skills and behaviors but wakefulness, vigilance, and readiness that precedes and undermines self-consciousness. Ethical action competence, according to Levinas, means "deformalization": symbolic forms are interrupted, overcharged, and broken by moral imperatives (Cohen 2003, xxxi). Moral imperatives mean "ethical transcendence," another human being's humanity, his or her very otherness.

4. Problems of competence and teaching

Is it possible to teach ethical action competence? Hans-Georg Gadamer (1988, 286) pointed out a crucial pedagogical challenge when writing that "moral knowledge can never be knowable in advance in the manner of knowledge that can be taught." He referred to Aristotle. When criticizing the Platonic idea of good as an empty generality, Aristotle posed a question about the humanly good: what is good in terms of human action? According to him, man becomes what he is through what he does. Aristotle drew a distinction between a virtue of thought and a virtue of character. The first grows mostly from teaching, but the virtue of character results from *ethos* (habits) and education. In action, which is different from making or production, a specific kind of knowledge is needed: self-knowledge, knowledge for oneself, distinct from theoretical and technical knowledge. It is a virtue, a complex of experience and ability to see how to apply general principles in a specific, singular situation. What is important is that one is not an observer but involved in the situation. Simon Critchley (2009, 66) puts this well in these words: ethicality is "not a spectator sport" but "my experience of a claim or demand that I both cannot fully meet and cannot avoid." What is needed is practical wisdom – not the same thing as knowledge, which can be known in advance.

Is it fitting to speak about "competence" when describing ethicality? In everyday and administrative parlance, "competence" refers to skills and knowledge acquired via training and experience, and to one's ability to apply them to performance of some tasks. "Competence" refers to something we can know in advance, but in a deeper sense action competence is very different; it means to be alive and to act in an unknown reality. As Arendt says in the quote

at the start of this chapter, with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world. The concept of action competence is rooted in the fact that we as humans are holistic units – beings with physical-social-psychic-ethical aspects of being. Ethicality, as ethical action competence, is the driving force in this holistic being, because it is how we encounter other individuals and the world. For instance, shortcomings in physical, psychic, or social respects may somehow be compensated for by other facets, but losses of ethicality cannot be offset by training in physical fitness or by enhancing psychic and social cleverness. One might have a large amount of knowledge, be extremely clever, and be in good shape physically but still be without ethicality.

Responsibility is the core of ethical action competence: I must take responsibility and not try to deny my responsibility by attributing it to others. Ethical action competence is not a legal category, and it does not mean merely acting in accordance with professional codes of conduct. Neither is it only acting in line with certain moral norms. Ethicality as action competence is against externalizing responsibility to a legal or moral system. Especially in a strictly hierarchical crisis and emergency organizations such as the military, police, and rescue services, with their detailed codes of conduct and other rules, the question of personal responsibility is crucial. An institution has no agency apart from that of people: “Its actions are their actions as performed in accordance with the appropriate rules” (Audi 2007, 86 – emphasis in the original). In practical education and training, there is a pedagogical challenge to transform those rules into individuals’ ethical action competence. If we feel an obligation to help other beings only because of principles and codes or “feel that obligation only when the suffering person I am confronted with is **nice, or sympathetic, or someone I can identify with,**” we are “not [...] ethical at all, no matter how many principles [we] may be guided by or willing to give [our] life for” (Putnam 2005, 24 – emphasis in the original).

However important the role of teaching moral knowledge and codes of conduct, we should be more interested, as Levinas says, in “vigilance of a continual reawakening” within ethical situations, more interested in the uniqueness of an individual “identifying itself as incessant awakening” (Levinas 1993, 156). Awakening to what? To our infinite responsibility to and for other beings. Before accountability to systems and codes, even to “ethics,” ethicality is responsibility to and for other beings: for Arendt and Levinas, “responsibility is both about the self and other(s), enacted by a self who is therefore taking responsibility for the other and thus acts to strengthen and support the shared world,” as Topolski notes (2015, 192). Ethical action competence is taking care of our common world, the world as a social and political space between us. In Arendt’s words, ethical action competence is, in essence, fighting against the “loss of the world” or “world-alienation,” or “worldlessness.” In short, it is this fighting that Arendt calls “action.”

As Arendt says in the opening of this chapter, action competence – capability of action – is the core of every unique human being’s humanity. According to Levinas, violence involves not only injuring and annihilating persons but also destroying the possibility of their action. Neither Arendt nor Levinas offers a normative theory of ethics and action. They do challenge us, in different ways, to grasp our encounter with the social reality before and beyond concepts, theories, and institutions. That is not to say that concepts, theories, and institutions are bad things, but they may turn out to be if we become “thoughtless,” as Arendt says, and do not meet the ethical relation beyond knowledge, as Levinas says. It is important to

teach moral knowledge, but the task of education deep down is to help and empower individuals to take the step from formal moral knowledge to ethical action competence.

5. What ethicality means

The Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard wrote in 1835, “What I really need is to be clear about **what I am to do**, not what I must know ... [the main thing] is to find **the idea for which I am willing to live and die** [...]. It is this inward action of [...] man, that matters, not a mass of information” (Kierkegaard 1996, 32–34 – emphasis in the original). This is the foundational meaning of ethical action competence. But it is not enough: Levinas takes us even further by asking this: “Do I have a right to exist?” This means that ethicality is “**against nature** because it forbids the murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first” (Levinas 1986, 60 – emphasis in the original).

Ethicality consists of an individual’s experiences, deliberations, judgments, decisions, actions, and responsibility. It may sound like an oxymoron to speak about competence in the sphere of ethicality. We never can be ethically “competent” in the ordinary, administrative sense of the word, according to which a competent individual is the master of a situation. On the contrary, ethical action competence refers to a shock, to an encounter with an event that disturbs the peace and coherence of one’s mind or soul. Ethicality hurts; it wounds me.

An ethical person is neither a saint nor a hero. If one understands ethical action competence as a heroic excellence, that person may turn to be what Kierkegaard called “a tragic hero” lost in obedient, mechanical application of universal rules. Rather, an ethically action-competent person is like the Kierkegaardian “knight of faith” with the paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal. Without this kind of individual ethicality, morality condenses to formal rules and norms and, at its worst, to sheltering of evil and indeed a politics of war and a culture of death. As Arendt (1973, 45) wrote, “We now [after Hitlerism and Stalinism] know that moral norms and standards can be changed overnight, and all that then will be left is the mere habit of holding fast to something.”

Ethicality is more than knowing moral rules and codes of conduct, and more than to behave in accord with them. To be ethically action-competent means that an individual awakens to ask him- or herself “**how should I act in this particular situation so as to act in a good, right, and responsible way?**” Those situations are often not only new, complex, and difficult but mentally stressing, and they may be lethally dangerous. There may be heavy and contradictory political, cultural, juridical, religious, social, and organizational pressures on one’s conscience and sense of justice and humanity. Those situations are events that fall on us. Ethicality happens at the borders of ethics.

Perhaps we wake up into ethicality only when facing what Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) called a boundary situation. This refers to a situation in which the individual must choose and decide without being guided by certain knowledge. One has to undergo extreme decisions and choices in the course of existence and thereby find out who his or her self is. This is manifested in an event wherein “I am no longer sheltered by a certifying effectiveness of pragmatic truth, by a demonstrable certainty of the understanding, or by a protective totality of spirit”

(Jaspers 1995, 39). The boundary situation is experience as an interruption; experience as “contact with a reality that does not fit into any a priori idea, which overflows all of them,” as Levinas (1987, 59) says. This is where ethicality starts.

In the words of Levinas, the hard core of ethical action competence can be condensed in this way: “The humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for others, an extreme vulnerability.” This means that ethicality is, at base, one’s non-egocentric encounter with another individual. According to Levinas, the encounter with the other can never be reduced into consciousness; it precedes all empirical social and political realities and therefore can never be known by the self-conscious subject. At the moment we reduce the other into our concepts, we step out of ethicality.

It is fruitful to consider, alongside Levinas and Arendt, “practical wisdom,” the Aristotelian *phronesis*. In a way, ethical action competence means practical wisdom. The *phronimos*, a practically wise man, is already in an event, in a situation, with obligations to make decisions and to act. Ethicality as *phronesis* is not a duty mediated through the formal and procedural universalization of maxims. Rather, from the Levinasian perspective, it is lived in the sensibility of a corporeal obligation to the other, and according to John Caputo (1993) it is an obligation that we cannot avoid. Accordingly, ethical action deviates radically from the commonsense and mainstream theoretical conceptions about action in which an autonomous and intentional subject is the starting point of action. The Levinasian perspective differs from the Aristotelian *phronesis*, and if we are to develop the idea of ethical action competence, Caputo’s “radicalized *phronesis*,” a sort of meta-*phronesis*, is needed. This is what Levinas means when he says that ethicality “is lived in the sensibility of a corporeal obligation to the other.”

In ethicality there is always experience, with the “ex” referring to exteriority, to other than me. Ethicality is not inside myself; it is my encounter with the world, the reality that is other than me. Vulnerability, one of the central notions of Levinas, refers to a shock of the encounter as the starting point for ethicality. This is a shock that calls me into a never-ending self-forming activity. In “to be ethical” there is the verb “to be,” becoming without a final end, because the world is infinite. As much as self-forming activity, ethicality is infinite awakening into the infinity of the world.

Ethics is principles, norms, rules, and theories, but ethicality means one’s actions as an individual in singular situations and events in which one is obliged to act. Obligation is more than a duty; obligations “come over us [... and] shock our freedom and autonomy” – obligation is something “that has us before we have it” (ibid., 27–31). Let us consider a disaster such as a terrorist attack or earthquake. We have plans and orders that address how to behave, but the disaster transcends them and we find ourselves in a dramatically new situation. There is a real, painfully urgent need to make decisions without certain knowledge and not merely follow procedures. Ethicality emerges primarily from our experiences as sentient bodies of flesh and blood. Without returning to bodies that feel hunger, thirst, and cold, that need rest and fresh air, we are not able to think about ethicality. Only through awakening for those basics are we able – if we want to be human beings – to see our obligations and non-transferable responsibility.

6. Thinking, awakening, and experience

The two central features of action are, according to Arendt, freedom and plurality. Freedom means the capacity to begin, to start something new, to do the unexpected. Action is “doing,” different from “making” as production and from rule-based behavior. Action as the realization of freedom is rooted in the fact that each birth of a child is a new beginning and introducing of novelty into the world. In principle, every human being is born into action competence. Plurality as the other feature of action refers both to equality and to distinction, to the fact that all human beings are sufficiently alike to understand one another while, at the same time, no two of them are interchangeable, since each is a unique individual.

Ethical action competence is not knowledge, but still it is thinking. It is internal dialogue between me and myself as a sort of Socratic “two-in-one” thinking, and it is a study of the self’s relationship to itself, *rappont á soi*, as Michel Foucault (1986) said. Unethical behavior is more an absence of thinking as inner dialogue than one’s evilness or lack of knowledge. It is a profound question, how and why we may become – if we may borrow Arendt’s two key concepts – “thoughtless” and what might be the way to become, as it were, thought-full. An answer might be found rooted in the concept of *phronesis*. For Aristotle, this means “the state of soul” as a precondition for action, *praxis*. He distinguished action from productive work, *poiesis*, for which the state of soul is *techné*, know-how. We need both of them, but practical wisdom should precede the knowledge of how to make things. For awakening into ethicality and thoughtfulness, it is crucially important to grasp the difference between *phronesis* and *techné*. Forgetting *phronesis* and displaying inability to see the difference between *praxis* and work is the common feature of capitalism, Marxism, and neoliberalism. Its most brutal sign was the text “Arbeit macht Frei” at the Nazi death camps. In John Caputo’s words, a society where productive work rules out *phronesis* is a world in which “a responsibility to those who live and die, to those who are embodied, who suffer or are in pain, who grow old and infirm, above all, to innocent victims” has been silenced (Bernstein 1991, 134).

Levinas describes the destruction of humanity in many ways, but the core of it is denial of the independence of beings and making them my property. He goes as far as saying that already “understanding carries out an act of violence and of negation” in the sense that it “denies the independence of beings: they are mine” or they “are in my power” (Levinas 2006, 8). According to Levinas, herein lies the challenge of ethicality: there is a crucial difference between **understanding** and **meeting** the other person. Only meeting can be ethical – in understanding the other in terms of his or her history, environment, and habits, we do not meet “him in himself.” In understanding, however, we put the other “on the horizon” and see him or her “as an element in the world in which I stand [...]. I have not looked straight at him” (ibid., 9). This means that we can teach understanding (how to put individuals on the horizon of environment, history, culture, religion, habits, etc.) but not ethicality as meeting of a unique human being in him- or herself.

Ethicality as ethical action competence is one’s incessant awakening into infinite responsibility or, in Arendt’s words, into action as care for our shared world. Ethical action competence takes place in the plurality of unique individuals, but always it is the I who is responsible. Education into ethical action competence is not training but more self-formation or self-cultivation, better described as *Bildung*, or edification. When Richard Rorty described edification as “abnormal and reactive,” he came close to the Levinasian “continual reawa-

kening”: edification is aimed at defeating the danger of “freezing-over of culture [...] the dehumanization of human beings” (Rorty 1989, 377). Gadamer (1988, 15–17) had already described *Bildung* as keeping oneself “open to what is other, to other” – “to distance oneself from oneself and one’s private purposes” and after that “to return to oneself.”

In practical terms, education as *Bildung* or **edification** must start with acculturation as awareness of the social practices of a community and culture and with learning to behave in line with its codes of conduct, but this is only a preliminary stage, providing a jumping-off point for continuous self-forming, as a “return to oneself” or as “the self’s relationship to itself.”

Totality is a central concept when we consider ethicality. Totalization means “a reduction of all experience [...] to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaves nothing other outside of itself, and thus becomes absolute thought” (Levinas 2011, 75–76). In contrast to totalization, ethicality means fighting against reducing the other to the same in the sense of a refusal of what is outside my (our) knowledge or understanding and intentions (Levinas 2015, 43). It can be said also, in line with Rorty’s words, that ethicality as solidarity is not based upon Reason or Theory; rather, it is a goal to be achieved by imagination whereby we become sensitive to the concrete details of the pain and humiliation of our fellow human beings (Bernstein 1991, 264–265). One’s behavior becomes unethical when he or she has not become sensitive to the concrete details of the pain and humiliation of fellow human beings. Even “professional ethics” may operate against ethical action competence, in hiding, or forgetting, the face behind a totality of professional expertise.

The action competence of individual, unique men and women is violated every time their singularity is subsumed under a concept wherein the singular is seen only through a structure, whether it be religion, politics, technology, economy, race, nationality, party, profession, or whatever else. Because action is a fundamental mode of human being, suffering is not solely physical or mental pain; it is fundamentally “the reduction, even the destruction, of the capacity for acting, being-able-to-act” (Ricoeur 1994, 190).

Ethicality disappears if we stop thinking – or are forced to stop by, for instance, politics, education, or even moral codes. Thinking, in this sense, is not a cognitive process but going back to experience. People can be very intelligent, well-trained, highly educated, and technically competent, with plenty of knowledge and skills, but still thoughtless and blind to the banality of evil in themselves and their communities. Actually, we may become thoughtless and blind just because of training that takes us inside a totality of certain knowledge, values, and worldview. Arendt’s concern lay in the huge potential danger of highly trained, well-educated, and intelligent people – acting as politicians, civil servants, military officers, etc. – without the capability of thinking. Against thoughtlessness, ethicality is “a shock” in Levinasian terms; it “breaks with the inward play of the soul.” It challenges me and my intentions.

Challenging belongs to experience. In the profound sense of the word, experience means that we are transported beyond what constitutes our nature – an experience in the strongest sense of the term is contact with a reality that does not fit into any *a priori* idea schema; experience overflows all the existing ideas (Levinas 1987, 59). We are confronted with the challenge of ethicality in events and situations that are beyond knowledge, habitual codes of conduct, and modes of customary behavior. As Levinas (*ibid.*, 56) says, experience is a

relationship with the exterior and “breaks with the inward play of the soul”; he states that, therefore, it “alone deserves the name experience.” That is much like what Jacques Derrida (1999, 66) called undecidability in real decision-making: “there would be no decision, in the strong sense of the word, [...] and thus no responsibility, without the experience of some undecidability.” Without it, “the decision would simply be the application of a programme [...]. If we knew what to do, [...] then the decision would not be a decision.” That is, according to Derrida, the point where ethics starts: you have to go beyond knowledge at “the moment when the general categories have to be overcome, when I am alone facing a decision.” Undecidability is not a psychological state of mind, nor does it mean weakness of character; the word describes the experience of an entirely new and difficult situation for which we do not have training, knowledge, and concepts but a situation in which we are deeply involved, one that “breaks the play of the soul” and in which we have the obligation to act, even beyond our professional and institutional duty and morality. That is why Levinas (2015, 21) said that it is “of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.”

7. Conclusions

Professions govern themselves through codes of ethics that define their obligations in their professional behavior. A code of ethics, or a moral code, provides professions with a consistent and common moral language and principled guidelines for ethical actions. But moral codes have limits when applied to ethical decision-making of individuals in the midst of particular new situations – in ethical situations.

The UN concept of human security, with its focus on individuals, families, and local communities, means a paradigm shift. Slogans such as “freedom from fear,” “freedom from want,” and “life with dignity” represent the idea of human security. If human security is to be the paradigm of the activities for peace, the individual selves should be at the center of education and training for building and keeping peace. New conceptions of competencies are needed. I have argued in this chapter that ethical action competence could serve as one of these. As a metaphor, it leads us to think about how ethicality emerges from an experience as “a contact with a reality that does not fit into any a priori idea.” We can be ethically action competent only through a relationship that opens us to the infinite otherness of all other human beings.

Universal principles and rules cannot keep us safe when we are concretely confronted with an other, a fellow human being. It is typical of political, administrative, and scientific discourses to forget individuals behind structures. The duty of thinking about ethicality is to deconstruct that kind of structuralism via the question of why it is that we are doing bad things within the sheltering structures of goodness and morality even though trained to behave in accordance with moral, cultural, and political codes of conduct. At their best, moral rules serve as guidelines for ethicality. At their worst, they destroy ethicality, one’s infinite responsibility.

Ethicality as ethical action competence is radicalized practical wisdom, which means “the ability to cope with, to judge among, competing and incommensurable schemata” and readiness “to face the worst, to wade into the difficulty of factual life without the guardrails

of metaphysics or ethics” (Caputo 1993, 102). Ethicality goes further than solving moral problems. It is one’s infinite becoming and responsibility as a vulnerable subject. It has neither a firm foundation nor a fixed end. At the borders where codes of ethics cannot support and save us anymore, ethicality leads us to “fear and tremble,” as Kierkegaard said, or into the horrible experience of undecidability, as Derrida said a hundred years after him. Arendt put it in a positive way: “Moral conduct [...] seems to depend primarily upon the intercourse of man with himself” (Arendt 2003, 67). That kind of intercourse is “thinking and judging instead of applying categories and formulas” (ibid., 37). It is a type of thinking different from solving technical and theoretical problems. It is the line that strikes across all social, cultural, and educational differences. Without personal thinking, “moral norms and standards can be changed overnight” (ibid., 45). Ethicality is sensibility that takes place “on the surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves” (Levinas 1991, 18). That is why only individuals as unique human beings, as subjects, can be ethically action competent. Institutions and organizations cannot. Action is initiation and unpredictability, and it needs the virtue of courage, as Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (2006, 86–87) says in her book *Why Arendt Matters*.

Ethical action competence is the way to keep morality and codes of conduct alive. Levinas (1986, 65) says that morality “is what governs the world of political ‘interestedness’, the social interchanges between citizens in a society.” Ethicality “as the extreme exposure and sensitivity of one subjectivity to another, becomes morality and hardens its skin as soon as we move into the political world of [...] government, institutions, tribunals, prisons, schools, committees, etc.” It belongs to the core of the concept of ethical action competence to “inspire and direct the moral order” to see “the ethical norm of the interhuman,” because without ethicality the moral-political order “must accept all forms of society including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them” (ibid., 65–66). In the Levinasian vocabulary, ethicality means “diacony before dialogic.” But in this “humanism of the other” there is the self. It is intimately tied to responsibility in the meaning of justifying oneself in front of the other. Responsibility is “to be called to justify one’s life and one’s construal of the world before an other whose body is vulnerable to hunger, thirst, pain, and misery” (Perpich 2008, 6). It is the face of the other that calls me to responsibility.

Ethical action competence differs sharply from “macho ethics,” a term borrowed from the words of Hilary Putnam (2004, 29–30). It is based on the experience that there can be “**glory** – glory, and yes, **dignity** – in siding with the victims of plunder and conquest, with the poor and downtrodden” (emphasis in the original). Ethicality hurts, and it requires courage: “How can I tell right from wrong, if the majority or my whole environment has prejudged the issue?” (Arendt 2003, 18). Am I action competent if left alone with my conscience and my infinite responsibility?

References

- Arendt, H. (1998 [1958]). *The Human Condition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, H. (2003). *Responsibility and Judgment*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Arendt, H. (2014 [1951]). *Men in Dark Times*. USA: Stellar Classics.
- Audi, R. (2007). *Moral Values and Human Diversity*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

- Barnett, R. (1994). *The Limits of Competence: Knowledge, Higher Education and Society*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
- Bernstein, R. (1991). *The New Constellation*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Caputo, J. (1993). *Against Ethics*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Cohen, R. (2003). Introduction: Humanism and Anti-Humanism - Levinas, Cassirer, and Heidegger. In: Levinas, E., *Humanism of the Other*. Urbana & Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois.
- Critchley, S. (2009). *Ethics—Politics—Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas & Contemporary French Thought*. London: Verso.
- Derrida, J. (1999). Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility. In: Kearney, R., Dooley, M. (Eds.) *Questioning Ethics. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy* (pp. 65-83). London: Routledge.
- Deschamps, M.; Jallow, H.; & Sooka, Y. (2015). Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic. Available at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/cenaficrepublic/Independent-Review-Report.pdf> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).
- Florian, H. (ed.) (2002). *Military Pedagogy – an International Survey*. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang.
- Foucault, M. (1986). On the Genealogy of Ethics. In: P. Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin Books.
- Gadamer, H.-G. (1988 [1975]). *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Jaspers, K. (1995 [1939]). *Philosophy of Existence*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
- Kierkegaard, S. (1996). *Papers and Journals*. London: Penguin Books.
- Kvernbekk, T.; Simpson, H.; & Peters M. (eds.). (2008). *Military Pedagogies and Why They Matter*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Levinas, E. (1986). Ethics of the Infinite. In: R. Kearney (ed.), *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Levinas, E. (1987). *Collected Philosophical Papers*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Levinas, E. (1991). *Otherwise Than Being, or, Beyond Essence*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.
- Levinas, E. (2003). *Humanism of the Other*. Urbana & Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois.
- Levinas, E. (2011 [1982]). *Ethics and Infinity*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
- Levinas, E. (2015 [1961]). *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
- Micewski, E. & Annen, H. (eds.) (2005). *Military Ethics in Professional Military Education – Revisited*. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang.
- Perpich, D. (2008). *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Putnam, H. (2003). *Ethics without Ontology*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Ricœur, P. (1994). *Oneself As Another*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rorty, R. (1989). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. London: Basil Blackwell.
- Toiskallio, J. (ed.) (2004). *Identity, Ethics and Soldiership*. Helsinki: National Defence College / Edita.
- Toiskallio, J. (ed.) (2007). *Ethical Education in the Military: What, How and Why in the 21st Century?* Helsinki: National Defence University / Edita Prima.
- Toiskallio, J. (2008). Military Pedagogy As a Human Science. In: T. Kvernbekk, H. Simpson, & M. Peters (eds.), *Military Pedagogies and Why They Matter* (pp. 127-144). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Topolski, A. (2015). *Arendt, Levinas and a Politics of Relationality*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

UN Standards of Conduct (2016). Materials at <https://conduct.unmissions.org/standards> (most recently accessed on June 6, 2017).

van Baarda, T. A. & Verweij, D. E. M. (eds.) (2009). *The Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare*. Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Young-Bruhl, E. (2006). *Why Arendt Matters*. New Haven, Connecticut, & London: Yale University Press.

5. BRIDGING THE GAP OF UNDERSTANDING: Dialogue Competence in the Renewal of UN Peacekeeping and Civil Crisis Management

Reijo E. Heinonen

1. Renewal of the UN's peacekeeping and crisis management

1.1. Reasons for undertaking change

“Many both within and outside of the UN challenge and question the foundational assumptions and doctrines of UN peacekeeping,” Arthur Boutellis and Lesley Connolly wrote when describing “The State of UN peace-operations reform.” This assessment has come in response to the growing complexity of local and regional conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping operations are no longer “fit for purpose,” even though there are currently more UN peacekeepers on the ground than ever before: 120,000 UN personnel when military, police, and civilian personnel are included (Boutellis & Connolly 2016, 1–2).

Another reason for rethinking peacekeeping and civil crisis management, and indeed for this article, has been the question of what security means from a collective and individual-level perspective today. The collapse of East-European communism created, in essence, a vacuum of values in the early 1990s. It was no longer possible to define the concept of security via military terms representing the “balance of horror”. The focus ultimately was directed to problems of sustainable development. It became necessary to ask how average people define peace and security. This shift towards “human security” discourse contributed to a new understanding of cultural and religious differences, alongside their impact on international and national political tensions. In his well-known article “Clash of Civilizations?,” published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, Samuel Huntington reflected on the outcomes of this new situation. It is remarkable that Huntington used question marks in the title of that article but then, in his book with the same general title, released three years later, in 1996, the question marks were removed! (Huntington 1996). This may illustrate the author’s assessment of the ongoing development.

What was new in the work by Huntington is that, at the end of his book, he accorded an important role to world religions in the process of defining the basic values of cultures. Hans Küng cited this passage when stating that the world’s major religions “also share key values in common,” such that a “principle of commonalities” must be formulated for peace to be reached in a multicultural world; “peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expound values, institutions and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations” (Küng 1999, 104).

Some Muslim scholars reacted immediately to Huntington’s thesis. Hassan Hanafi, from the University of Cairo, wrote, “Why must Islam be seen after the collapse of Communism as a substitute enemy?” (Hanafi 1995, 252). To avoid this kind of confrontation, the president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Roman Herzog, declared his opinion about what

should be done so as to hinder the clash of civilizations. In 1995, in his opening address before the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Herzog defined his “diplomacy of inter-cultural understanding.” He frequently reiterated that “clashes of civilizations” are not “clashes” between Buddhists, Christians, Confucians, Hindus, Muslims, and adherents to other religions on account of creed but between fundamentalism and enlightenment, dogmatism and pragmatism, civilized behavior and uncivilized behavior within each of these cultures’ (Herzog 1999, viii). This project of Herzog led to establishment of various academic study programs, as in Finland, but the controversies continued, gaining various new forms also, and terrorist attacks were not infrequently combined with names of religions. (Grolig 2009, 25.) In tandem with this, labeling of Muslims as potential terrorists gained renewed vigor after the attack on the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.

Now, after 20 years, we can see that in the Near East the political and military front lines do not follow the borders of states so much as those between religions and sectarian groups, through their supporters. One author argues that the religious group of reference is a more stronger connecting power than nationality or national borders, stating that “[t]hese primordial features, emotions and identities should be recognized, in order to solve the conflicts” (Kerkkänen 2015, 155).

Today’s larger question is how to establish constructive dialogue and interaction between these anonymous groups so as to construct a topical strategy for peacekeeping and civil crisis management.

1.2. Work toward transformation of how operations are planned and conducted

In March 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and make specific and realistic recommendations for change. The panel was composed of individuals experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building. Its output is known as the Brahimi Report, after panel chair Lakhdar Brahimi.

The problem posed for UN peacekeeping activities can be seen in the changing context of operations. Rather than restore or keep peace, UN peacekeepers are now asked to manage conflicts. This means that their capacities to interact and communicate are challenged.

In 2007, the new Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, was called upon to find solutions to the growing problems. His newly appointed High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), established in October 2014, released a report with 166 recommendations. A later report dealt with their implementation. The report identified the following four recommendations as fundamental shifts:

1. In the implementation and design of UN peace operations, more emphasis should be given to political solutions rather than military or technical ones. The aim behind this recommendation might be to strengthen enduring peace through widening of the circles of well-informed people who are able to commit themselves to solutions to the problems. This may highlight the role of “dialogue competence” of politicians and soldiers in peace negotiations.

2. More flexibility should be applied in responding to changing needs on the ground. This includes smoother transitions between phases of a mission rather than conformance to a rigid template for either “peacekeeping” or a “special political mission.” The aim with this recommendation might have been to diminish the bureaucratic focus of the solutions in the operations and give the actors in the field greater flexibility.
3. “A stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership is needed for the future” for responses to crisis. This poses a challenge related to the training of peacekeeping personnel – it should shift towards more holistic understanding of their mission.
4. Finally, the UN secretariat is challenged to be “more field-focused” and peace operations “more people-centered” (The State of UN Peace Operations Reform 2016, 1–4).

Scrutinizing the recommendations arising from the HIPPO conference, Secretary-General Ban identified the following three changes as necessary:

1. 1) “Prioritize prevention and mediation in order to break the cycle of responding to crisis too late and with insufficient support” was given as a recommendation for prevention and mediation. This can be taken as encouragement to develop more appropriate and better-targeted dialogue capacity among all partners in peacekeeping and conflict-resolution processes. It is not difficult to read a readiness to learn from failures such as that in Srebrenica here.
2. 2) It is necessary to change the way peace operations are planned and conducted (in order to make them faster to develop and more accountable to the countries and people amid conflict).
3. 3) To manage peace and security challenges, a global-regional framework should be established. From the perspective of this article, the most important recommendations made in the HIPPO report (2014) can be characterized by their emphasis on making UN operations more people-centered and field-focused.

The question now becomes how the new focus can be achieved. What does it mean that peacekeeping and crisis management should be more people-centered? Does this mean that more information about the concrete circumstances and mental climate on the ground should be available to those who make decisions? Does it mean that new capacities are needed for the communication with local people and the mutual interaction of various actors involved in the peacekeeping process? Then, what would the goal of changes in dialogue competence mean for the training of various groups of peacekeepers, soldiers, police personnel, and social workers? How can we find a common language for these groups, with their various educational and social backgrounds, and, secondly, how might we develop such

modes of communication and cooperation with local people as they can accept and respect? People-centered peacekeeping can be interpreted as operations that place new emphasis on communication skills, aimed at fuller competence for dialogue.

This would enable better follow-up of the development of tensions on the ground and hence give time for preparing tools to solve the problems behind crises. Better dialogue competence changes the orientation and entails holistic comprehension of the factors in crises. For the people on the ground, better communication with peacekeepers delivers accurate information about the process of solving problems, which should increase human security.

The proposed shifts in UN peacekeeping operations that were articulated in the HIPPO report represent visualization of broad-based strategic change in which the UN is asked to manage conflicts rather than restore or maintain peace (Boutellis & Conolly 2016, 1).

Lack of communication and understanding has thus far diminished opportunities to reach these goals. This has happened, according to the 2015 Challenges Forum annual report, because peacekeepers and the mission are deployed in a given country “with pre-conceived ideas and templates” for what is needed (Challenges Forum 2015, 41).

2. Challenges of a people-centered approach to dialogue

2.1. Institutional and individual moral concepts – different requisite abilities for dialogue

From the standpoint of dialogue, what are the differences between institution- and people-centered peacekeeping and crisis management?

If representatives of institutions – be they military administrators or a town or country’s civil administrators – are engaged in negotiation, they are bound by codes of ethics and official legislation of their society. Room for personal interpretation is limited, and the space for making compromises and concessions is defined beyond their personal opinions and beliefs. In this case, it is usual to come together “with pre-conceived ideas and templates” delimiting what is necessary. From the partners’ personal perspective, this increases inability to commit oneself ethically to the results of the negotiations.

In the “people-centered” scenario, it cannot be presumed in advance that any common ideological, religious, or philosophical ground exists; it must be found. Numerous possibilities await for thinking about basic values and facts. This means that there are many potential ways to communicate, which differ from those typical in official diplomacy. The questions in intercultural, inter-religious-community communication may be unexpected and deeply challenging. They demand deep personal commitment to open-mindedness and flexibility. Below, we consider a case in which institutional, professional, and personal ethical stances were in mutual conflict and examine how it was resolved.

2.2. Context-dependent moral concepts of soldiers – a case study of *The Grand Illusion*

In his great historic film *The Grand Illusion*, Jean Renoir describes human relations of the German and French officers in the WWI era in a prison setting. The film was made in 1937 but deals with military ethics and multicultural dialogue in a way that has been topical ever since.

In this film, one can identify four quite distinct – and partly contradictory – levels to the ethics of soldiers. The common system of ethical values that is compulsory for every soldier is represented by some of the actions of the head of the prison, Germany's major von Raufenstein, played by Erich von Stroheim. He demonstrates a discrepancy between these military values and personal morality: after shooting the French officer Captain De Boeldieu, portrayed by Pierre Fresnay, who had helped two French officers to escape, von Raufenstein recognizes himself as guilty although he had acted in accordance with the regulations of his army. On the second level of moral awareness, the personal one, he is internally urged to apologize to a victim. Hence, the German major found in himself two conflicting levels of moral behavior. The first involves obedience to the collective, legally sanctioned morality of the army. The second is the intimate level of his deeply personal conscience, which knows better what is right or wrong at a universal, global level.

The third level involves a certain kind of group morals shared among the French prisoners. Renoir shows that this is a particular and exclusive state of mind and morals. Because of his high-ranking military status and membership of the aristocracy, the French captain, De Boeldieu, is treated differently by the German major than the other members of the French group, and the others in these group feel disrespected. Thereby, the major built moral insecurity within the French group of prisoners (in the end, Captain De Boeldieu does not, however, abandon solidarity with his companions, and he helps two of them escape).

The fourth and the most all-encompassing level of moral behavior in the film involves the bigger picture in Europe at the time, of more or less obvious anti-Semitism. Collective discrimination is not limited to the Germans. Also, French officer Lieutenant Maréchal, played by Jean Gabin, is not only aware of the common prejudices but even uses rude, racist words when leveling accusations at Jewish friend Lieutenant Rosenthal during their common jailbreak. That they were running a common risk did not change the racist, anti-Semitic worldview of this French officer. The collective prejudice was stronger than the individual-level friendship and jointly experienced danger. The anti-Semitic worldview, as a *Zeitgeist*, subsumed all small- and large-group moral codes in the manner of an international epidemic. However, awakening to moral reasoning and responsibility does occur, later in the film. Lieutenant Maréchal returns to his Jewish friend and apologizes. Here Renoir's film emphasizes the last instance of justice, enduring in the human mind, in the conscience.

How deep-rooted the anti-Semitic attitudes were in Europe in the 1930s is illustrated by the fact that *The Grand Illusion* was banned by German and Italian authorities because it was not anti-Semitic enough and was pacifistic (*The Grand Illusion*). How much the film could voice support for resistance movements is difficult to estimate. That good powers or European old values could overcome the new brutality seemed to be illusion. In particular, the intelligentsia of Jewish Europeans, trusting in those values, had to be disappointed with the tragic consequences of the war that began two years later.

What kinds of ideas can the ethical problematic in Jean Renoir's film offer for the discussion of dialogue capacities and ethical self-understanding with regard to UN peacekeeping troops?

2.3. Ability to experience guilt as a prerequisite for ethical integrity

In *The Grand Illusion*, the moral capacity of the soldiers is illustrated through their practical decisions but also through their ability to feel that they are guilty. Things that, one soldier assesses to belong to normal loyalty to his oath to be dutiful to the army and state, are recognized by another soldier as violating his moral identity and conscience. Also, the German major does feel guilty though doing his duty. For him, killing is not normal behavior, yet it is among his obligations in the war. For him, the worth of human life and its annihilation can never be degraded to a mere "banality" of day-to-day life (see the work of Hannah Arendt, Eichman in Jerusalem, 1963). The killing of a man whom he knew and appreciated, French captain De Boeldieu, caused him "moral injury" (a concept discussed below).

It has been asked where freedom for ethical decision-making by an average soldier fulfilling his duty is to be found. In cases wherein a soldier is obliged to kill and he cannot and will not escape this, he may reflect on whether he is now becoming guilty. Many others, in contrast, neglect this kind of thinking and try to put any question of whether obedience could lead to guilt out of mind. Perhaps this is where the ethical freedom of soldiers and peacekeepers lies, in how to think in situations of conflicting systems of ethics.

This is paradoxical because if one is feeling guilty, he is somehow in a "prison" of his mind. If, on the other hand, he neglects to think about perhaps being in violation of universal ethical dictates not to kill or annihilate other human beings, any internal accusations are unconscious and in many cases cause not only moral injury but also mental disorders. This can create long-lasting war *traumata* from which healing is difficult. Otherwise – i.e., if the reason for the guilty conscience has been comprehended – it is often easier for the sufferer to be treated and counseled. The freedom reached in this way enables preserving human ethical integrity, which has an impact on a person's future behavior.

The personal tragedy of the captain of the US warplane *Enola Gay*, which dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima, was that society did not take his awareness of guilt earnestly into account. The hero worship he received was, from his personal perspective, catastrophic. It hindered him from being freed from his sense of guilt.

The physical effects after a war or peacekeeping operation, even if they involve becoming an invalid, are sometimes easier to bear than the mental disorders arising from the moral injury. For healing from the distress, it is important that society surrounding the "wounded soul" understand the deepness of his injury (Dombo et al. 2013, 198).

2.4. How to understand moral injury

One route to this apprehension of the situation of a soldier with deep feelings of guilt would be for clinicians to be able to distinguish moral injury from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (ibid., 197). The current conflation of the two loses sight of the idiomatic roots of the moral injury and subsumes such injury, in all its variety, under a very broad psychiatric term. Thereby, the treatment of both PTSD and the problems of guilt combined with moral injury is made more difficult: “Mental professionals have been too quick to make the diagnosis of PTSD [...]. And it renders soldiers automatically into mental patients instead of wounded souls,” (Boudreau 2011, 749). One reason the practice has been described in this manner is that both the concept of moral injury and research into it are relatively new (ibid.). According to the simplest sort of definition, the notion refers to someone “taking action that directly violates [his or her] moral beliefs and values” Jonathan Shay (2014) defines moral injury on three dimensions: it is, firstly, violation of what is considered right; secondly, an occurrence in which the violator is the self (that is, the violation is a voluntary act); and thirdly: a violation that occurs in a high-stakes situation (Dombo et al. 2013, 199).

B. T. Litz et al. (2009) developed a cognitive explanatory model of moral injury from military situations. They describe it as “an act of transgression that creates dissonance and conflict because it violates assumptions and beliefs about right and wrong and personal goodness” (op cit., 200). In *The Grand Illusion*, this kind of transgression is perpetrated by von Raufenstein. Although De Boeldieu, the victim of the shooting, attempts to console von Raufenstein by saying that as a soldier he would have done the same, acting in accordance with obligations, this did not convince von Raufenstein. According to the global ethical principle not to kill, he felt himself to be guilty. The universal moral value was stronger than the professional morals of soldiers. How this dissonance or conflict is to be reconciled is one of the key determinants of injury (op. cit., 698). If von Raufenstein had not hindered the group members’ escape attempt by shooting de Boeldieu, he would have experienced shame and perhaps been brought before a military court. Shame is usually understood as more public, whereas guilt has been viewed as more private (ibid., 201). The principle of not “losing face” has to do with shame. This principle can lead to cognitive dissonance because these “actions or virtues which win public repute oppose the demands of conscience” (Robinson 2006, 2).

The extent of conflict between collective morals and individual-level ethics depends in many cases on the sensitivity of the relevant individuals. Michael Walzer formulates this problem from a very high-level perspective: “The world of necessity is generated by a conflict between collective survival and human rights.” And referring to Thomas Nagel (author of “War and Massacre”), Walzer states, “We all can come to situations where we know that there are outcomes from our actions that must be avoided at all costs and we also know that there are some costs that can never rightly be paid” (Walzer 1977, 325).

Sometimes we avoid such cognitive dissonances by restricting them to war situations or “looking away,” but Walzer asks rightly, “How will we know when to look back?” (ibid., 326). For a peacekeeper or conflict manager, things are more complicated. In humanitarian crises, the mandate of the intervening forces, if they have one, is usually political but rights to transform cultures are not specified. Those intervening “might set about changing the customs and beliefs of the people they are (temporarily) ruling” (ibid., 325).

Today more of us than before accept Walzer's proposal that "negotiations and compromise are almost certainly better than the coercion" (ibid., XI). Nonetheless, too little is done at present to learn the preconditions for a positive realization of negotiations with the aid of dialogue competence. How can we do this? We can find guidance by analyzing the Camp David peace negotiations of 1978.

3. Dialogue competence and diplomacy – the Camp David peace talks of 1978

3.1. Fundamentalistic Thinking Leading the Negotiations to the Brink of Collapse

In this section of the chapter, I use the Camp David peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt, directed by President of the USA Jimmy Carter, as a case study as I consider problems surrounding negotiations with a multicultural, multi-religious basis. It illustrates opportunities and difficulties found in intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The process itself and the roles of the partners are examined with help of the dialogue-competence theory.

Lawrence Wright's *Thirteen Days in September* (2014), referred to here in German translation (WGB 2016), follows the peace talks day by day. Not only the negotiations, the results of which were given form in the peace agreement from 1979, are exceptional and held up as among the greatest achievements of diplomacy in the 20th century. The background of the participating statesmen – Prime Minister of Israel Menachem Begin, President of Egypt Anwar Sadat, and US President Carter – was unconventional too (ibid., 63). They held themselves to be living examples of the prophetic traditions of Abrahamic religions – "The words of prophets and the Holy Scriptures were echoing in their minds" (ibid.) – which not only created common understanding but also led to conflicts. Religious matters simultaneously supported and hindered the negotiations.

For Begin, Biblical texts delivered advice on how to achieve peace but also how to advance the territorial demands of Israel. By appealing to Carter's knowledge of Biblical texts, Begin tried to persuade the initiator of the conference and the leader of the US to his side. Begin said "President Carter can recite the Bible from memory that's why he knows to whom the land legally belongs" (ibid., 20). That said, Carter was not willing to accept the political consequences of a fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible, even though this kind of interpretation was not unfamiliar to him (his background involved Baptist traditions). The reason is that Begin's proposal was not ethically acceptable to Carter. It also ran counter to UN Security Council Resolution 242, from the time after 1967's "Six-Day War." The core problem was that Begin would not accept this resolution, which demanded that Israel withdraw from the territories it had conquered at that time (ibid.).

Because of the vague formulation of the resolution, the following question arose: what regions did the resolution refer to? Was it **all** the territories conquered (the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights), as the Arab states and the Soviet Union argued, or did it mean **"the"** conquered territories, as in the reading of the French version, without emphasis on all-inclusiveness? This was made more unclear by the English text leaving out the defining words "all" and "the." The aim of clarifying this text with so many meanings gave reason to arrange the peace negotiations held at Camp David (ibid., 132).

In the early stages of the peace talks, the interpretation of some Biblical concepts caused problems. That of “land” led to controversy, because of Begin’s fundamentalist interpretation (ibid., 45), but so did that of the exceptional role of the people of Israel in world history as “the chosen people.” It sparked heated debate. Sadat and his foreign minister, Mohamed I. Kamel, were fully aware of the text of Koran 5:13, which states that Israel had lost its lot as chosen people because of its transgressions. Here we have two fundamentalist interpretations of holy texts, which led to controversy at the very beginning of the negotiations. Inability to read ancient religious texts in a multidimensional way increased the fixation on a single interpretation alone, which hampered negotiation. The lack of understanding was so great that Kamel, as part of Sadat’s group, accused Israel’s delegation of being racist because of its interpretation of the Bible, which seemed to demand more rights for Israel than for other nations (ibid., 115).

Hence, the beginning of the negotiations was difficult. The partners and, especially, Carter were disillusioned and at first did not see any possibility of proceeding further. How could a new start be possible, and how was it that Wright would later come to the following assessment. “The struggle for peace at Camp David is a testament to the enduring force of religion in modern life, as seen in its ability to mold history and the difficulty of shedding the mythologies that continue to lure societies into conflicts” (Wright 2014, xiv; Wright 2016, 12.)

What made it possible to change the thinking and acting such that the interpretation of the holy texts would not harm the enterprise of making a peace agreement, especially such that the spirituality and faith of each negotiator, rather than being overlooked, could make a positive contribution to the whole?

3.2. *The ability to change the strategy applied in negotiations*

It was already evident in the first few days that there were very few opportunities for the Camp David conference to lead to a peace agreement. For the delegations of Israel and Egypt, it had reached a dead end at the very outset. Sadat was convinced that the conflict between Israel and Egypt had a psychological character (ibid., 36). The three men had different backgrounds and life histories, which contributed to their intellectual and emotional reactions – especially how they used religious concepts and referred to the history of their religions. Carter had hoped that he could find a common level of understanding and productive dialogue through his knowledge of Biblical history, but he was disappointed. He was forced to state that the apocalyptic-style speech used by Begin torpedoed any hopes of reasonable negotiation (ibid., 219). Begin used Biblically rooted expressions as a secular Jew, fundamentalist way, which lent him strength to the point of an uncompromising position. He was not used to thinking about how to interpret the ancient texts such that they could give space for consensus in negotiations (ibid.).

Carter as a Baptist had a more holistic understanding of commitment to Biblical texts. He gave more emphasis to the ethical constitution and orientation of the human mind. This had led him to think that Begin and Sadat “would find in themselves their intrinsic goodness,” which could help them to meet halfway. This turned out to be wishful thinking during the first encounter at Camp David (ibid., 35).

Therefore, Carter felt that he should change his strategy in the negotiations. At the start of the conference, he had chosen a role of moderator, aiming to let Begin and Sadat discuss their differences together without any active contribution from his side in relation to the contents of the disputes. Now he took a leading position and partner's role as US President. This meant that he had to accept the "tragic Old Testament attitude" of the partners. He started trying to force them to rethink their presuppositions for a peace agreement. Carter's chip in the coming negotiations was, for both Israel and Egypt, an important friendship with the USA. If they were not willing to discuss things in a constructive way, they would place their good relationship with the superpower at risk.

Two things still stood in the way of this process of rethinking. Firstly, all of the partners saw that not only the *status quo* but also a peace agreement would create difficulties that were not easy to envisage (ibid., 235). Secondly, both Begin and Sadat had life experiences that complicated their relationship to people and politics. Begin had lost both parents in the Holocaust at Auschwitz and was very formal in his social contacts. This may have contributed to his relationship to the emergency faced by Palestinian refugees, which Carter interpreted as "lacking compassion" (ibid., 235).

Both Begin and Sadat had sat in jail because of conspiracies and terrorist activities. For Sadat, the time in prison meant a change of mind or religious awakening. He became a visionary and a peacemaker, reflecting a holistic decision on the Near-East conflict. Sadat's solution took into account both political and religious facets of the conflict: "I dream still more about consultation on Mount Sinai with us, three heads of state, as representatives of three nations and three religions. This is, furthermore, my prayer before God" (ibid., 332).

Delegate for Israel Ezer Weizman assessed the difference in character between Begin and Sadat thus: "Both desired peace. But whereas Sadat wanted to take it by storm [...] Begin preferred to creep forward inch by inch. He took the dream of peace and ground it down into the fine, dry pulver of details, legal clauses, and quotes from international law" (ibid., 127; see the English edition's p. 98).

3.3. Finding a common ethical basis

Both Carter and Sadat had visions of how peace should be made in the Near East. Begin stayed on the defensive and tried to gain acceptance for the military-political *status quo*. Sadat's vision, of a peace deal among the three nations on Mount Sinai that is based on three Abrahamic religions, made him eager to reach positive results at Camp David, although the rest of his delegation was against a peace agreement or at least suspicious.

In Carter's thinking, the Camp David negotiations were bound up with his own vision: "I had a feeling that God wishes for peace in the Holy Land and I could be useful in connection with this issue" (Wright 2016, 63). Through their religiously motivated endeavor, Sadat and Carter became close partners personally, but both seem to have realized that their activity might cause them personal harm and pain.

On the third day of negotiation, the gulf between Israel and Egypt was so great that the delegates on both sides assumed the conference would end then and there. First Lady Rosalyn Carter too saw that Begin and Sadat, with their hard-line stances, were not able to come further. She perceived her husband to be the only person who could solve the problem. That is why she asked him, “Are you willing to be the scapegoat?” She got the answer: “What else is new?” Carter replied. (ibid., 65). As a matter of fact, Carter, during his military service, was ridiculed for being a “nigger lover,” (see Balmer-Randall 2014) and he had already taken a gamble against his own political interests in order to reach the great aim of peace for the Near East, which many Americans did not understand. Carter saw now that Begin and Sadat needed a partner and a “scapegoat” who could bear the shame for possible failure of the conference (Wright 2016, 65).

The problem for the delegation from Egypt was the inequality of Israel and Egypt. Indeed, this was stated directly: according to Kamel, Egypt was too weak dialogue partner for Israel (ibid., 93). But we could well ask when the states involved could ever be equal. Better than estimating the political and the military power of parties to a potential agreement is to turn the focus to broader, more universal values from which they might establish a platform on which the two partners are equal. From a theoretical point of view, this means that common ideas such as peace are expressed on the same level of symbolizing. A sign of hope in this direction was that all three men at Camp David could cite the vision of peace in the Book of Isaiah (2:4): “[A]nd their swords will be turned into plough blades, and their spears into vineknives ...” This level of symbolizing a peace process could connect all partners to the common aim. Everyone knew that this was a holistic vision and a metaphor for a total change of mind leading to concrete deeds. In the tradition of the three monotheistic Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, there were connecting teachings, which could bridge the gap in understanding (ibid.).

4. The theoretical frame of dialogue competence

4.1. *Rules for dialogue*

In order to tackle the research question, of how to bridge the gap of understanding in multi-cultural peacekeeping and conflict management, we further consider the results of the historical analysis of the peace negotiations at Camp David within the theoretical framework of dialogue competence. If we are to understand the failures and successes of the negotiations, we must assess the partners’ values foundation and especially their use of religious-political arguments. Both Sadat and Carter were devout believers, while Begin was more secular but still a traditional practicing Jew. How their religious background influenced their dialogue competence is one of the key issues for our study: it shows the ambivalence of religious arguments – how they in some cases block negotiations and in other contexts promote a breakthrough in negotiations (Appleby 2000). To understand from a theoretical angle when religious language, with its specific concepts, has a dialogue-supporting function and when an isolating one, we need to take a look at the various elements of dialogue competence.

In the field of dialogue competence, we can discern three elements. First are some “dialogue rules” derived from the anthropological and religious-history studies of Gustav Mensch-

ing and Udo Tworuschka (Heinonen 2002; 2009; Tworuschka 1982; Biehl 1989; Fowler 1982). To these belong urging not to generalize from some special features of a culture or of a religion – e.g., by saying that Muslims, Hindus, Christians, and Jews are such-and-such. Usually such generalizations do not fit individual representatives of these groups, so they create prejudices about a situation or encounter. The partner is then taken not as a unique personality but as only representative of a community or nation. This renders a genuine encounter of dialogue partners difficult. Another example of dialogue rules involves how to compare religions and cultures with each other: it is not right to take facts out of practical day-to-day life and compare them with ideal, theoretical doctrines of any other religion or culture. It is important to assess issues practical against practical and theoretical against theoretical (Tworuschka 1982, 105). The dialogue rules that are part of dialogue competence require knowledge of cultural and religious facts. It is necessary to discern what their central, inner values and teachings are, and what relative, historically developed features yield the outlook in public life.

How could we assess the process of negotiation at Camp David from the perspective of the latter element of dialogue competence? Both in Israel's delegation and in Egypt's, there was knowledge about religious issues, but this did not promote dialogue. On the contrary, it sometimes caused conflicts. The superficiality of the knowledge, and applying it against dialogue rules, was one of the reasons for this result. For instance, Kamel had knowledge of material in the Bible, but he used it for accusing Jews for historical transgressions against Yahweh and Moses. His aim in this was to demonstrate how difficult it was to negotiate with Israel's delegation. From the failures of ancient Israelites, Kamel generalized to the character of past Jewish generations and also modern representatives of the state of Israel, violating dialogue rules via this anachronistic comparison (ibid., 197). If Kamel had borne in mind that not only was Moses rejected at first by the ancient Israelites but also Muhammad was rejected by the ancient Arabs, his knowledge of the Bible could have led to better mutual understanding. Because of his argument's one-sidedness, he applied that knowledge in a manner blocking the discussion and creating more tensions and prejudices (ibid., 46).

4.2. Symbol theory and levels of understanding

One of the great misunderstandings of religious texts, sometimes leading to unethical deeds, has entailed their fundamentalist, word-for-word interpretation. To understand this phenomenon we need to look at the special character of religious and poetic language. For this, we will use symbol theory based on studies by James Fowler and Peter Biehl, for whom the abstraction level and specificity of a concept are divided into five levels or stages of development (Fowler 1982; Biehl 1989). The first of these is the *magic-numenic* level, on which things and issues are taken as holy phenomena that are experienced as *tremendum* or *fascinosum*, as frightening or admirable. Holy places and pictures refer not to something concrete but to being holy itself (Heinonen 2002, 90–91). A picture of a Roman emperor was seen as bringing him to a place because his numenic presence was experienced as real. Mosche Dajan, who was a member of Israel's delegation, had committed to politics of "open bridges" after the Six-Day War and showed tolerance towards the citizens of the West Bank such that they could freely move across Jordan. Also, Arab citizens could study at the area's universities and meet with friends and family members. Regrettably, Dajan's hope for a friendly coexis-

tence between Israelis and Palestinians proved to be in vain (Wright 2016, 224). The roadblock to reconciliation was the problem with Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. One reason it was so difficult to solve the problems was a magic–numenic understanding of the land. Because for Dajan, who was a secularly oriented Jew, theological arguments about the ancient life of Israel could not convince, the archeology became more important. Findings from archeological excavations that held proof as to the history of Israel took the role of a religious surrogate (ibid., 225). For most, a magic–numenic understanding of the land made the way to reconciliation with Palestinians difficult, while it was possible for Dajan to be tolerant but only on the basis of his own conditions. In his words after the Six-Day War, he presumably articulated the opinion of many Israelis: “We have come back to our most sacred cities and will never depart from them” (ibid., 223). Here we see how a magic–numenic understanding of land and ancient finds can create barriers between people that are difficult to overcome.

The second level in the symbol theory is the *fundamentalistic* level, which refers to reading the meaning of a concept “word for word.” The many-dimension religious language is condensed into one-dimensional expression. If this happens and religious language is rendered “absolutely literal, then that must be the end of religion” (Heinonen 1996, 757–761; 1997, 115). The context of the words and concepts is not taken into account. Out of the great variety of lexical meanings of the words, a one-dimensional alternative is used. This makes it understandable why violent radical movements can justify their actions with fundamentalist-interpreted citations from religions’ holy books. Religion is transformed into some kind of ideology or politics, which supplies directions for almost every problem in everyday life.

The main concept provoking conflict during the negotiations was “the Promised Land.” The power of the fundamentalist use of this notion was its close link to modern land-ownership. Begin did not recognize the broad metaphorical, symbolic use of the notion of the Promised Land in the history of other cultures, such as how it was used by the Founding Fathers for America. Begin insisted on concrete political implementations based on the Bible, because he used it as, in effect, a codex of law (Wright 2016, 63).

Understanding the problem of this kind of fundamentalism, Carter came to the conclusion that human problem often have “their own irrational logic” and need an approach other than those that had been planned before (ibid., 237). Carter took issue with Begin’s “apocalyptic language,” by which he meant a fundamentalist manner of interpretation that, as he described it, torpedoed all reasonable communication. Also, this challenged Carter to change his role in the negotiations (ibid., 219).

The third level of symbolizing involves a slight split from literal interpretation. Understanding on the *trivial symbolic* level works with cultural, historically formulated symbolic meanings that have formed through the society or community using the concept. Also, care is taken that the symbol is used in line with its meaning in the community. Multidimensional understanding is still absent, with every culture or religion having its own interpretation. At Camp David, all the partners knew that “Jerusalem” was a symbol for the Palestinian movement just as it was for the Jews. The three religions of the Near East (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) held Jerusalem up as a place where “the Last Judgment” will take place. However, the partners emphasized the differences more than common features. Their level of symbolizing did not promote dialogue, because it retained features of fundamentalist

interpretations. Jerusalem was a symbol for all parties, but it was differently interpreted. Wright concludes, “Because legends of this kind are taken as literal truths, the battle for Jerusalem has no end” (ibid., 241).

Following Carter’s thinking, Wright concludes that one of the symbolic actions that pointed to the common heritage of these three religions had been undertaken by Dajan, the hero of the Six-Day War, after that war ended. He draped the flag of Israel on the hill of the temple in Jerusalem as a symbol for reconciliation among the three religions, as a symbol of their equal rights. This symbolic act illustrates the fourth level in symbol theory, the *symbol-critical* level. It involves understanding of the common universal contents of religions and cultures. Dajan’s act may have represented this but could not lead to productive dialogue, because the tolerance was one-sided and initiated by a conqueror. The disparity in power relations hindered mutual solidarity. Furthermore, Dajan’s politics of expanding the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories after 1967 blocked the way to peace.

The *symbol-critical* level highlights what is common among religions and cultures while avoiding acknowledgement of the unique features specific to each of the dialogue partners. Thinking on the fourth level recognizes what is common to religions and to cultures but does not consider the differences between them as is necessary for a genuine dialogue (Heinonen 2002, 92; 2009, 59).

For the partners at Camp David, the common aim was to reach a peace agreement. This is expressed metaphorically and poetically in the Bible by Isaiah 2:4, which all the partners knew. The passage continues, “Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,” as pointed out by Wright (2016, 335). This was a common ideal basis, but it left open the specific role and contribution of each partner in the process of its realization. Still, the awareness of what the common aim was provided a foundation and increased the ethical commitment of the partners.

On the fifth level, “*post-critical*” *symbolizing*, genuine dialogue can be realized: an encounter that enables reciprocity in giving and getting. The common values and principles are comprehended, and the differing, unique features do not alienate the partners from each other (Heinonen 2002, 93; 2009, 59). *Vice versa*, they are understood as enriching inspiring discussion of issues and thereby leading to self-understanding and reflections on the basics of one’s personal conviction. This is necessary for openness to mutual questions and answers. The ability to be open and change one’s interpretations and worldview is important if one is to convince oneself and the others of the earnestness of one’s commitment to the aim and action. This devotion is possible because of the common ethical foundation, comprehended in connection with the religious issues on the previous level (the symbol-critical one). An indication that this had been understood at Camp David came in the mutual commitment to the peace ideal expressed in the verse from Isaiah.

One sign of post-critical thinking at Camp David can be found in Sadat’s vision of the heads of state meeting as representatives of the three Abrahamic religions on Mount Sinai: “I have a dream about a meeting on Mount Sinai with us three chiefs of states representing three nations and three religions. This is, furthermore, my prayer before God” (Wright 2016, 127; see also pp. 97–98 of the English edition).

This should demonstrate simultaneously unity in diversity and a guarantee to the religions of the Near East that there will be righteous representation of the most holy place in their shared history. The dialogue is based on unity from common ethical principles and on diversity in the historically different interpretations of doctrine and morals.

4.3. Global ethical principles as the third main element of dialogue competence – awakening of moral awareness

For understanding of the results of the peace negotiations, it is necessary to look at the changes in the life history of the partners at Camp David. Reading about their political and social background, one is astonished by the great change in their influence in public life.

All three men had served in military positions. Begin had been a soldier in World War II and, as had Sadat, been jailed. The time in prison influenced the value base of both and molded their character traits. Carter, in turn, had been a submarine officer in the US Navy. In thinking about this article's theme of peacekeeping and conflict management, it is important to notice the connections of the negotiators to military service and intelligence activities. Both Begin and Sadat had blood on their hands, because of their former conspiracy-oriented activities. They all could imagine what a peace agreement would mean in relation to the concrete defense problems of their countries.

The life history and ethics-related thinking of Sadat had received contributions from highly controversial personalities (Wright 2016, 21). For example, Sadat had seen Mahatma Gandhi in Port Said in 1931 and been impressed by his value-based *satyagraha*-type resistance. This also stirred Sadat's political ambitions. He decided to emulate Gandhi's struggle for human rights and political independence. The resistance against British colonialism left him blind to the dangers of Hitler's racist, violent world politics later. Imprisoned by Allied forces after WWII, Sadat changed his worldview. He experienced a religious rebirth and became a confessing Muslim.

It is possible that just the religious commitment of Sadat made him spiritually close to Carter, who had been a practicing Baptist since his youth. The mutual sympathy and the basis for dialogue competence arose from their religious commitment. Religious experiences not only increased their tolerance but also gave them ability to understand different traditions. Religious values established a bridge for mutual understanding between Carter and Sadat. However, Carter's great ethical leap to changing his mind and adapting the conference strategy, combined with his willingness to be open to changes, contributed to the positive end result, including its historic peace agreement, in a decisive way.

Begin too had important wartime experiences. He had been held in a gulag in Siberia, in 1940–1941, where he had learned to respect the spiritual power of human beings. Remembering a Polish corporal in the same jail, Begin said, "It is a fact – and I saw it with my own eyes – that a human being in his misery has nothing to grab on to, nothing that could console him, but faith" (ibid., 212).

The time in prison changed both Sadat and Begin such that they could find a common theme for discussion and feel freed from the difficult problems of the peace negotiations. For the success of the negotiations, the risk-taking of Carter and Sadat was vital. Their spiritually motivated readiness to realize their visions of peace – whatever this would cost – paved the way for the important Camp David peace agreement of 1979.

5. Concluding remarks

If we are to be more “people-centered” and “field-oriented” as the HIPPO recommendations urge, it is necessary to focus on the quality of the communication skills needed between peacekeepers and local people. We must be able to bridge the gap in understanding that is seen in relation to various challenging circumstances and actions. This is part of action competence.

This demands a deeper understanding of what dialogue is and how it can be promoted. For this article, the theoretical framework for dialogue competence was divided into three main elements: dialogue rules based on knowledge of religions and cultures; second, a system of symbol theory based on the abstraction level of the concepts, which can be comprehended dependently of their context. The third element of the dialogue competence is the awareness of the combining universal ethical principles and norms (global ethic), which can connect people and create mutual understanding. This element of dialogue competence is necessary also for readiness to embrace openness and for ability to change one’s attitudes, worldview, and values.

We examined how these elements are realized in practical decision-making through two cases. Ethical responsibility of soldiers was analyzed in light of Renoir’s *The Grand Illusion*, in which tensions and discrepancies between group members are created through various ethical loyalties and templates. The second case study, related more obviously to dialogue competence, involved the analysis of the peace negotiations at Camp David 1978. In the discussions at the peace negotiations, the five levels of symbolizing religious and cultural issues can be identified.

A magic–numenic understanding of “land” can be identified in earlier actions and speeches of Dajan, and the fundamentalist level is visible in the debate between Begin and Egyptian foreign minister Kamel on the meaning of “chosen people.” Against Begin’s statement about Israel’s special, great value in world history, Kamel took issue with the fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran passage stating that Israel had lost this value because of its transgressions. This clash of fundamentalist interpretations brought the whole conference to the brink of collapse.

The third level of symbolizing was reached in the debate on the role of Jerusalem in the three religions. In trivial symbolic thinking, the various symbolic meanings of Jerusalem were predicated upon the history of each religion. Although common, synthesizing meaning could be found for Jerusalem as a holy city, consensus and dialogue could not be established, because this was not accorded as much importance as the differing meanings that the various religion gave to the city.

The fourth level of symbolizing can be identified in the symbolic action of Dajan dropping the flag of Israel at the top of the temple hill after the Six-Day War. Although this was part of his reconciliation politics, it could not convince the Palestinians, because his tolerance was one-sided and that of a conqueror – the disparity in power relations hindered mutual solidarity. At the symbol-critical level, the understanding highlights what is common among religions and cultures, but it falls short of recognizing the features specific to each dialogue partner.

At Camp David, the metaphorical expressed aim for peacemaking in Isaiah 2:4, which all the partners were familiar with, did not lead to genuine dialogue, because of differences in its interpretation. However, it did increase their understanding of the ethical context of the negotiations and showed the necessity of a radical change of mind.

On the final level of symbolizing, a genuine dialogue can be realized. This enables reciprocity between partners in “give and take.” At the post-critical level, the common values and principles are comprehended and the differing, unique features do not alienate the partners from each other. In the Camp David negotiations, this level can be identified in the vision of Sadat, in which he pointed out the common ethical grounding of the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

In Sadat’s vision, the highest representatives of these religions meet on the mountain where the Ten Commandments were handed down. The unity of the ethical foundations and the diversity of the historical appearance of these religions were illuminated in this vision in peaceful interaction. This is even though both the delegation of Israel and that of Egypt at Camp David held opinions on the aims of the negotiation that lacked internal consistency. Begin was a hard-liner and had difficulties in accepting any concessions, although Dajan and Weizman were not so unbending.

From the Egyptian delegation, Kamel opposed Sadat and was afraid that nearly any kind of result from the meetings at Camp David would get condemned by the Arab states. Against this background arose the ethically motivated decision of Carter to change his role from moderator to partner and his readiness to take the risk of being a scapegoat. This marked a turning point in the negotiations. The ethical commitment of Carter and Sadat to the peace agreement, which entailed risking personal setbacks, was vital for the achievement of consensus in the peace treaty. As we know from the time after Camp David, not Carter but Sadat had to bear the role of scapegoat. He was assassinated in 1981, but the Camp David Accords and other results of the negotiations survived.

References

- Appleby, R. Scott (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Biehl, Peter (1989). *Symbole geben zu lernen. Einführung in die Symboldidaktik an hand, der Symbole Hand, Haus und Weg*. Neukirchen, Germany: Neukirchener.
- Boudreau, T. (2011). The Morally Injured. *The Massachusetts Review* 52(3–4), pp. 746–754.

- Boutellis, Arthur & Connolly, Lesley (eds.) (2016). *The State of UN Peace Operations Reform: An Implementation Scorecard*. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Challenges Forum (2015). Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN's Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions. Policy Brief 2015:3.
- Dombo, E. A.; Gray, C.; & Early, P. B. (2013). The Trauma of Moral Injury: Beyond the Battlefield. *Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought* 32, 197–210.
- Fowler, James (1982). *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning*. San Francisco: Harper Collins.
- The Grand Illusion. Article at en.m.wikipedia.org/wC (most recently accessed on April 4, 2017).
- Grolig, Wilfried, Roman Herzog: Preventing the Clash of Civilizations. In: Heinonen, R. E. & Romppanen, J. (eds.) *Towards Global Responsibility. New Understanding of Cultural Diversity. The tenth Anniversary Seminar April 15, 2009, University of Joensuu*, pp. 17-28.
- Hanafi, Hassan (1995). Die Religionen müssen zusammenarbeiten. In: Hans Küng (ed.), *Ja zum Weltethos. Perspektiven für die Suche nach Orientierung* (pp. 248–254). Munich: Piper.
- Heinonen, R. E. (1996). Imagination and Values Education. In: M. O. Valente, A. Barrios, A. Gaspar, & V. Teodoro (eds.), *Teacher Training and Values Education* (pp. 755–762). Lisbon: Universidade de Lisboa.
- Heinonen, R. E. (1997). Imaginaatio – kadotettu ulottuvuus [“Imagination – Lost Dimension”]. In: Matti Kotiranta (ed.), *Kuwan teologia*. “Suomalaisen Teologisen Kirjallisuudenseuran” series, No. 209 (pp. 107–118). Jyväskylä, Finland: Gummerus.
- Heinonen, R. E. (2002). Values Memory: Global Ethic and Civil Crisis Management. In: J. Toiskallio, R. E. Heinonen, & P. Halonen (eds.), *Cultures, Values and Future Soldiers* (pp. 67-96). Finnish National Defence College, Department of Education Series 2, No. 11.
- Heinonen, R. E. (2009). *Der letzte Baum- An der unbekanntten See. Gustav-Mensching-Vorlesungen für religiöse Toleranz* 4. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Otto Lembeck.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). *The Clash of Civilizations?*. Foreign Affairs 72, No 3.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kerkkänen, Ari (2015). Syyria ja Lähi-Itä [“Syria and the Near-East”]. In: *Havainnot ja nykypäivästä ja heijastuksia historiasta*. Helsinki: Like Publishing.
- Küng, Hans (1999). Inter-Cultural Dialogue versus Confrontation. In: Roman Herzog, Amitai Etzioni, & Henrik Schmiegelow (eds.), *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Litz, B. T.; Stein, N.; Delaney, E.; Lebowitz, L.; Nash, W. P.; Silva, C.; & Maguen, S. (2009). Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy. *Clinical Psychology Review* 29(8), pp. 695–706.
- Robinson, Paul (2006). *Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Tworuschka, Udo (1982). *Das Problem des Vergleichens von Religionen. Methodische Zugänge zu den Weltreligionen. Einführung für Unterricht und Studium*. Munich: Kösel.
- Walzer, Michael (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wright, Lawrence (2016). *Dreizehn Tage im September. Das diplomatische Meisterstück von Camp David*. Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. German translation of the 2014 book *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

6. INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF EDUCATION AS A THREAT TO A GOOD LIFE:

An Introduction to Education in the Midst of Wicked Problems

Veli-Matti Värri

1. Introduction

In the midst of global wicked problems such as climate change, population explosion, and terrorism, it is difficult to maintain a positive outlook for a hopeful future and the idea of a good life. Because of the tensions within societies and mistrust between civilizations, it is more necessary than ever before to ascertain what moral resources (Glover 2008) are required for a peaceful and sustainable life. These necessary moral resources will be actualized only if human beings are capable of developing the moral resources in themselves – a human subject will actualize her or his intellectual and moral potential both as an individual person and as a member of society only if educated. My purpose with this chapter is interpretation of the conditions for growth into a moral subject and of the social prerequisites for education in an age characterized by post-nationalist global challenges (ecological, cultural, and economic globalization). At the same time, my analysis maintains awareness of the special significance (relative autonomy) of education. I will argue that neoliberal (economic) politics with its global hegemony is the greatest obstacle both to a moral education and to a good life in the midst of the many global wicked problems we face.

2. Threats to education on the horizon of global economy

What do I mean in referring to the specific significance of education? From a theoretical standpoint, education has a dual nature: it is a particular phenomenon of life alongside other phenomena and social institutions (religion, politics, and economy), but at the same time it is intimately intertwined with the socio-cultural situation of its time and the ideas, ideologies, ideals, and power relations that prevail in it, and in this sense it is culturally and sociologically defined (see Siljander 2002, 32–35). Because the function of education is not only to recognize the individualization of the subject to be educated but also to further his or her socialization, it gets caught up in a whirlpool of conflicting interests in accomplishing this task (*ibid.*, 75–76). The unavoidable tension in my thinking involves dealing with both dimensions of education: education is and indeed must be at least a **relatively autonomous** area relative to any other phenomenon in surrounding society, so that it does not get reduced to a mere means to political, economic, or religious ends, and at the same time education functions as a means of socializing. In this sense it has been an “organic” part of the prevalent ideological hegemony (see Gramsci 1979) of the nation-state. Being a medium of socialization, education has been used in all ages as a tool of society for realizing the prevailing ideal of citizenship.

From the Foucauldian point of view (Foucault 1979), socialization is based on the techniques of control; if it is successful, it also produces the so-called techniques of the self, by

which the subject internalizes the control as a matter of course. The techniques of control are applied toward systematization, stability, and the regulation of power relations. Hence, the individual is produced and his or her behavior controlled (Besley 2002, 422). Because there is neither modern citizenship nor education for citizenship outside the framework of the nation-state (see Delanty & O'Mahony 2002), we can understand the changes in the socio-cultural basis of education only by interpreting them in conjunction with the changes that have taken place in the ideological hegemony of the nation-state (Gramsci 1979). As Pierre Bourdieu (1998) has argued, the nation-state is a historical and ideological construction without any essential foundations. Therefore, the common meaning horizons (including education-related aims) composed by the nation-state are not fixed fundamental truths by nature. The disappearance of certainty is reflected in everything from the politico-economic superstructure down to the day-to-day life of citizens and the bases for the construction of the individual self (e.g., Bauman 2002; Delanty & O'Mahony 2002; Giddens 1991). Hence, the uncertainty of common ideals and aims is also the problem of education.

Education is fundamentally connected with the moral horizon of significance that prevails in society (see Taylor 1996). The sense of uncertainty that exists is also inevitably reflected in the prerequisites for education and the formation of its aims. The term "horizon of significance" comes from the philosophy of Charles Taylor: the horizon of significance is a common, historically varying symbolic framework that sets in place the foundation for orientation to our moral commitments, civic education, and individual-level identity formation in society. What does that mean for education? Education is, in essence, a goal-oriented human task. As a means of socialization, it is engaged with future prospects at the prevailing horizon of significance. As such, it reproduces the common horizon of significance, with its core beliefs and power relations. Therefore, the key question is whether there is any room for education as an opportunity for overcoming the dominant form of life, with all its wicked problems. This is a central question for the growth of moral agency and living democracy. It is the central question also for the survival of diversified nature. I approach this question from the perspective of human practices as defined by German philosopher and education theorist Dietrich Benner.

According to Benner (2005), human practices can be divided into economic, moral, political, aesthetic, religious, and educational. These practices are necessary in all societies, and the power relations between them are vital in determining the general ethos of the age as an a priori signpost for control, for the molding of the moral subject and civic behavior. Changes in the balance of power among the various societal practices are reflected also in the ideals of education for citizenship and in the conditions set for the development of a moral subject. These conditions assume a particular meaning content, depending on whether the source of governance that defines the age and the cultural community is tied to religion, politics, or economics. For establishing a historical perspective for my analysis, it is possible to discern distinct phases with their respective "moral cosmologies" of governance (see Foucault 1979) in the history of society. Each of these moral cosmologies could be considered a kind of shared perspective of the hegemonic class (see Gramsci 1979) for citizens' moral orientation. Let us consider the case of independent Finland, the history of which can be summarized as consisting of three stages: the "First State" (1917–1939), b) the "Second State" (1945–1970s/1980s), and c) the "Third State" (1980 or 1990 –) (Alasuutari 1996).

In the early years of the First State, the moral sphere (or horizon of significance) of education, teaching, and curricula was constituted by religious and national values. School and citizens' education were expected to integrate a nation that had been divided by the civil war (of 1918). The state was regarded as the highest moral order articulating the common ideals and norms for citizenship, in Hegel's and Snellman's conception. After the Second World War (i.e., with the dawn of the Second State), the earlier notion of citizen lost its philosophical foundation. This turn to sociological foundations reflects the increasing complexity of the modern world and growing awareness of the lack of an autonomous, self-sufficient inner self. The socio-cultural conditions for the new kind of awareness of subjectivity stemmed from the post-war situation. A society in ruins had to be rebuilt on physical, political, and symbolic levels. The project of the welfare state dictated the moral framework for social life at large and especially for education and teaching. The grip of the nation-state was still strong in the citizens' lifeworlds, although the mass media and elements of popular culture expanded people's global awareness. Comprehensive schools, liberalization of the army (including expanded rights for servicemen), and many other social reforms were implemented at that time. That era could be interpreted as characterized by a shift from virtue-based morality towards individuals' rights and subjective lifestyle choices. In the late-modern information society, the horizon of significance is more dispersed and fragmented than ever before. Questions about education and citizenship must be considered in relation to a sphere of globalized nation-states marked by multiculturalism, marketization, and a neoliberal economy. Instead of national policy, the discourse and terminology of education emerge increasingly from the neoliberal economy and global markets. The moral sphere has shifted again, from national identity toward the post-structural and post-modern meanings of subjectivity. All of these trends that may be evident point to the same conclusion: one's identity is the target of construction in the post-modern situation. Therefore, there is no clear direction for citizenship and moral education (Värri 2012). The conditions of ideological governmentality in shaping moral subjects as citizens have changed, in a move from a virtue-based communitarian moral horizon through welfare-state politics with the attendant ideals of equality to late-modern society and its neoliberal competitive tendencies. In simple terms, the nation-state has become dominated by economic factors, and the economy has become globalized. In the power balance between politics and economic factors, the global economy has assumed dominance over national policy (see Beck 1999).

The post-modern notion of "the death of the meta-narrative" notwithstanding, there are still universalistic aims in education, which now are rooted in the neoliberal ideology of a global economy and its impacts on national school policy and education. This new kind of hegemony is a manifestation of pure secularization and instrumental rationality. It has no reference point in values that lie beyond aims of instrumentality. In the economic sphere, we are doomed to be lifelong learners in the midst of global economic competition. Competitiveness seems to be the only aim for education in OECD-driven school policy. In the wake of the "economic turn" in the moral perspective of nation-states (i.e., the triumph of neoliberal ideology), education is under threat of being reduced to a tool of the economy (see Autio 2006). From the standpoint of Foucauldian critique (Foucault 1979), this economy-driven governmentality constitutes an attempt to standardize, stabilize, and control behavior, to implement the principles of a neoliberal pedagogical ethic that serves as an attempt to concretize competencies for the labor market and the ideals for consumer behavior (e.g., Apple 2001; 2004; Pinar 2004). When education is reduced to purportedly neutral, test-assessed

learning, we lose track of the real challenges posed for development of a moral subject. By losing sight of a unique existential meaning of education, we lose sight of our responsible being in the world. Hence, we are unable to see any pedagogical solutions to our ecological threats, the polarization of society (i.e., the increase in inequality), and the commercial colonization of childhood.

In the frame of reference of economy-driven education policy there exists the obvious risk that interpreting education to be a tool of the economy will lead to supranational standardization and assessment, that testing and quality assessment will gradually become the criteria in judging learning, and that a universalist arena of “moral education” will arise in our globalized but morally fragmented age. In fact, the field of education in many countries has already become a test-driven battleground where children and young people are divided into winners and losers on the basis of their test scores. Because of the competitive setting, education has been corrupted into mere training and “teaching to the tests” (see Autio 2006). Unlike in ethical education – where every child would be respected and be recognized on the basis of his or her existence – in competitive training all children have to battle for recognition and many will be left without it (Honneth 1995). In fact, economy-based training is unethical by its very nature and therefore does not deserve to be called education.

3. The horizon of a good life under the siege of neoliberal instrumentalism

There are new kinds of threats within societies today. The combination of neoliberal politics, with its conception of atomistic individualism, and post-modern fragmentation of lifeworlds has intensified the segregation process and the degeneration of a welfare society into a winner-takes-all-society. The prevailing instrumental thinking has brought an economic rationale to every corner of society. In this kind of moral sphere, the meaning of “citizen” and of being a member of society has slowly become narrowed into roles of client, consumer, and producer in the market. In the absence of an ontological understanding of the various kinds of logic and ethos in various societal practices (Benner 2005), competition is taken as a core model for the whole of social being. Such an instrumental ideology expresses symbolic violence with an implicit threat of real violence. According to Zygmunt Bauman, the current pluralism and tensional life-perspectives necessitate dialogue-orientation among people but these tensions encompass also potentiality of violence (Bauman 2002, 130–134, 253–254).

Bauman’s analysis of the ambivalence and tensions in the post-modern era has gained currency in a shocking way. We have been forced to face a new kind of unpredictable violence both in Finland (e.g., with school shootings) and in many other countries (as with the massacre in Norway). It demonstrates that the prevailing form of social control does not prevent so-called exceptional persons from acting in a horrible manner. According to Finnish researchers Tomi Kiilakoski and Atte Oksanen (2011a; 2011b), a new type of script for using destructive and spectacular violence arose after the Columbine school massacre. At the same time, our social world is more fragmented than ever before. There is no longer self-evident social control regulating one’s intentions, aims, and acts; meanwhile, numerous young unemployed men in Europe feel that they have no prospects for the future and experience a lack of recognition and respect within a consumption-oriented culture that reifies

competition-oriented neoliberal nihilism. These are among the seeds for sudden rising of far right and far left in an uncertain and desperate situation that is intensified by “hatred demagogy” of political agitators.

If we Western people are living in the midst of a secular consumption culture without any bigger picture beyond economic growth, is there any common perspective for moral engagement beyond one’s private life or duty as a taxpayer or consumer? Where do the moral aims come from in the global economized era? Is there a need for common educational aims anymore in this fragmented world? Whatever age we may live in, there will always be some permanent constituents for the formation of one’s identity as a member of society: one must have a sense of recognition and a sense of being respected by others in a democracy. If there lives among us a mass of people without recognition, common security and democracy are under threat. Alongside the traditional threats in the field of security strategy exist the new kinds of global threats. Here, I do not refer only to armed conflict, civil wars, and terrorism – especially important is climate change, with its unpredictable effects in and between the various nations and societies. In fact, the ecological realities and the ecological disasters in progress implicitly – and should explicitly – form the meta level for our all efforts, aims, and goals at both local and global level.

Because of the problems described above, it is impossible for me to avoid criticism of the instrumental and destructive traits that are engaged in the prevailing cultural horizon of our societies. Education as a constitutive praxis of constructing prevailing moral subjectivity is part of the problem. Therefore, education must be released from being simply a means of instrumental thinking. Firstly, we must realize that there are some inalienable “intrinsic values” and “constant truths” in education. The first basic truth is that of the educational responsibility given to us. My argument is ontological in nature. As soon as someone becomes a parent, the accordant responsibility is on the lifelong horizon of that person’s life and hence an essential part of his or her identity – the motherhood and fatherhood never disappear, and they cannot be cut off, even upon divorce. For compassing the essence of responsibility, reducing them to the intellectual or emotional category is inappropriate. The fundamental postulates of responsibility and parenthood could be understood only through considering parenthood an ontological concept with ontic origin. By the ontic I refer to the immediate responsibility given to parents (independently of social conventions and temporal changes) to take care of their helpless child (Värri 2004). The responsibility becomes concrete and is given flesh – literally made incarnate – at the child’s birth. Almost immediately upon coming into the world, a child tries to find a connection to others with his or her searching gaze and groping hands. He or she is completely helpless and dependent on care from others. If nobody answers the child’s “call of being” and provides nourishment, warmth, and protection, he or she would perish. From birth, a child needs care and tenderness but also responses to his or her wordless expressions. Therefore, **an immediate responsibility for caring** is generated for the parents by birth of a child. The first requirement is **protection of the child’s basic living conditions**, at the fundamental level of responsibility: it demands that the parents respond to the fundamental physiological needs, the factors on which their child’s existence depends. Satisfying of these needs is also a prerequisite for the child’s mental development and basic confidence in the world. Thus the other levels of responsibility are tied to protection of the child’s basic living conditions from the very beginning.

Every newborn child is a concrete living call to responsibility for everyone in the social world. In a broad sense, all adults are responsible for the welfare of children and younger generations, but the primary and fundamental responsibility belongs to the parents first of all.¹ In a morally developed society, education would be seen as a specific human practice (among the other societal practices) constituting the moral resources for a good life (see Ben-ner 2005). Therefore, all political and economic decisions and their possible implications would be considered in light of the educational good. Under neoliberal instrumentalism, in contrast, the human subject is restricted to being a competitor on the battlefield of markets. There is no need for virtue and empathy. At the same time, we are on the road to eco-catastrophe. For addressing the threats and negative trends of our age, the central question is how to construct a trust-based society with ecological understanding.

We have enough evidence (knowledge) of our destructive relationship with nature, but, as we know, this has not led to permanent changes in our behavior. Regrettably, the late Finnish philosopher G. H. von Wright (1987) might have been right in saying that only catastrophes will teach us. Yet, as educators and educational philosophers, we have to keep hope alive. Neoliberal politics must come to an end if we wish to preserve democratic values and the atmosphere of a common society for every citizen. At the same time, the relations between human and non-human nature must be reinterpreted at ontological, ethical, and political levels. Societal and ecological facts must be the primary groundwork for establishing the frame necessary for rethinking our understanding of human conditions in the world and making the political decisions that preserving our planet for diversified life requires. On this scale, we must be ready to adjust our sense of human rights to the ecological realities. Simultaneously, we have to defend human rights both in general and especially for the weakest and most vulnerable members of society.

It is more than likely that we will see very tragic results of climate change and other eco-disasters related to natural resources and conditions of life in general for the most vulnerable parts of our planet. Starvation, scarcity of water, and decreases in farmland cause battles, wars, and migration. Presumably, awareness of ecological realities and scenarios of eco-catastrophe will become a core framing element in both the education and security thinking of the future. Actually, in our global situation of ecological crisis, there is no moral subjectivity beyond ecological awareness. From the ecological point of view, we need both concrete awareness of the world as a home under our feet and the conviction that nature is a transcendent whole we can never own. Creating theoretical and pedagogical justifications for an ecological philosophy of education requires reinterpretation of the moral subject. We need both the educational horizon of hope and globally shared visions of the basic virtues (moderation,

¹ From the responsibility angle, fatherhood and motherhood are, in essence, not biological, juridical, or sociological concepts, nor are they only social roles. For instance, Gabriel Marcel underlines the unique essence of parenthood in his analysis of the basis of fatherhood. According to Marcel, fatherhood if a biological category would be reduced to the actor in breeding and, accordingly, to the reason for the child's existence. As a juridical and sociological concept, it would be dependent on the prevailing legal and religious institutions' engagement in the relevant era and society with its mutable social order. Hence, parenthood would be a completely relativistic concept (Marcel 1978, 99).

justice, and charity) if we are to preserve our ethical action competence² (see Toiskallio 2003; 2009; 2016a; 2016b) in the midst of ongoing ecological crisis. In fact, we must create a new kind of educational (*Bildung*) project of an ecological sort, and this project has to be of both a political and a pedagogical nature.

The greatest challenge facing efforts to create a value-linked perspective on education arises from radical reinterpretation of both the human self and the fundamental ecological constraints imposed on individuals by Earth. There is need for a new kind of education, one aimed at fostering the sense of participation and experience of recognition and one providing the moral resources for a sustainable way of living. Ecological awareness must be the primary focus in establishment of the framework, both for re-understanding the conditions that humans face in the world and for making the political decisions that are necessary for saving our planet for diversified life.

References

- Alasuutari, P. (1996). *Toinen tasavalta. Suomi 1946–1994* [The Second State: Finland 1946-1994]. Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino.
- Apple, M. (2001). *Educating the “Right” Way: Markets, Standards, God, and Inequality*. New York: Routledge Falmer.
- Apple, M. (2004). *Ideology and Curriculum*, third edition. New York: Routledge Falmer.
- Autio, T. (2006). *Subjectivity, Curriculum, and Society: Between and Beyond German Didaktik and Anglo-American Curriculum Studies*. Mahwah, New Jersey, & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Bauman, Z. (2002). *Notkea moderni*. Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino. A Finnish translation, by Jyrki Vainonen, of *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press..
- Beck, U. (1999). *Mitä on globalisaatio? Virhekäsityksiä ja poliittisia vastauksia*. (Was ist globalisierung, 1997). Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino. A Finnish translation, by Tapani Hietaniemi,
- Benner, D. (2005). *Allgemeine Pädagogik. Eine systematisch-problemgeschichtliche Einführung in die Grundstruktur pädagogischen Denkens und Handelns*, fifth amended edition. Munich & Weinheim, Germany.
- Besley, T. (2002). Social Education and Mental Hygiene: Foucault, Disciplinary Technologies and the Moral Constitution of Youth. *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 34(4), pp. 419–433.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998). *Järjen käytännöllisyys. (Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l'action, (1994)* Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino. A Finnish translation, by Mika Siimes
- Delanty, G. & O’Mahony, P. (2002). *Nationalism and Social Theory: Modernity and the Recalcitrance of the Nation*. London: Sage Publications.
- Foucault, M. (1979). Governmentality. *Ideology and Consciousness* 6, pp. 5–12.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

² Professor Jarmo Toiskallio has emphasized the importance of advanced action competence as a core aim of ethical pedagogy (Toiskallio 2003; 2009; 2016a; 2016b). He has drawn from the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, in his thinking. According to Toiskallio (2009, 49), ethics is both the core and the manifestation of one’s action competence in practice. Therefore, ethics and identity are strongly coupled with our capacity to act morally. The more fragmented our social context is, the less there is any self-evident source of common will for one’s moral orientation in a situation of ignorance. Therefore, we must set an advanced moral imagination as the necessary aim for education, to foster our action competence and sensitivity towards others in a world that involves many ambiguities and perspectives that stand in tension or even conflict.

- Glover, J. (2008). *Ihmisyys. 1900-luvun moraalihistoria*. Keuruu, Finland: Like. A Finnish translation, by Petri Stenman of *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, (1999)
- Gramsci, A. (1979). *Vankilavihkot 1: valikoima 1*. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri. A Finnish translation, edited by Mikael Böök, of *Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Volume 1*.
- Honneth, A. (1995). *The Struggle for Recognition – the Moral and Political Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. An English translation of *Kampf um Arrkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte*, 1992. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Horkheimer, M. (2008). *Välineellisen järjen kritiikki*. Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino. A Finnish translation, by Olli-Pekka Moiso and Veikko Pietilä, of *Eclipse of Reason* and “The End of Reason, 1947. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kiilakoski, T. & Oksanen, A. (2011a). Peer and Cultural Influences on Homicidal Violence. *Journal of Youth Development* 1(129), pp. 31–42.
- Kiilakoski, T. & Oksanen, A. (2011b). The Soundtrack of School Shootings: Music, Cultural Script and Male Rage. *YOUNG (Nordic Journal of Educational Research)* 19(3), 247–270.
- Marcel, G. (1978). Creative Vow As the Essence of Fatherhood. In: G. Marcel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope*. Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith. An English translation, by Emma Craufurd.
- Pinar, W. F. (2004). *What Is Curriculum Theory?* London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Siljander, P. (2002). *Systemaattinen johdatus kasvatustieteeseen* [“The systematic Introduction to Education”] Helsinki: Otava.
- Taylor, C. (1996). *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Toiskallio, J. (2003). Ethics, Military Pedagogy, and Action Competence. In: Edwin R. Micewski (ed.), *Civil-Military Aspects of Military Ethics*, Vol. 1 (pp. 97–119). Vienna: National Defence Academy.
- Toiskallio, J. (2009). Toimintakyky sotilaspedagogiikan käsitteenä [Action Competence as a Concept of Military Pedagogy]. In: J. Toiskallio & J. Mäkinen, *Sotilaspedagogiikka: sotilisuuden ja toimintakyvyn teoriaa ja käytäntöä* [Military Pedagogy: Theory and Practice of Soldiership and Action Competence] (pp. 48–73). Part of the series “Julkaisusarja 1,” No. 3/2009 (“Johtamisen ja sotilaspedagogiikan laitos”). Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.
- Toiskallio, J. (2016a). Eettisyys ja toimintakyky [Ethicality and Action Competence]. In: Markku Niinivirta & Markku Wilenius (eds.), *Reijo Wilenius. Henkisen kasvun ja toiminnan filosofi* [“Reijo Wilenius, The Philosopher of Mental Cultivation and Action”] (pp. 83–105). Part of the “Snellman-korkeakoulun tutkimusosaston julkaisu” series, No. 1/2016.
- Toiskallio, J. (2016b). Hyvä elämä, toimintakyky, sivistys [“Good Life, Action Competence and Education”]. In: Arto Mutanen, Mauri Kantola, Hannu Kotila, & Liisa Vanhanen-Nuutinen (eds.), *Hyvä elämä. Käytäntö, tutkimus ja ammattipedagogiikka* [“Good Life, Practice, Research and Vocational Education”] (pp. 47–68), part of the series “Turun ammattikorkeakoulun tutkimuksia,” No. 44. Turku, Finland: Turun ammattikorkeakoulu.
- Värrö, V.-M. (2004). *Hyvä kasvatusta – kasvatusta hyvään* [“Good Education – Education for Good”], fifth edition. Tampere, Finland: Tampere University Press.
- Värrö, V.-M. (2012). *The Sense of Moral Imagination in the Sphere of Uncertainty*. Keynote speech at the Symposium of Military Sciences, at the National Defence University on May 23, 2012, in Helsinki. Unpublished.
- von Wright, G. H. (1987). *Tiede ja ihmisjärki* [“Science and Human Reason”]. Helsinki: Otava.

III APPLIED PERSPECTIVES

7. A PRACTITIONER'S REFLECTIONS: ETHICAL ACTION IS NOT PERFORMED; IT TAKES PLACE

Juha Rautjärvi

1. Introductory remarks

One of my fellow citizens, Professor Reijo Heinonen, issued a challenge to me recently. He had learned that I was involved in South Africa's nuclear disarmament endeavor, and he asked me whether I, as a practitioner, could talk about the role of ethics, ethicality, and ethical action competence. How did all of that work in reality, and would I tell my story, providing examples of the praxis?

I accepted the challenge. My fellow citizen had called on me to tackle something interesting and very intriguing, challenged me to contemplate one of my clandestine love and hate affairs. I promised to look into the matter, and I ended up with a sense of complexity and confusion, feeling very uncertain.

I know the effort and resources that were invested in the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) toward the aim of improving the organization's performance, covering areas such as conceptual approaches, management and personal skills, and technological means. In addition, administrative practices were enhanced to improve the cost-efficiency and effectiveness of implementation of the measures taken. The question is this: was there still something else happening of importance that we may have ignored? Is there an unutilized resource that we should be interested in and are able to put to full use? This question has continued to occupy my mind in the years since I resigned from the IAEA in January 2000.

This call offered me an opportunity. To bring me some emotional comfort and add clarity, deeper reflection was called for, a dialogue between me and myself. This entailed a step into a new area for exploration and elaboration. For someone with a background in experimental nuclear and theoretical physics and whose professional experience has been in national and international civil service, this was somewhat new territory.

All my life, I have been interested in understanding how things happen, how nature works, and have striven to become more aware of the complexities associated with relationships and communication, to understand the nature of confidence-building better, and to uncover what it takes to accommodate ethics considerations and integrate them into a decisive flow of action for security. I will begin with a metaphor: at an intuitive level, professional and ethical action competence feels like balanced walking on both feet when one is well-centered, with brain in gear, proceeding with confidence towards the goal.

The sections below provide insights into the conditions and circumstances but also certain actions that enabled the Republic of South Africa, as a *de facto* nuclear-weapon state, to join the international community as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1991. The choice of events for discussion and issues to be elaborated upon is aimed at exemplifying the ethical competence in action, the praxis.

2. Reflections aimed at shedding light on implicit power potential and ethicality

In search for a starting point for considering ethics, capacity to reflect ethically, and ethical action competence, I revisited a previously published article of mine (Rautjärvi 2014), which I use as one of the references for the chapter. In that piece, I wrote about my role, as a section head for operations at the IAEA, in the final phase of negotiation and initial phase of implementation for the IAEA's new approaches to safeguards for South Africa during the critical time July–September 1991.

Recently, 25 years since then, I happened to receive further encouragement for this engagement. I exchanged messages with an authority on the events in South Africa, my counterpart responsible for implementation at that time: in March 2016, I got hold of a book written primarily by a nuclear physicist who had worked for the South African Atomic Energy Corporation, or AEC, then (von Wielligh & von Wielligh–Steyn 2015). Describing what occurred and also **how** certain things happened, he provided a broader contextual framework for the very specific episode elaborated upon here.

The physicist, Nic von Wielligh, was responsible for taking concrete actions, including some mitigating the risks associated with implementing this genuinely novel step in confidence-building non-proliferation undertakings, which then unfolded under complex and difficult circumstances. The goal was to ensure that the Republic of South Africa (RSA) would join the nuclear non-proliferation community as a respected member state with the proven status of non-nuclear-weapon state.

While reading the above-referenced book, I decided to contact him, sending a message with my brief article attached. He responded promptly. This brief exchange reveals something about the underlying ethics that guided us in our practical work. The exchange of messages is reproduced below:

March 6, 2016:

Dear Nic,

thank you for the book “The Bomb” you have written about the way of RSA to NPT [the non-proliferation treaty]. I would like to share with you some of my particular experiences, namely in the area of Nuclear Exit of South Africa, the insights, I believe, being of some relevance for addressing the challenges we have faced and are facing also [...] today.

With best regards, Juha Rautjärvi

March 8, 2016:

Dear Juha,

thank you for your message and the attached article. I found it very interesting with your experience very narrowly paralleling my own. I still find it surprising that organizations such as the IAEA and the AEC and individuals like yourself and me, from such different backgrounds, objectives and views could mesh so smoothly in the process of exercising our mutual tasks and responsibilities. Obviously the lubricant, which made that possible was the goodwill from both sides, much of which I experienced from you personally – for which I thank you.

Best regards, Nic

The above spontaneous response demonstrates that ethics must have played an important role in securing a successful outcome for this risky endeavor. The ethics appear not to have been something made explicit in formal plans; the ethics element was implicit, a kind of disposition or underlying value guiding and influencing the timing of the action. Things just happened as they did, because there was goodwill and personal commitment on both sides. At the same time, this could be experienced as something reassuring, inspiring confidence in our ability to address the challenges and consequences that arise appropriately, even those that came as a surprise.

In the end, it worked: South Africa went on record as the first state to have eliminated its nuclear weapons and associated program, joined the NPT, begun to cooperate in implementation of all the required measures, and gained non-nuclear-weapon state status. All of this marked a first in the history of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Confidence-building as conditional on professional and ethical action competencies

In the work, the focus was on professional action competence nurtured to enable efficient organizational performance, thereby contributing to functionaries' ability to conduct themselves in accordance with certain norms and to compliance with the formal requirements. These qualities were deemed to enable efficient response, of the required nature, to any given situation, in fulfillment of the rule-based requirements and organizational expectations. However, the organization of the day, being oriented toward efficiency and impressed by objectivity, did not appreciate the time taken to understand values or the effort invested in assurance for their realization. Hence, discussions about good safeguards died. Objective criteria for implementation and evaluation were instituted to direct operations.

A few years later, it was realized, in the case of Iraq, that such confidence-building undertakings cannot deliver the desired impact. There is a high risk of losing credibility. On one hand, a confidence-building undertaking aimed at credible assurances builds on premises

of objectivity and competence. On the other hand, assurance refers to management confidence, which is understood as trust that is based on proven reliability of the “one” (the individual) **and** the “thing” (the institution or entity). The focus in implementation and management has been on objectivity. However, if the output is to be credible and be perceived as such when addressing complex situations, the “one” is the key to success or failure. Therefore, professional competencies and skills must be complemented by ethical competencies if credibility is to be secured.

Ethical action competence entails personal accountability and implies willingness to deal also with one’s moral duty and obligations. Particularly in situations that are genuinely new and involve uncertainty and insecurity, wherein previous rulings and experiences are not able to provide adequate guidance, both professional and ethical action competencies are required. The will and also the ability to reflect in ethical terms are necessary. Consequently, self-assurance and self-enforcement empowered by a sense of purpose and confidence in one’s character together enable taking responsibility and strengthen the ability to face and to cope with unknown eventualities. Strength is required, for facing the consequences, however serious they may be, including those the “one” is deemed to face.

4. The Age of Deception and the IAEA’s positive surprise for the international community

Successful implementation of the initial steps for the IAEA safeguards in South Africa contributed to re-establishment of the IAEA’s reputation as the competent authority in the domain of international nuclear non-proliferation.

This positive outcome resulted from the engagement and bold action of Director General H. Blix and Director of External Relations Mohamed ElBaradei, who, despite the difficult conditions, decided to aim at finalizing the negotiations for a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).

Moreover, the decision was made to commence the initial phase of implementation in South Africa as soon as possible – in September 1991, only two months after South Africa acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The circumstances and conditions were difficult, the IAEA management was preoccupied, and the staff was dealing with the Iraq case.

Uncertainty, complexity, and even insecurity are the concepts that best characterize the conditions and circumstances amid which the IAEA made efforts to deliver its services to the Member States and to the international community, as required by its role under the NPT. The bold action taken by the two institutional leaders under those conditions can be understood as an example of ethical competence in action. However, I do not know the depth or level of consciousness of the ethical reflection that might have been guiding these leaders. It would be good to know.

Various books have been written about nuclear weapon programs and the non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In its approach to this topic with regard to ethics, one of those to attract my attention was *The Age of Deception*, by ElBaradei (2011). It offers insight into

the “state of soul” and describes the conditions and circumstances that, on one hand, have enabled and, on the other hand, constrained the practitioners engaged with nuclear safeguards and security, where failure is not an option.

His focus is on cases such as those of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. The state of soul he refers to, omnipresent and omnipotent, had an impact also on the evolving case of and connected with South Africa. I know from experience that elements of that state of soul are still alive and having a detrimental impact on current confidence-building affairs, incapacitating institutions with regard to action.

One of the lessons learned lies in ElBaradei urging and encouraging us to look for a way out of the Age of Deception by taking genuinely collaborative actions, to work jointly with others, to contribute to collective security. In the book, he did not elaborate further, did not show the way and suggest solutions. This task remains for those of us still “in gear.”

5. The new paradigm required to complement the professional one, for efficiency

What we are lacking is a complementary paradigm from “outside the box.” Rethinking the very concept of security is required. Attention should be devoted to will, trust, dialogue, and ethical action competence, with the aim of enabling genuine confidence-building and collaborative action. Thereby, the desired, sustainable impact may be expected. Security culture would be reformed. Negative impacts of deception and undesired implications of elements from the “culture of secrecy” would be mitigated.

The following four issues and some associated questions may guide the reader further:

- Action in good faith holds the key role in confidence-building for security. The key question is “what does this **good** mean in this context?”
- Coping with the complexity is a difficult challenge for formal administrations. Out of the complex circumstances will emerge a unique situation, an opportunity for ethical action. The question here is whether there is someone present who is willing, able, and ready to take responsibility.
- Personal experiences related to negotiation, preparatory discussions, implementation, and conflict resolution exemplifies ethical action competence. Incidentally, what does praxis mean?
- What and how could we learn, and how can we integrate the given “wisdom” into the body of personal and institutional knowledge? How can it be made accessible to the actors, and how can the presence of leadership be ensured?

For the administration to deliver the desired services, to facilitate meeting the objectives while also serving its purposes, administration should be perceived as a philosophy in action. This implies that today’s (predominantly rule-based) institutions and organizations must be acquainted with ethicality.

Professional competence must be complemented by role-based ethical competence if we are to create a position from which to address specific complex situations efficiently, to assure the presence of all desired and sustainable outcomes and impacts. If this is not done, we continue running a high risk of institutional and organizational performance being reduced to bureaucratic discipline with known consequences.

This does not involve or require a paradigm change. It means a change in coping strategy, just introduction of a complementary paradigm such that we are in a position to cope with complexity and uncertainty.

6. Action in good faith as the key to confidence-building for safeguards and security

The key question was and still is what the **good** is in the construct “the one undertakes to sign an agreement with the other one in good faith”, as explicitly required by the respective operative paragraph of the Model Safeguards Agreement subject to negotiation.

I will make the following four assertions to guide the elaboration further:

- Without initial trust at personal level, confidence-building is not possible.
- Without good care being taken that the state of soul is conducive to confidence-building, the efforts are in vain.
- Without personal will to act, and commitment to securing action in good faith, the engagement in implementation is fruitless.
- Without commitment to a collaborative undertaking to address given types of new situations, cooperation is reduced to performance, without the desired impact.

In the case discussed here, von Wielligh and I were both acting in good faith. That was for us the only ethical option. Ethicality was there, present as a disposition, the state of soul, something embedded in character. This is something that cannot be done or put in place when required – the desirable just happens, naturally and many times surprisingly. Important things are not done; they happen!

Both of us were committed to bringing that “thing” through, to making it happen. We were both committed to collaborating. While pursuing the shared goal, we both were taking good care also of our own specific interests. Also, each of us was helping the other contribute to progress in pursuit of the common goal. On one hand, it was a matter of taking responsibility for something, for that “thing.” On the other hand, this was about accountability – to oneself first and then to the other “one,” the counterpart, and also to the respective institutions, to the otherhood – *inter alia*, to the UN and the Security Council. This I understand as about ethics, about ethics of responsibility.

6.1. Securing credibility was a personal challenge

How could it be ensured that other stakeholders, including all members of the team, play their role in a constructive manner? How could the risks of emerging non-objective elements or evidence of incompetence be mitigated?

Continuous assessment, including self-assessment, was called for. This included awareness of whether one is and continue to be in a position from which one can appreciate the conditions and circumstances; monitoring of one's character traits, moods, and attitudes in a given evolving situation; and conducting oneself in a manner befitting of the task's complexity.

The team members had a right to know what was expected from them. Our obligation was to inform them about the play and make sure that they were able to commit and play their roles as expected. The team had to be welded together during the rehearsals, in the initial phase. However, vigilance and continuous maintenance of awareness was called for, for being sure that one's state of soul was conducive to the desired results.

At that time, the process was driven and managed primarily through intuitive-level information. This kind of self-awareness enabled understanding oneself and gaining assurance that, *inter alia*, the underlying motives were honorable and that each other "one" could rely on the first. Consequently, open(minded)ness made it possible to reflect also ethically with and within the team.

Professional, political, administrative, and technical competencies and skills are necessary but by no means enough. Personal engagement, dialogue, and ethical action competencies make the difference for bringing about the desired impact. If desired, this kind of empowerment can be learned – however, not by teaching but possibly through facilitated playing and, in any case, through experiences, sometimes painful ones.

Without these personal qualities and competencies, there is a high risk of falling into escape mechanisms such as deception.

6.2. The key lesson learned: Deceptive coping strategies put confidence-building and security at risk

Complexity manifests itself through two generic concepts, certainty and uncertainty. These open two lines of action for the development of coping strategy. The concept of certainty represents what is most desired currently, a kind of guiding value, a center and aim of security and a frame for confidence-building discourse and action.

Real-world situations, however, tend to be characterized by the qualities of uncertainty and insecurity. These create pressure for us to seek certainty and security, sometimes at any cost, also by exerting excessive power, including that of the word, over the situation and over the other "one." Pragmatic use of power frequently causes undesired major "collateral damage," also to ourselves. Is it possible to enhance our contemporary certainty-oriented coping strategy with a complementary one that more directly addresses and takes good care of the underlying uncertainty and associated insecurity?

One way to mitigate uncertainty and insecurity is to avoid escaping, unintentionally or intentionally, into some of the most obvious deceptive practices. These might include the following, alongside others:

- To fail to fulfill expectations (deficient management of expectations)
- To cause to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid (questionable motives, character deficiency)
- To while away the time (distancing, indifference, non-responsible or irresponsible conduct)
- To give a false impression (manipulation, action that is not in good faith)
- To impose a false idea that creates ignorance (directing attention away from the relevant and important information, increasing vulnerability)
- To confuse via complexity (manipulation, misleading and causing feeling of helplessness)
- To obscure the truth (providing “alternative” facts, appealing to authority)
- To stress the use of charm and persuasion in decision-making (beguiling with false promises)

One of the most effective measures to mitigate the risks is ensuring transparency in dialogue, including engagement in deeper ethical deliberation and direct communication. Should deceptive strategies be identified, they should be made explicit and acknowledged, with any necessary measures being carried out appropriately, with attention to proper timing. Understandably, disclosure of such deficient strategies has consequences, both those desired and, at times, less desirable repercussions for the one exposing them.

Sometimes positive things just happen, with the consequences not always having been explicitly required or wanted. Desired corrective action and conduct may just follow naturally. This condition, when observed, is an indication of ethical deliberations taking place, being noted well, and creating good lessons learned.

7. Dramatically changing circumstances and conditions as an opportunity for ethical action

Opportunities for ethical action do not emerge out of nowhere. The potentiality for ethical action is embedded in the complexity of an evolving situation that extends over many years, as the following recollection of evolving events suggests. The body of knowledge – both institutional memory and, especially, the knowledge of the persons engaged in the work – plays an important role in understanding the significance of the moment inviting action.

In July 1991, South Africa signed the NPT. However, the issue of its nuclear capabilities had emerged already in 1984. That was the year when the IAEA addressed South Africa's nuclear capabilities to express alarm that South Africa's non-safeguarded nuclear facilities enabled that country to gain the capability of producing materials usable for nuclear weapons.

The IAEA demanded that South Africa immediately submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection. State parties to the NPT, including the depositaries (the USSR, UK, and USA), called on South Africa to negotiate a CSA with the IAEA. The Director General did not accept the invitation to visit South Africa at that time; however, he did assign a technical team of four, including me, to undertake a major project: the development of a safeguards approach for the country's semi-commercial enrichment plant.

Three years later, in September 1987, the IAEA General Conference was still addressing South Africa's nuclear capabilities. In September 1990, it urged South Africa to comply with the resolutions in place and was ready to make a decision on the suspension of South Africa's rights and privileges at its next General Conference, to be held in September 1991.

Then, in the first half of the deadline year, 1991, the Director General of the IAEA held discussions with South African officials. A contingency plan was prepared, including an action plan to negotiate the required agreements and *ad hoc* arrangements for the possibility of South Africa becoming a party to the NPT at the earliest opportunity. South Africa deposited its instruments of accession on July 10, 1991.

The question emerged of whether the situation, prevailing conditions, and circumstances warranted signing the CSA at the forthcoming General Conference of the IAEA. Was the required level of initial trust there, so as to enable the parties to meet in Vienna and sign the CSA in good faith and commit to implementing it also in good faith? What does "the good" mean in the given context – what is the implication for practical work and conduct? In particular, what does it mean to me, as one of the key actors? These were some of the key questions, though mostly implicit at the time, that require deeper understanding and answers.

Because of the novelty of the situation, the effort that lay ahead and the complexity of the task could not be fully understood. There was neither prior experience nor enough information for development of a comprehensive plan of action and guidance for conduct. In addition, the circumstances surrounding the IAEA, particularly recent experiences with implementation of actions in Iraq, were of major concern that summer. Neither were the conditions **within** the IAEA optimal for taking on any major new challenges, let alone undertaking something unprecedented.

The 1990–1991 Iraq War and detection of non-compliance with the NPT did put IAEA credibility at risk. Hence, the IAEA could not afford to fail in the case of initial implementation for South Africa. Leadership was required.

In light of these conditions, circumstance, and the unprecedented task complexity, "wise" decisions had to be made and actions taken in good faith. The capability of reflecting ethically, the ability to realize the underlying ethical values and implement everything in accordance with the letter **and** spirit of the agreement, was in question. The negative experiences

of the IAEA in Iraq were creating concerns not only within and surrounding the IAEA but also in South Africa.

8. Added complexity through the conditions not going unnoticed by the South African party

During the Iraq War, it became evident that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. The NPT-based IAEA safeguards did not reveal that fact. Also, it was not reported in a timely manner. Accordingly, the credibility of the IAEA and its safeguards system was indeed at risk.

In May 1991, the Board of Governors of the IAEA took note of the tasks entrusted to the IAEA by Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). An IAEA Action Team was established. The task and timeline were concrete and were specific in their scope. Iraq's response to the IAEA's request for declarations of nuclear materials, equipment, and activities and other information was uncooperative. Additionally, the first two IAEA field inspections in Iraq did not proceed in a cooperative manner.

By a Security Council Resolution, the UN requested the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities on the basis of Iraqi declarations. It was requested that declarations be issued within 15 days, with the locations, amounts, and types of all specified items included, and Iraq was requested to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control of the IAEA for custody and removal.

Two initial inspections in Iraq were conducted by the IAEA, in May and June–July 1991. The objectives included verifying the accuracy and completeness of the Iraqi declarations and conducting inspections of sites (designated by the Special Commission) for which there were grounds to believe that undeclared nuclear activities had been occurring. Iraq denied access to certain facilities and fired warning shots. The Iraqi response thus failed to meet the requirements and expectations of the IAEA.

A consolidated report, dated July 11, 1991, was submitted the following day by the Director General of the IAEA to the Secretary-General of the UN. On July 15, the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution declaring that Iraq was in non-compliance with its CSA. The Director General advised the Board of Directors meeting on July 18 that Iraq was non-compliant with its CSA with the IAEA.

All the above was taking place in parallel with South Africa acceding to the NPT, a process completed on July 10. The obligation for South Africa and the IAEA was to negotiate the CSA within 180 days. These conditions and circumstances did not go unnoticed by the South African party. As reported by Waldo Stumpf (1995):

The confrontational verification process between Iraq and the IAEA at the time, which was highly visible in the news media, convinced South Africa that it could very easily have been branded as a second Iraqi case in international quarters in spite of the fact that South Africa had not violated the NPT as Iraq had done.

This concern had to be taken seriously and addressed appropriately during the negotiations and discussions with South Africa, particularly during preparations for the initial implementation of the NPT-based IAEA safeguards there. This was a matter of securing implementation in good faith, again of complying with the letter and the spirit of the CSA.

The task for the IAEA and South Africa was to assign the teams, select the people to take part in discussions, and agree on the *ad hoc* arrangements for establishment of the Initial Inventory by the IAEA for the Republic of South Africa. Attention had to be directed to precautionary measures that would prevent the “bad” experiences with the Iraqi implementation from “contaminating” the spirit, conditions, and initial implementation practices in South Africa.

9. Successful negotiation and preparatory discussions, leading to proven reliability of the thing and the parties – and ultimate success in the mission

Successful negotiation and discussions in the final week of August 1991 convinced South Africa to come to Vienna and sign the CSA with the IAEA on September 16 of that year. After four days, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution requiring the IAEA to ensure early implementation and verification of the completeness of the inventory of South Africa’s nuclear materials and facilities.

A team of senior IAEA officers conducted the first inspection, in November 1991, on the basis of the Initial Report from South Africa. Establishment of the initial inventory of nuclear-materials activities by the IAEA proved to be a complex task, which took about four years. The report published in the IAEA *Bulletin* periodical by IAEA senior officers (von Baeckmann et al. 1995) gives a good sense of the effort that was required for achieving credible assurance as to the completeness **and** correctness of the Initial Inventory established for the Republic of South Africa by the IAEA as foreseen by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Negotiation, preparatory discussions, and implementation of all available measures resulted in management confidence, related to trust that stemmed from proven reliability of the results and also of the parties involved in the implementation. The executive body of the IAEA, its Board of Governors, and the General Conference were highly engaged, and the international community was kept informed about the progress and the results achieved. The mission was accomplished successfully.

10. Some possible ethical actions that emerged in reviewing of the initial implementation

When revisiting the first implementation experiences, I recalled some that might well be characterized as involving ethical actions. These are described below.

10.1. *The request and spontaneous acceptance of the assignment to go alone to South Africa*

Director of External Relations ElBaradei requested that I go on my own to South Africa, to get the outstanding issues negotiated with the aim of reaching acceptance for a standard CSA. With regard to the Initial Inventory and associated Initial Report, I was to explain and discuss the practicalities, with the objective being to reach a shared understanding of how to proceed with establishing of the Initial Inventory. Formally, the mission was to be referred to as a technical one. I understood that I was now the responsible one, accountable to myself and to the institution.

I asked whether I could take a person of my choice with me on the mission. The request was declined. Director of Safeguards Operations Ruben Bello, who was participating in the meeting, turned to me and said, “Juha, you go alone. I trust you.” I thanked him for his confidence. The meeting was over. In those days, the atmosphere within the IAEA was somewhat tense. Some of us in Safeguards Operations did not like what was happening and how it worked.

10.2. *My decision to deviate from the advice given*

I had three days for preparation and briefings before departing for South Africa. At a briefing, senior staff guided me: with reference to, the IAEA experiences with Iraq and when discussing the Initial Declaration, make sure South Africa understands that the proceedings will be about the verification by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of the Initial Declaration.

During my flight to South Africa, that Saturday night, I once again read the draft CSA. With regard to the establishment of the Initial Inventory, the operative paragraph stated that the IAEA shall establish its Initial Inventory for the Republic of South Africa on the basis of the Initial Report provided by South Africa and the results of the IAEA inspections. This was a revelation – the task was not one of declaration-verification dialectics. Rather, confrontational practices could and had to be avoided. Hence, I was required to act inconsistently with the expectations, instructions, and advice.

In this initial phase of implementation, the task was to develop genuinely new *ad hoc* arrangements and to secure commitment to cooperation, to implementation in **good** faith. I changed my plan and decided to deviate from the guidance given and inform the South African counterpart about my discovery and conclusion. The purpose was to manage the attention to collaboration and expectations of it while tuning the affect to be conducive to that end.

10.3. Generosity, transparency, and open(minded)ness at the negotiation table

I was known to the South African nuclear authority since I had been in charge of the IAEA's Safeguards Operations Division since 1983. The reception in South Africa was formal yet friendly. While the situation remained somewhat tense, the meeting was conducted in an open atmosphere.

The head of the South African delegation advised two of his experts to take a seat on my side of the table. This was a gesture that I took to be a sign of generosity, and I expressed my appreciation to the host. For me, it was a positive sign, and I felt assured enough to bring up my points in a direct manner in the expectation of constructive dialogue. That expectation proved to be valid.

Subsequently, all points and concerns were addressed directly. The outstanding issues related to the draft CSA were clarified, and the South African party was prepared to accept the standard agreement. How to proceed with the establishment of the Initial Inventory appeared to be the key concern, representing the main issue still to be resolved.

The initial declaration problem was resolved through my statement that there was no requirement for the Republic of South Africa to submit declarations to the IAEA at this initial stage, just an Initial Report – as foreseen by the CSA. The IAEA was responsible for establishing its Initial Inventory for the Republic of South Africa; South Africa was just expected to cooperate. We had to read the relevant terms to convince ourselves that this was really the case, since it was contrary to the prevailing thinking.

Establishment of the Initial Inventory would be based on the Initial Report, which contained the best information available to the government of South Africa as of September 30, 1991. It was understood that, on account of the unprecedented complexity of the task, the report would not be deemed complete at the outset: corrections would be made as additional information became available, either in the form of results of measurements performed by South Africa or as a result of IAEA inspections. The process would entail role-based *ad hoc* collaboration, not confrontational declaration-verification dialectics.

The Initial Report would be respected by the IAEA as a document prepared in good faith, serving as the basis needed by the IAEA for starting to create its Initial Inventory for the Republic of South Africa. The format for the Initial Report was developed to that end, during this very negotiation/technical visit.

The Initial Report was fully fit for this purpose and, though the first of its kind, has proven to be also the best of its kind thus far in the history of IAEA non-proliferation safeguards.

10.4. The invitation to an informal meeting after “negotiation,” to tune the effect

At an informal meeting held after the negotiations proper, the South African side expressed concern about the possible negative impact of the bad experiences the IAEA had had with Iraq. With reference to the IAEA's problems with Iraq, I underlined the importance of differentiating – drawing such comparisons would not be relevant and should not be accepted.

South Africa and the IAEA were entrusted with initiation implementation of the CSA in good faith. There was no justification for the IAEA to come to South Africa and start talking about its problems with Iraq, whether as an excuse for a new kind of approach and policy or otherwise.

The ensuing conduct had to be compatible with the letter **and** spirit of the CSA. It was reiterated that the undertaking was a cooperative one, to be implemented too, from the very outset, in good faith. It was understood that we had to be present and vigilant throughout the implementation process so as to be able to mitigate the risks of any challenging situations that might emerge in the course of this complex undertaking.

The South African side concluded this informal session by noting its readiness to advise the President of the Republic of South Africa to send the delegation to Vienna with a mandate to sign the standard CSA with the IAEA during the IAEA General Conference, on September 16. In the end, I referred to the Kalahari Desert as a metaphor and stated, “Let the truth begin unfolding naturally, as the flowers in the Kalahari during the coming October.” Mission accomplished, I reported success to ElBaradei. He confirmed this, and I returned to Vienna.

11. Summary remarks and some recommendations for consideration

What we have accomplished thus far may well be the very best that we have been able to achieve. However, there is a need to introduce major improvements in our ability to cope with the dangers of today, to mitigate the risks endangering the very survival of humanity and humankind. Doing so is fully possible.

Uncertain “dark times” are challenging our normal coping strategies, calling into question the effectiveness of existing practices, capabilities, and competencies. The usual approaches and practices cannot be efficient for assessing and addressing some of the major challenges, on account of their inherent complexity. Existing policies and operation practices cannot be adapted in a timely and efficient manner to a continuously evolving threat. The professional competencies and skills are necessary but are far from sufficient; in addition, dialogue and ethical action competence and associated skills are required, to play an important role in responding to contemporary security challenges.

Administration needs to be understood more as philosophy in action, and – particularly in the domain of confidence-building – the role of ethicality must become recognized, well-understood, and an integral part of the knowledge-creation process that provides premises for the decision-making and action. Dialogue and ethical competencies are of paramount importance if we are to make sure that decisions are made and action taken in good faith.

When we address new and complex situations, credibility is always at risk. Therefore, we must ensure that we do not run a high risk of showing evidence of non-objectivity and of incompetence, including deficits in ethicality. At a very personal level, attention should be directed to considering task complexity, including the nature of the challenges, meanings, motives, and behavior. Certain qualities of character are called for: a forbearing spirit is of

help, as are patience, refraining from enforcement, controlling oneself when provoked, and not giving in. This is the kind of balance required between generosity and integrity.

The International Atomic Energy Agency implemented its safeguards successfully in solid cooperation with the Republic of South Africa. It worked, and South Africa went on record as the first state to have eliminated its nuclear weapons and associated program, signed the NPT, cooperated in implementation of all (some of them novel) required measures, and subsequently gained non-nuclear-weapon state status. All this marked a first in the history of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, yet I am not sure whether the lessons from this success story have been duly understood and learned.

There is hope that we can learn and improve our ability to cope with complex and conflict-ridden situations. We can trust that evolution has given us a survival strategy, there is wisdom within the state of soul, there is a will, and there is knowledge that can empower and guide the action of the “one” to tackle the dangers that loom large – especially now. This basic trust in life may well give us hope. However, if we are not willing or not able to exploit that wisdom and knowledge and to act accordingly, the troubles are going to loom even larger.

References

- ElBaradei, Mohamed (2011). *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*. UK.
- Rautjärvi, Juha (2014). Initial Inventory Negotiations between the IAEA and the Republic of South Africa: Personal views to Nuclear Exit.
- Stumpf, Waldo (1995), Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme. Presentation at the conference 50 Years after Hiroshima, organized by the Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo (USPID) in Castiglione della Pescaia, Italy, on September 28 to October 2, 1995. Available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm> (most recently accessed on June 15, 2017).
- UN Security Council (1991). Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991). Available at <http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/documents/resolutions/s-res-687.pdf> (most recently accessed on June 15, 2017).
- von Baeckmann, Adolf; Dillon, Garry; & Perricos, Demetrius (1995). Nuclear Verification in South Africa. *IAEA Bulletin* 1995(1), pp. 42–48.
- von Wielligh, Nic & von Wielligh–Steyn, Lydia (2015). *The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme*. Pretoria, South Africa.

8. GLOBAL ETHICS AND ETHICALITY IN PEACEKEEPING – EXPERIENCES FROM THE FIELD

Rolf Kullberg & Tuomo Mero

1. Introduction

“It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.”

This famous sentence by Dag Hammarskjöld, 1961 Nobel Peace Prize winner and the second United Nations Secretary-General, describes and summarizes well the dilemma of the UN in the context of international crisis management and intervention efforts, global ethicality, and ethics dilemmas facing individual military actors. The aim with this chapter is to discuss the disconnect between high-level political aspirations (at UN General Assembly or Security Council level, for example) and individuals’ perspectives, along with the ethics problems in peacekeepers on the ground. A note of clarification is needed here: for purposes of this discussion, the authors will refer to these high-level UN (or predecessors’) political aspirations as “global ethics.” What kinds of factors determine how an individual peacekeeper and soldier understands his or her role in bearing the associated global responsibility?

The Brahimi Report, released in early 2000, outlined the notion of “responsibility to protect,” or R2P, and laid down a new theoretical foundation for global ethics. The international community was described as having a moral obligation to act decisively even if the local government or security institutions are unwilling or unable to prevent a catastrophe. Slowly but steadily, this principle has matured into the concept of protection of civilians (POC). Operating under a Security Council resolution and Chapter VII, a peacekeeping force now has a stronger mandate to act than ever before, but does it have the means to do so? A theoretical foundation is not enough, for the credible execution of appropriate tasks requires sufficient resources.

2. Protection of civilians

From the very first day of the war, South Lebanon had been under heavy shelling and bombing by the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF) and Israeli Air Force (IAF). Infrastructure in southern Lebanon was badly damaged: main roads, bridges, and intersections were destroyed; Beirut Airport and the Port of Beirut damaged; power plants destroyed; etc. This led to a situation wherein residents who were able to leave headed for more secure areas in the northern part of the country. Many people, however, some of them women and children, remained in their badly damaged villages.

In the second week of the war, the village of Maroun al-Ras was under heavy shelling by IDF artillery. A large group of locals, mainly women and children, some of whom were bleeding, appeared at the gate of Patrol Base Ras in search of shelter. The United Nations Military

Observer (UNMO) team contacted me by cell phone and asked whether to let them enter the base. One could easily hear the children crying and the sound of continuous shelling. After a couple seconds of thinking, I gave permission to let them onto the patrol base.

The size of the group was 34 people, most of them women and children as noted above, but there were also four adult males, 25–30 years of age. They were all taken into the shelter that had been built for five military observers. Some first aid, water, and food were given to this unfortunate group.

This incident was followed from the Israeli side of the Blue Line. After a while, when the locals were in the shelter and the four observers sitting in the patrol base's kitchen (on the first floor, at ground level) because they could not fit in the shelter, an IDF main battle tank (Merkava Mk 4) used its main weapon system to fire a dummy grenade through the patrol base's operations room (on the second floor), causing a lot of property damage. There were large holes left in both of the walls, just beside the black lettering "UN." The four UNMOs sitting downstairs were shocked. What had happened? Why did they shoot?

In the course of the following night, those four local adults left the base. The other members of the group stayed for two days and returned to their village, most of them to be evacuated from the south. Most probably, the Israelis considered those four adult males to be Hezbollah fighters and it was because the UN gave them shelter and cover that the "reminder" shot was fired.

Was my decision to protect the civilians in this situation ethically sustainable? It was clearly stated in the mission rules and regulations that no unauthorized personnel were permitted inside UN compounds. Did we save some civilian lives? Most probably yes. Did we risk our own security? Yes! Did I ask for permission from my superiors? No – there was no time!

With new or renewed missions with POC mandates in Congo (MONUSCO), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the peacekeeping force was authorized to neutralize, disarm, or disrupt those who gravely threaten human rights and the execution of the mandate. This has proven to be a two-edged sword: when deployed early and given adequate resources, the forces have, on several occasions, been able to prevent a repeat of the tragedies of the mid-1990s. The spoilers of peace have been forced to stop their disruptive actions, an outcome that has at the same time opened a window for the political process to move further. However, this window of opportunity closes sooner than one might expect, and the deadly spiral starts again. Regrettably, after that point, both military and civilian workers with the UN, along with its installations, became the primary target for the opponents of peace. And that is something the UN is not prepared for. Also, when this window closes, the individual peacekeeper is left very alone and vulnerable on the ground, as the following case study illustrates.

3. The UN as primary target: The destruction of Patrol Base Khiam

On July 25, the whole northern part of our area of operations had been under heavy fire, subjected to both artillery and air raids. Patrol Base Khiam had reported several firing closes in the course of the day. The security situation had been getting worse and worse.

I had requested permission from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force commander to evacuate all patrol bases. That request was denied: all Observer Group Lebanon patrol bases and UNIFIL "UN Position" facilities should continue their tasks and should observe and report.

In late afternoon, Patrol Base Khiam reported that the base had taken a direct hit from four 155 mm artillery rounds. A lot of damage to infrastructure and vehicles was caused. The patrol vehicles could not be started, and the shelter door was damaged in such a way that the UNMOs could not close it properly.

The PB Khiam shelter was the strongest underground shelter in the whole Middle East. Thus far in the war, the UNMOs had stated that everything was OK and that they felt safe. After the direct hit, they informed me that they did not feel safe anymore. It was agreed that the base would be evacuated by Indian Battalion armored personnel carriers (APCs) at 0700 hrs the following day. The team started the evacuation preparations promptly. The time was 1830.

In the early days of the war, I had ordered that operations rooms be manned 24/7 and that a radio check be conducted every 30 minutes. Patrol Base Khiam could not be reached by radio in the check at 1900 hrs. The neighboring base tried to relay the message but to no avail. Also, all the individual cell phones were dead (later it was discovered that an Israeli F-15 fighter had dropped a GPS-guided bunker-buster bomb, which had hit the base shelter).

We informed the UNIFIL operations staff that Patrol Base Khiam could not be reached by any means of communications. A rescue team from the Indian Battalion was ordered to go to PB Khiam to investigate the situation. On account of the heavy shelling, that team did not reach the base until 2230 hrs. When it did, the personnel reported that the gate was closed and the building had collapsed. We told them to drive through the gate and start to investigate what had happened.

The first body was found at 2355 hrs, two bodies the following day, and the remains of the last body after eight days in all. The bomb had hit the PB building and, with a delayed fuse, had penetrated the shelter by the time it exploded. All the UNMOs were killed instantly.

Four of my officers were dead! Why? Why didn't I evacuate them earlier? That is a question I have asked myself several times. This incident was investigated by an independent board of inquiry. It was stated that I could not have acted differently. Everybody told me the same thing. Still, even today, 10 years after this horrible incident, sometimes when I look in the mirror I ask myself "WHY?"

One has to bear in mind that even if the UN and its global ethics many times get blamed for inefficiency and unhurried actions, this union is as strong as its 193 nations are. The nations and their national politics make the UN, not *vice versa*. That involves willingness to commit funds and resources. The annual peacekeeping budget (approx. USD 9 billion) is less than one percent of a year's global arms expenditure. However, building the UN's military peacekeeping muscle is not enough on its own. It needs to be more widely recognized in every capital that there is no military solution for complex crises or contemporary conflict. The military is needed but in a concerted undertaking in clear conjunction with political, humanitarian, and economic actions. If the local people don't have everything they need for basic survival, such as water, food, and shelter, they lack what is most important: hope for a better future for their children and themselves. People desire roads, bridges, electricity, and a police officer they can trust. Addressing these needs should be the cross-cutting objective for coordinated efforts both for global ethics and for each individual military peacekeeper. But what is the framework for authorizing it?

Ethics in general should describe what is right or wrong. Military ethics cannot be isolated from overall ethicality, as the military constantly interacts with surrounding society. The use of military force must therefore be monitored by a civilian authority – i.e., be “under political control.” The primacy of politics, wherein the end states and objectives for the military are set forth by democratically elected governments or government institutions, must exist for the multinational force as well. In the case of the UN and global ethics, this primacy requirement must form the normative foundation for each peacekeeping soldier.

4. The value of human life: The wounding of an Italian military observer (a UNMO)

After two weeks of heavy fighting in South Lebanon, Patrol Base Ras was still manned by four military observers. The task remained that of observing and reporting whenever possible. Most of the time was spent in the shelter.

The area of Maroun al-Ras was once again under heavy fire from IDF artillery and subject to IAF bombing. The four UNMOs had spent almost the whole day in the shelter when they realized that, to keep the communication network up and running and lights on in the shelter, they had to refuel the generator that was providing electricity for the base.

An Italian captain left the shelter to refuel the generator. On his way, he was shot with an assault rifle fired from the neighboring building. The bullet hit him in the stomach and exited through his back. After hearing the shot and the scream of their wounded colleague, the three other UNMOs rushed out and started emergency first aid and a call for medical evacuation.

When the evacuation request reached headquarters, the initial decision was to send an ambulance APC from the nearest UNIFIL command post. That vehicle never reached Patrol Base Ras, because of heavy shelling. The UNMOs had requested immediate action because the casualty was losing a lot of blood. After this, UNIFIL headquarters contacted the Israeli authorities for evacuation assistance. It was agreed that a helicopter would be sent close to

the patrol base, on the other side of the Blue Line and the Israeli-built technical fence. Close to the landing zone was an old gate in the fence that had not been in use for years. The IDF promised to open that gate for evacuation.

The UNMO team decided to use one armored patrol vehicle for evacuation purposes. The casualty was put in the back seat of the vehicle. When nearing the agreed spot, they realized that there was an old minefield on the Lebanese side, just in front of the gate. The team stopped and contacted me, asking whether to go ahead or not. I asked whether there were any paths or tracks leading to the fence, and the team answered that some old tracks were visible. Again I was asked to give a “go” or “no-go” order. I had a few seconds to think. My answer was to use those tracks and go. “Roger,” was the team’s reply.

The vehicle was driven through the minefield and through the gate to the Israeli side, where the helicopter was waiting. The casualty was taken to Rambam Hospital, in Haifa, for emergency surgery, and his life was saved.

Did we risk the lives of the three other UNMOs by driving through the minefield? Probably so. What if we had waited for more secure routes to the landing zone to be found but lost the life of the Italian captain in the process?

As we have witnessed in the past, global ethics consists merely of learning from grave mistakes. The perspective has been too narrow in the past, and the system has been unable to adapt in changing situations and circumstances, at both strategic and individual level. The task of a commander, staff officer, or peacekeeper is to understand what the dimensions of this ethical deliberation are and how it is eventually defined and to ensure that those dimensions fit the specific peacekeeping mission or operation at hand. Understanding its dimensions from your own perspective is a good starting point. Perhaps we can make saving humanity from hell a bit easier that way. Maybe each peacekeeper can thus learn to understand better what is the right way for him or her to act in a situation that might arise later. Maybe humanity and ethicality on the part of the actors can be actualized in this way.

9. UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Helena Ranta

“Srebrenica, Summer 1996

There were places among the crowded trees where the birdsong dropped away to nothing, shaded clearings with a sound vacuum: once you had stepped in no noise could reach you from the outside world except the rustling summer breeze, and you did not want to listen to that too carefully, for if you were alone your mind began to play tricks and it was more than just the grass that you heard whispering.”

Anthony Loyd, in “My War Gone By, I Miss It So”

1. Introduction

In 1996, when completing the final report to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on forensic investigations from the mission to Srebrenica earlier in the summer, I introduced the idea of extending human rights to the deceased in the form of identification, dignity in the handling of human remains, and burial. This approach was not considered acceptable by the legal experts at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the text was amended accordingly. Yet the view I expressed was already becoming widely accepted within the forensic science community, having its roots in the code of ethics of forensic science. It is also partially based on the legal framework of international humanitarian law (specifically, articles 32–34 of Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949; 1975).

The investigations related to Srebrenica were my first assignment in areas of conflict. Later missions have taken me and the Finnish Forensic Expert Team (FFET) to Peru, Colombia, Libya, Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq, Nepal, Chechnya, and Kosovo. In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted, without a vote, a resolution on human rights and forensic science (Human Rights Resolution 2005/26). That resolution explicitly addresses the dignified handling, proper management, and appropriate disposal of human remains and the needs of the surviving families. For those who have lost loved ones and may have been subjected to discrimination, sexual abuse, torture, or other violence themselves, it is imperative to learn the fate of the missing family members. They have a right to know, in order to be able to close the door on the past and look forward. The truth will also aid them in reconstruction of their broken society and, one hopes, in reconciliation. While truth and reconciliation commissions have an important role, they can never replace legal proceedings against the perpetrators.

The human rights of the dead have been discussed in a few articles, and the issue was raised at a recently public event, held on March 22, 2017, at the London School of Economics: “Migrant Deaths at European Borders: States’ Duties to Identify and the Rights of Families

to Know.” Also, an article by Helena Ranta and K. T. Takamaa (2006) addresses the human rights of the dead from a medicolegal point of view, while A. Rosenblatt (2010) has studied the ultimate philosophical foundations of the issue. He completely rejects the idea that dead bodies have human rights.

2. The case study of Račak

In January 1999, 40–45 bodies were recovered in the village of Račak, Kosovo, and its vicinity by the villagers and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) verifiers. There was unhindered access to the sites, and the bodies were taken to the local mosque. Two days later, Serbian troops entered the village and took the bodies to the morgue in Priština. Local experts had started the medicolegal autopsies before the Finnish experts arrived in Kosovo. When a proposal was made to sign a joint report, the Finnish team hence refused to do so. The documentation was taken to the Department of Forensic Medicine at the University of Helsinki, and the final reports were submitted to the authorities in March 1999. While the work was being done, the Serbian Minister of Health visited the morgue and asked for more detailed information, referring to our collegiality. Also, the head of the OSCE Verification Mission wished for the team to confirm his view of the perpetrators. I want to emphasize that comments on who the perpetrators were, which party to the conflict they represented, or why certain victims were executed are not within the professional sphere of expertise and competence of a forensics expert. Forensic evidence has its limitations and cannot on its own determine liability or guilt. Only through impartial legal proceedings before a national court or international tribunal can these judgments be made.

After the NATO air strikes that began five days after submission of the reports, in autumn 1999 and spring 2000, scene investigations were conducted at Račak and the results were submitted to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). There were several efforts to learn more about the results. For example, the Russian ambassador to the UN requested that I appear before the Security Council to give more information, but this request was turned down. Then, the Russian ambassador to the Netherlands turned to the ICTY to request the autopsy reports and the summary of the scene investigations. The tribunal was ready to hand over the documentation on the condition that I give my permission. I found this unacceptable. Finally, the Russian Foreign Minister published an article in a peer-reviewed scientific journal that reported falsely on my written statements. In a letter to the editor, I then addressed the factual mistakes in the article. I had been called to testify to the ICTY in the capacity of a chamber witness. This involved work in cross-examination by both the prosecutor and the defense, in addition to the right for either to consult me. I also assisted the prosecutor in cross-examination of the key witness for the defense in the Milošević case.

I have received death threats and hate letters over the years with reference to Račak. The scene investigations, recovery of forensic evidence (bullets, bullet fragments, cartridge cases, and human materials), and subsequent analysis – including DNA profiling – rule out the possibility of there having been a “set-up” in the village. An expert has to follow the scientific standards of his or her profession and refrain from making any political inferences and judgments. Regrettably, it appears to be difficult for the media, the public, the international

community, politicians, and diplomats to acknowledge this principle, even though it is based on an established code of conduct and may even have been affirmed as a legal obligation.

There was great attention from the media in January 1999. The local pathologist granted a journalist from *Paris Match* access to the autopsy theater and permission to take photographs there. The magazine later published these, thereby violating the privacy of the victims, not to mention the issue of the families' emotions. Another example is the publication of the autopsy reports by *Berliner Zeitung*. Only a few copies were submitted to the corresponding authorities, and they were individually marked. Autopsy findings related to individuals should never be made public, and this is a matter regulated both by courtesy and via media standards of ethics.

Finally, three members of the FFET published an article in a peer-reviewed scientific journal that was based in part on the autopsy reports. They had neither participated in the scene investigations nor had access to the results. Also, they failed to inform the team leader of the article. Good academic practice hence was violated, and confusion arose within the scientific community.

3. Dignity in handling of human remains

In fall 2000, members of the FFET participated in the forensic investigations in Orahovac under the auspices of the ICTY. Determination of personal identity is an important part of this work, in which INTERPOL guidelines were followed. The operations protocol adopted at the morgue listed specific bone samples to be taken. These included the pubic symphysis, which is exceptional. It later became evident that the bone samples had been removed from the country and used in scientific research and training. The issue was brought up at a meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and forensic anthropologists were involved in the heated discussion that ensued. The Finnish team had participated in the collection of the bone samples under the impression that they were being taken only for identification purposes and would be returned to individual-specific body bags. Therefore, a letter was submitted to the ICTY explaining our role in the procedure.

During the investigations in Thailand after the tsunami in late December 2004, one national disaster-victim identification team removed both upper and lower jaws, allegedly to allow easier documentation of dental findings. This procedure is unnecessary and should be avoided. Some of the excised jaws were stored without proper identification in boxes marked for DNA analysis. It should be emphasized that the recommendation was for only selected teeth and/or piece of femur to be taken for DNA analysis. The practice applied caused problems in the repatriation process.

4. Closing words

There are numerous ethics-related and professional challenges encountered by forensic scientists today in conflict zones. International collaboration has been based on harmonization of training and investigation methods, in combination with immunity of forensic experts. On account of the complex nature of each conflict and the diverse political views on it, interference in forensic investigations must be rendered impossible. Also, forensics experts have to distance themselves from any clandestine missions. Only the results of properly conducted forensic investigations, maintaining an appropriate chain of custody, may be accepted as evidence in legal proceedings. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) gives hope of ending the era of impunity.

References

- Ranta, Helena & Takamaa, K. T. (2007). Crimes against Humanity and Other War Crimes. In: Tim Thompson & Sue Black (eds.), *Forensic Human Identification* (pp. 445–456). CRC Press.
- Rosenblatt, A. (2010). International Forensic Investigations and the Human Rights of the Dead. *Human Rights Quarterly* 32(4), pp. 921–950.

THE AUTHORS

Reijo E. Heinonen is an emeritus professor with a PhD in theology and MA in pedagogy. He began his historical studies at Germany's University of Tübingen, researching the German Church struggle of 1933–1945, with a focus on the problems of anti-Semitic indoctrination, and continued with studies of the Lutheran Church and Judaism. He now works on inter-religion, intercultural communication in conflict situations. As chair of the Peace Education Institute in Helsinki, he worked on renewal of the theoretical basis of peace education, and he did dedicated practical and theoretical teacher training at the universities of Helsinki and Turku. Under the Roman Herzog initiative, he established the international master's program *Islam and the West* (1999–) at the University of Joensuu (today University of Eastern Finland). In 2002–2003, he was its founding dean for the theological faculty, with departments of Western and Eastern (Orthodox) traditions. Publications include work on modern history and global ethics, along with contributions to the UN Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg (2002) and in Rio (2012).

V.A. Heiskanen is Docent of International Law, University of Helsinki. He has published extensively on international law and regulation, and the philosophy of international law.

Vincent F. Hendricks is Professor of Formal Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. He is also Elite Researcher for the Danish State and the director of the Center for Information and Bubble Studies (CIBS), funded by the Carlsberg Foundation. Hendricks is the author of many books, among them *Infostorms* (Springer Nature, 2016), *Mainstream and Formal Epistemology* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), and *The Convergence of Scientific Knowledge* (Springer, 2001). In addition, he has authored or edited numerous papers and books on bubbles studies, formal epistemology, methodology, and logic. He was Editor-in-Chief of *Synthese* and *Synthese Library* in 2005–2015.

Rolf Kullberg is a retired Finnish Army officer who spent almost his entire military career dealing with international affairs, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Lt. Col. (ret.) Kullberg has completed five overseas missions in the Middle East and Balkans (both UN- and NATO-run), served for 10 years in the Finnish Ministry of Defence's UN division, and spent two years with the Finnish Defence Command PSO Branch. In addition, he was the first commander of the Peace Support Operations Training Center upon its establishment, in 2007. Since his retirement, in 2009, Kullberg has worked under contract as an instructor for various courses at the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre. His current position is Chief Instructor for United Nations Military Experts on Mission Course (UNMEM).

Tuomo Mero has 21 years' professional experience in the military. He has gained strategic- and operations-level planning expertise at Finnish Navy component and HQ level and at International Joint Command Kabul, ISAF, Afghanistan (2010–2011). Additionally, Mero served for three years, in 2012–2015, as a strategic planner with the Military Planning Service, United Nations Headquarters (DPKO/UNNY), in New York. These positions have

given him excellent opportunities to develop his planning competencies for Finnish homeland defense and in contemporary crisis-management environments, both of which require a holistic civil–military approach and collaborative planning. Mero’s command positions extend to battalion level: in his most recent assignment (2016–2017), he commanded the Amphibious Coastal Battalion for Uusimaa Brigade in Tammisaari, Finland. Earlier command positions include unit-level command at the Isosaari artillery fortress (2005–2007) and duties of a training officer and course director for Naval Academy cadets (1999–2002). Furthermore, Mero served as UN Military Observer in the Middle East (UNTSO) in 2002–2003. He is now on assignment to study at the National Defense University, in Washington, DC, for the 2017–2018 academic year.

Professor Helena Ranta has made her long and significant academic career at the University of Helsinki. She is a Finnish forensic dentist who has been a leader or member of several research groups of Finnish Forensic Expert Team that have contributed to various international forensic investigations of conflict situations.

Juha Rautjärvi has worked in the field of nuclear non-proliferation since 1975. That career started with four years at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland (STUK) to establish a national safeguard system. For the next 20 years, he worked at the International Atomic Energy Agency, with 10 of those years in the Safeguards Inspection Division as Head of Operations for the section. In 2000, he returned to Finland and to STUK, where he acted as a project manager responsible for bilateral and European-Union-funded projects in the area of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security and safeguards. He left STUK in January 2015 and continues his work in the area of societal security as a senior partner in a recently established company.

Jarmo Toiskallio, PhD, graduated from the Finnish military academy in 1969 and then the University of Turku, where he has held title of adjunct professor since 1994 in the area of adult and higher education. Since 1994 he also became senior lecturer at the Finnish National Defence University and after that he served as a full professor of military pedagogy during 1999–2009. His academic specialization is in philosophy of education, theory of adult and higher education, and military pedagogy. Lt. Col. (ret.) Toiskallio’s career as a teacher, educator, and researcher covers three areas: academia, health-care training, and the military. Currently, his area of primary interest is ethicality as a constituent of human existence. In the field of military ethics, he has been the editor of *Cultures, Values and Future Soldiers* (Helsinki, 2002); *Identity, Ethics and Soldiership* (Helsinki, 2004); and *Ethical Education in the Military. What, How and Why in the 21st Century?* (Helsinki, 2007).

Joachim S. Wiewiura is PhD Fellow in Philosophy at the Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen where he works on conceptions of the public space in relation to political philosophy, architecture, and information structures. He holds an MA in Philosophy from the University of Copenhagen with electives in economics and economic history from Uppsala University, Sweden. He has also been educated at European College of Liberal Arts, Berlin, and has taught philosophy of science at the Niels Bohr Institute as well as philosophy of technology at IT University of Denmark.

Veli-Matti Värri, PhD, is a philosopher at University of Tampere, where he is Professor of Education. His work, with the School of Education, focuses on philosophy of education and teacher education. He has been a docent in ethical education at Finnish National Defence University since 2007. His expertise encompasses the central issues in educational philosophy and theory, teacher education, ethics of education, and philosophy of dialogue. Most of Värri's publications deal with the fundamental questions of educational ethics and critique of instrumental rationality in education. His 1997 monograph *Hyvä kasvatusta – kasvatusta hyvään* (“Good Education – Education for Good”) reached its fifth edition in 2004. With his current project, Värri's main interest is in re-conceptualizing the ontological, socio-cultural, and ethical reference points for constituting moral identity in the ecological sphere of late-modern education.

The editor of the volume, Arto Mutanen, received his PhD degree at the University of Helsinki and is Docent at the Finnish National Defence University.

The Finnish Navy's Commander Jukka-Pekka Schroderus currently works as the Commandant of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.



Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
P.O.Box 7, 00861 HELSINKI
Finland

Tel. +358 299 800
fincent.fi

ISBN 978-951-25-2927-8 (pbk)
ISBN 978-951-25-2928-5 (PDF)
ISSN 1797-8629 (print)
ISSN 2489-4788 (online)



Puolustusvoimat

The Finnish Defence Forces
puolustusvoimat.fi